Pace University

DigitalCommons@Pace
Pace Law Faculty Publications

School of Law

1-1-2007

To Disclose or Not to Disclose. That is the Question for the
Corporate Fiduciary Who is Also a Pension Plan Fiduciary Under
ERISA: Resolving the Conflict of Duty
Shelby D. Green
Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Legal Ethics and Professional
Responsibility Commons

Recommended Citation
Shelby D. Green, To Disclose or Not to Disclose? That Is the Question for the Corporate Fiduciary Who Is
Also A Pension Plan Fiduciary Under ERISA: Resolving the Conflict of Duty, 9 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 831
(2007), http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/299/.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace.
For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

To Disclose or Not to Disclose. That is the
Question for the Corporate Fiduciary Who is also
a Pension Plan Fiduciary Under ERISA:
Resolving the Conflict of duty
by Shelby D. Green ∗

CEO Ken Lay: “Now is the time to buy Enron shares.”

I. Introduction
The fall of the Enron Corporation in 2001 was a collapse of breathtaking
proportions.

A giant among the nation’s enterprises would be reduced to

shambles. There were many losers along with the company, including most
prominently the employee-shareholders, whose pension plans consisted largely of
Enron stock. 1 Why did they follow such a foolish course? Because that is what
the company required and urged--even on the eve of the collapse. 2
The public reaction was a massive sell off of Enron stock, causing a
plunge in the stock price from a high of $90 to $1, in just months, eventually
∗

Associate Professor , Pace University School of Law, J.D. , Georgetown University Law Center,
B.S., Towson State University.
1
Sharon Reece, “Enron: The Final Straw & How to Build Pensions of Brick, 41 Dug. L. Rev. 69
(2002).
2
It seems that the company had entered into several clear conflict of interest transactions with an
officer, which were hopelessly losing propositions for the company, but beneficial for the officer,
but which where not disclosed on the company’s regular books. When the deals were finally
brought to light, it was revealed that the company ad overstated its revenues by some $
billion. There were several other such shenanigans going on with the company that contrived to
present a false image of the company’s financial state. See Reece, supra note 2, at ----.
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sending the company into bankruptcy. But alas, Enron does not stand alone in the
annals of fallen corporate giants; many others would and continue in Enron’s
wake. 3

In virtually all these cases, non-employee shareholders commenced suit

seeking to hold corporations and their directors liable under the securities laws for
accounting misdeeds. 4 Employee-shareholders have also sued companies and

3

[newspaper articles announcing the scandals] A General Accounting Office study found that
between 1997 and 2002, 10 percent of the listed corporations in the country restated their financial
statements at least once, that financial information originally certified by their independent
auditors as correct and in compliance with Generally Accepted Accounting Practices “GAAP”
turned out to be false. U.S. Gen. Acct’g Office, Rept to the Chairman, Cmte on Banking, Housing
& Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, Financial Statement Restatements: Trends, Market Impacts,
Regulatory Responses and Remaining Challenges 4 (2002).
4
In the aftermath of the scandals, came the Sarbanes-Oxley Public Company Accounting Reform
and Investor Protection Act of 2002, law which imposed new and rigorous accounting review
procedures. Among other things, the Act established a new regulatory body with jurisdiction over
auditing standards (requiring registration of public accounting firms); required review by a
corporation’s audit committee of all audit and non-audit services provided to the company,
prohibited accounting firms from providing a variety of non-audit services (including
bookkeeping, financial information systems design and implementation, appraisal or valuation
services, fairness opinions, actuarial services, internal audit outsourcing services, management
functions or human resources, broker or dealer, investment adviser or investment banking
services, legal services and expert services unrelated to the audit), required the company to set up
an audit committee composed entirely of independent board members, one of whom is qualified as
a financial expert; required the audit committee to have direct responsibility for the appointment,
compensation, and oversight of the work of the independent auditor of the company, with
authority to engage independent counsel and other advisers, requiring the audit committee to
establish procedures for the receipt and evaluation of anonymous submission by employees of
concern regarding “questionable accounting or auditing matters.” The act also mandates that both
CEO’s and CFO’s make detailed certifications, in connection with each filing of a company’s
periodic reports, including that the signing officer has reviewed the report, based on the officer’s
knowledge, the report does not contain any material misstatement or omission and “the financial
statements and other financial information included in the report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition and results of operation of the issuer as of and for, the periods
presented in the report.” The signing officers are responsible for establishing and maintaining
internal controls and design such internal controls as necessary to ensure that material information
relating to the issuer is made known to such officers during the reporting period and have
disclosed to the company’s auditors and to the audit committee all significant deficiencies in the
design or operation of internal controls as well as any fraud, whether or not material, that involves
management or other employees who have a significant role in the issuer’s internal controls.
Another part of the act bars an issuer from directly or indirectly extending credit or making,
renewing, or arranging for a “personal loan” to any director or executive officer. The act also
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insiders who were pension plan fiduciaries to recover for losses to their pension
plans. They alleged breach of fiduciary duty by the plan trustees in continuing to
fund the plan with the company’s stock and for not divesting the plan of the
company’s stock despite knowledge of its worthlessness. What the employeeshareholders allege the pension plan fiduciaries should have done would place
them in a fine legal dilemma. To divest a pension plan of the company’s stock on
the basis of inside information about the company’s financial irregularities would
mean trading it to a purchaser on the open market without the same information.
The plan pension fiduciary is thus in a double bind: as a pension plan fiduciary, it
has a duty under the law to act to protect the assets of the plan, but as an insider of
the corporation whose shares are being traded, it has a duty not to trade on the
basis of material non-public information. To trade without disclosing would
violate the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The failure to trade would seem to

called for new disclosure of changes in financial condition or operations on a “rapid and current
basis”, including all off-balance sheet transactions, arrangements, obligations (including
contingent obligations) and other relationships that might have a ‘material current or future
effect” on the financial health of the company. The act instructs the SEC to develop a new
disclosure document called an “internal control report”, which report must be set forth in the
company’s annual report to the SEC, which “shall state the responsibility of management for
establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial
reporting. Section 404(a). This report must also contain management’s assessment of the
effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures, which the audit firm must then attest
to. Section 406 also requires the SEC to issue rules requiring public companies to disclose if it
“has adopted a code of ethics for senior financial officers” or to justify why it has failed to do so.
“Code of ethics” is defined as such standards as are “reasonably necessary to promote honest and
ethical conduct including the ethical handling of actual or apparent conflicts of interest between
personal and professional relationships, “full and fair disclosure, and “compliance with applicable
governmental rules and regulations.” SECTION------------------

3

violate the duties imposed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (“ERISA”). 5
The courts considering what appears to be an irreconcilable conflict of
duty and liability have themselves taken conflicting views. The rulings on both
sides of the issue are unsatisfying in that they offer no clear policy basis for one
position over the other and provide the fiduciary and insider little guidance on the
proper course to take.
This article examines this seemingly irreconcilable conflict faced by the
fiduciary of a pension plan who is also a corporate fiduciary, to disclose or not
disclose material, inside information to plan participants, that would be used by
the plan participants to divest investments in company stock, but without
disclosing the same to persons on the other side of these trades. The article begins
with a general discussion of the regulation of trade in securities and the history of
the insider trading laws under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Then in Part
III, I discuss the soundness of the prohibition against insider trading, In Part IV, I
discuss the duties imposed on pension plan fiduciaries and how they appear to
conflict with the corporate fiduciary’s duty to disclose material non-public
information or to abstain from trading. In Part V, I discuss the varying positions
taken by the courts that have considered the issue. Finally in Part VI, I discuss
ways of reconciling the two duties.
5

29 U.S.C.§ 1109.
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II. The Regulation of Trade in Securities
The need for regulation of trade in securities is based upon the perception
that securities are different from most other commodities.

Securities are

intangibles, and thus not susceptible to the kind of physical and concrete
examination one would conduct for an investment, say, in real estate or precious
jewels.

With intangibles, the value of an investment must necessarily depend on

information from the company and from persons with access to company
information about them, e.g., company plans, operational philosophy,
management skill and experience.

But, human nature being what it is, a seller

of an item, is inclined to intentionally and otherwise to emphasize or exaggerate
positives and conceal or gloss over negatives. Hence, the need for some standards
for truthfulness.
Another oft-stated reason for regulating securities is that the securities
market is critical in a capitalist economy that allocates scarce capital among
competing users, such that any serious disruption could cause a national
depression. 6 Considering the very large incidence of investment in securities by
the American citizenry, public distrust of the securities market as a result of
pervasive fraudulent practices could have serious consequences for the economy
as a whole.
A. Formal Disclosure as a Basic Requirement of the Securities Laws
6

CHOPER, COFFEE, & GILSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 308 (6th
ed. 2004).

5

The Securities Act of 1933 was passed by Congress in the wake of the
stock market crash of 1929 and during the first 100 days of Roosevelt’s New Deal
Plan. It was intended to achieve “truth in securities” by regulating the initial
public offering process of securities by corporations. The Congressional hearings
leading up to the enactment revealed numerous instances in which high risk and
sometimes worthless securities were offered by underwriters and dealers to
uninformed investors, with only minimal or no disclosure. 7 The “truth in
securities” law had two basic objectives: to require that investors be provided
with material information concerning securities offered for public sale and to
prevent misrepresentation, deceit, and other fraud in the sale of securities. 8
Thus, the basic strategy of the 1933 Securities Act was to specify
mandatory disclosure documents-- the prospectus and registration statement. 9
The act prohibits the sale or offer for sale of any security that has not been
registered with the SEC.

Registration is intended to provide adequate and

accurate disclosure of material facts concerning the company and the securities it
7

H.R. Rep. No. 85-73, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933). In recommending passage of the bill to the
1933 act, Roosevelt emphasized that by putting “the burden of telling the whole truth on the
seller”, the proposed act “should give impetus to honest dealing in securities and thereby bring
back public confidence.” At the time Roosevelt made this statement, the concern about public
confidence was great. “New corporate securities which had equaled $6.5 billion in 1927, $6.9 in
1928, and $9.8 billion in 1929, had fallen to $644 million in 1932 (and would equal $380 million
in 1933).” Seligman, at----. In recent times, between 1952 and 1983, there was a decided
reduction in the number of small investors in the stock markets, some say the result of the widely
held belief that institutional investors received “inside information” that small investors did not
have. Seligman, at -----.
8
Securities and Exchange Commission: The Work of the SEC (June 1997), http://www.sec.gov.
9
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §77e (2004). Section 5 prohibits the use of any “prospectus”
(broadly defined to mean in effect any writing that promotes or offers for sale securities) unless
permitted by SEC rule, until the registration statement is deemed effective by the SEC.
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proposes to sell, enabling investors to make a realistic appraisal of the merits of
the securities and then exercise informed judgment in determining whether to
purchase them. 10 While registration requires, but does guarantee, the accuracy of
facts represented in the registration, it prohibits false and misleading statements
under penalty of fine or imprisonment. 11 At the same time, the law does not
preclude the sale of stocks in risky or poorly managed or unprofitable companies
or even harebrained schemes. It only requires enough information so that the
investor, were he astute could see that it is so. 12
The act also precludes the use of any other written materials to initially
offer securities by a corporation, except as permitted by SEC rule (i.e., by the
prospectus) and not until a registration statement filed by the corporate issuer is
deemed effective. This means that if noncomplying written materials are used
10

Registration requires a description of the company’s properties and business; description of the
security to be offered for sale and its relationship to the company’s other capital securities;
information about the management of the registrant; and financial statements certified by an
independent public accountant. Registration statements are subject to examination for compliance
with the disclosure requirements. If the statement appears to be materially incomplete or
inaccurate, the registrant is informed and usually given an opportunity to file correcting or
clarifying amendments. But the Commission may conclude that material deficiencies in some
registration statements appear as a result of deliberate attempt to conceal or mislead, or that
deficiencies do not lend themselves to correction through the informal letter process. In such
cases, the Commission may hold a hearing to determine whether the issuance should be stopped.
CHARLES O’KELLY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS (4th ed. 2003); See Regulation S-K: Standard Instructions for
Filing Forms…, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.303 (instructions 1-3)(1998).
11
Work of the SEC, supra note -, at ---. Liability under the Act for material omissions or false
statements is strict for the issuer and based on negligence for secondary participants (including
members of the board, underwriters, accountants, who to escape liability had to prove they
exercised “due diligence” under the circumstances. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2004). The act effectively
shifted the burden of proof on the issue of negligence to the defendants.
12
Indeed, it is unlawful to represent that the Commission approves or disapproves of securities on
the merits. 15 U.S.C. § 77w (2004).
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prior to the effective date of the registration statement of if any oral selling of the
securities occurs by the corporation or its agents, the investor has an absolute right
to rescind, even if full disclosure had been made. 13

The effect of this

prophylactic rule is that there is a period of enforced silence by the corporation
and then the prospectus becomes the exclusive selling document.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was designed to require periodic and
continuous disclosure by certain companies, 14 although unlike the prospectus,
these periodic reports 15 are not required to be distributed to investors or
shareholders, but are only filed with the SEC. Nor, are these periodic reports
aimed at the ordinary investor, but at analysts and professional traders, because
they are factually dense, highly technical and quantitative, and not readily
accessible to the average lay investor. 16 The idea is that information contained in
13

15 U.S.C. § 77l (2004).
The companies are those who list securities on a national securities exchange; those with gross
assets over a specified level (currently $10 million); those with a class of equity securities held by
at least 500 persons; and those who file a 1933 Act registration statement that has become
effective. 15 U.S.C.§ 12(g) (2004).
15
The most important of the periodic disclosure is the annual report on Form 10-K, which must
contain audited financial statements as well as a detailed description of the corporation, including
percentage breakdowns of its various lines of business. In addition, quarterly reports on Form 10Q containing unaudited financial information, must be filed for each of the corporation’s first three
quarters. Finally, reports of current material developments must be filed on Form 8-K, within ten
days after the end of the month in which the event occurs.
16
However, the SEC does require corporations to provide a “basic information package”,
containing essential financial information and a qualitative discussion of recent performance and
known events and uncertainties likely to impact future performance, as part of its Management’s
Discussion & Analysis of Financial Condition and Result of Operations. (“MD & A”). SEC
Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. §229.303(a)(3)(ii). The MD & A provides “soft” or “forward looking”
information, such as projections of future earnings, predictions about when key new products will
reach the market; estimates of the adverse impact in future earnings, fluctuations or a recession in
a given foreign country. CHOPER, COFFEE, & GILSON, CASES & MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 314 (6th ed. 2004). The MD & A is made available to the shareholders subject
14

8

these reports will reach the average investor only through a filtration process,
where experts sift through, and analyze verify the information and the price is
adjusted accordingly.
B. Ad Hoc Disclosure Required Where Corporation has Chosen to Speak
Apart from the specific formal requirements of the securities acts
(including the periodic filings), it seems fairly well-settled that corporations and
corporate insiders have no general duty

to disclose all non-public material

information that it has about the corporation to shareholders. 17 However, where

to the SEC’s proxy solicitation rules, as part of the annual report required to be included in any
solicitation of proxy. CITE PROXY SOLICITATION RULES
17
Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 1997); Financial Industrial Fund, Inc. v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1973)(timing of disclosure of earnings
statement within board’s discretion, where information not ripe); Segal v. Coburn Corp. of
America [1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH ¶ 94,002 (E.D.N.Y. 1973)(corporation
not required to disclose decision to withdraw from a line of business where public disclosure
“might have impaired the collectability of the paper------------ disturbed credit relations, and
forced a precipitous liquidation of the business”); Reiss v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 711
F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1983)(disclosure not required of “fluid” merger negotiations where disclosure
would have subjected corporation to securities fraud action had the merger collapsed); see also
Basic. v.Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988)(implicitly finding no general duty to disclose, but finding
liability where corporation chose to speak untruthfully). A corporation though not under an
original duty to disclose or speak publicly, after having done so, may be under a duty to update an
earlier statement, for instance where material changes have occurred that result in facts that would
have been material to a reasonable investor. Weiner v. Quaker Oats, 129 F.3d 310 (3d Cir.
1997)(corporation had duty to update its original debt to capitalization ratio to disclose sharp rise
in light of probability of costly acquisition of another company); but see Backman v. Polaroid, 910
F.2d 10 (1st. Cir. 1990)(where disclosure was in fact misleading when made and speaker
thereafter learns of this, there is a duty to correct; when a prior disclosure “becomes materially
misleading in light of subsequent events, if it had a forward looking intent, correction or further
disclosure may be called for; however original statement projecting earnings were precisely
correct, even if forward looking, remained correct thereafter, giving rise to no duty to provide
additional information as to decline in projected earnings). See also TimeWarner, Inc. Securities
Litig., 953 F.2d 259, 267 (1993)(no duty to disclose lack of success in finding strategic partner
because original statements lacked definite positive projections, only suggestions of hope; but duty
to disclose alternative method of raising capital where information rendered prior statements about
particular method materially misleading. The stock exchanges require listed companies to

9

a corporation makes a disclosure voluntarily or involuntarily, “there is a duty to
make it complete and accurate. 18 Corporations rightfully may be reluctant to
make voluntary disclosures for a number of reasons. Premature disclosure can
often be harmful to the corporation and shareholders; it may misinform the market
and injure those who buy or sell based upon the disclosure. And, if disclosure is
not full and accurate, it could result in liability to the corporation for injuries
resulting to those who relied. Disclosure might also result in adverse reactions by
potential and existing lenders and suppliers.
There may also be a duty to speak that results from a fiduciary relation
between an insider when he is trading in the corporation’s shares. 19 But absent
such circumstances, it is not incumbent upon the corporation to provide any
information to shareholders merely because a reasonable investor would very
much like to have the information.

Instead, the SEC has left it up to the

promptly disclosed to the affected securities markets material nonpublic information. See NYSE
rule------------------------------.
18
Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 561 (6th Cir. 2001)(actor required to “provide complete
and non-misleading information with respect to the subjects on which he undertakes to speak”);
Rubin v. Schottenstein, 143 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 1998)(even absent a duty to speak, a party who
discloses material facts in connection with securities transactions “assumes a duty to speak fully
and truthfully on those subjects) Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 241 (6th Cir.
1985)(
); Roeder v. Alpha Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 26 (1st Cir.
1987)(
); Gross v. Summa Four, Inc., 93 F.3d at 992(1st Cir. 1996)(
); Glazer v. Formica Corp., 964 F.2d 149, 156-57 (2d Cir. 1992)(
); Sailor
v. Northern Staler Power Co., 4 F.3d 610, 611 (8th Cir. 1993)(“ A duty arises, however, if there
has been inaccurate, incomplete or misleading disclosures); Rubenstein v. Collins 20 F.3d 160,
170 (5th Cir. 1994)(“under 10b-5, a duty to speak the full truth arises when a defendant
undertakes a duty to say anything.”); In re Time Warner, Inc. Securities Litig., 953 F.3d 259, 267
(2d Cir. 1993) duty to update opinions and projections if the original opinions or projections have
become misleading as a result of intervening events).
19
See discussion infra at text accompanying notes --- to ----.
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corporation in the interval between periodic reports to decide whether to make
any disclosures.
As it stands, corporations often make “forward looking statements”, which
purport to reflect predictions about earnings, revenue and future economic
performance. 20 If things do not turn out as predicted, a corporation is only liable
if the statements were material and the corporation had actual knowledge that they
were false and misleading, and the statements were not identified as “forward
looking” or contained other cautionary language. 21
C. Anti-Fraud Rule as a Necessary Complement to Mandatory Disclosure
Early on, it was thought that mandatory disclosure alone was inadequate to
protect investors. This is because “[i]n securities markets, only a limited amounts
of information can be verified at all.” 22 Investors cannot “inspect” a business
venture in a way that enables them to deduce future profits and risks.” 23 Instead,
it is necessarily the case that the investor must rely on others to sift through and
decipher company information. Indeed, they “do not even want to inspect; they
seek to be passive recipients of an income stream…” 24 But, companies also have
an interest in truthful disclosure.

A firm that wants the highest possible

stock price at its initial offering will take all cost-justified steps to make stock

20

15 U. S. C. §78u-5(i)(1).
Id; see also Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d at 561 (
22
Id. at 674.
23
Id.at 674-75.
24
Id. at 675.
21
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).

valuable in the aftermarket. This it does by a believable pledge to continue
disclosing. 25
An anti-fraud rule is a necessary complement to the federal mandatory
disclosure regime not solely because of the disinclination of investors to
investigate, but also because some companies may be sufficiently short-sighted to
ignore the identified benefits. 26 An anti-fraud ruled reduces the costs of verifying
information, by making it more costly for low-quality firms to mimic high-quality
ones by making false disclosures. 27 To be sure, an anti-fraud rule has it costs too-including enforcement (investigation, prosecutorial, judicial staff) as wells as the
costs of over-enforcement or inaccurate enforcement. 28
D. Anti-fraud Provisions Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
Various sections of the 1934 Act impose liability upon issuers and their
officers for making false and misleading statements or omitting to state a material
fact necessary to make statements true. 29

The dilemma of the pension plan

fiduciary and corporate insider being explored here, would be covered by Section
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. 30 It provides that

25

Id. at
. Since the 1934 Act, firms not required to disclose (either because there were not
covered or not listed on a state exchange) have routinely provided voluminous information to
purchasers.
26
Easterbrook and Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 Va. L. Rev.
669 (1984).
27
Id. at .
28
Id. at .
29
Section 11, 12, 17.
30
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)(2004).
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“it shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or any facility of any national securities exchange
*** (b) to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may proscribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.”

Pursuant to Section 10(b) the Commission has adopted Rule 10b5 31 which makes

it unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) to employ
any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, (b) to make any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statement made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c)
to engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit on any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.”

What kind of conduct falls within the prohibitions of Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5? The statute and regulation are interpreted to make insider trading
fraudulent, i.e., the failure of an insider to disclose to his buyer or seller of
securities, material, non-public information.

Two theories of insider trading

under these laws have emerged from the courts.

Under the “traditional” or

“classical theory”, Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are violated when a corporate
31

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
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insider trades in the securities of his corporation on the basis of material, nonpublic information, without disclosing that information to the party on the other
side of the transaction. “‘Trading on such information qualifies as a ‘deceptive
device’ under §10(b)… because ‘a relationship of trust and confidence exists
between shareholders of a corporation and those insiders who have obtained
confidential information by reason of their position with that corporation.” 32 That
relationship… “gives rise to a duty to disclose [or to abstain from trading]
because of the ‘necessity of preventing a corporate insider from *** tak[ing]
unfair advantage of *** uninformed *** stockholders.’” 33
At common law, trading on inside information over the stock exchange
was not regarded as unlawful or a breach of fiduciary duty by a director to a
shareholder because directors were deemed to owe fiduciary duties to their
corporations, not to individual shareholders. 34 However, as an exception, the
“special facts” doctrine articulated an affirmative duty to disclose material, nonpublic facts in face-to-face dealings between an insider and a shareholder. 35 In
Strong v. Repide, 36 the Supreme Court ruled that even if a director has no general
duty to disclose facts known to him before he purchases shares, there are cases
where by reason of special facts, such a duty exists. There, the special facts were
32

United States v. O’Hagen, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997).
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652, citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228-229 (1980).
34
Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass.358, 186 N.E. 659 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1933).
35
Roberta S. Karmel, Outsider Trading on Confidential Information--A Breach in Search of a
Duty, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 83, 87 (1998), discussing Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
36
213 U.S. 419 (1909).
33

14

that the defendant, a director of the corporation and large stockholder, was also in
full charge of negotiations for the sale of certain lands held by the corporation to
the United States government, which sale would result in increased value to the
corporation.

The defendant was able to come to an agreement with the

government if and when he chose to do so. These facts he failed to disclose,
concealing his identity as a purchaser, and dealt in a roundabout fashion with the
person appointed by the shareholder to sell her shares, who believed there was no
prospect that a sale of the land would be consummated. 37 Shortly, after the sale
of shares, the sale of the land was in fact consummated. The Court explained
“[i]f is were conceded, for the purpose of the argument, that the
ordinary relations between directors and shareholders in a business
corporation are not of such fiduciary nature as to make it the duty
of a director to disclose to a shareholder the general knowledge
which he may possess regarding the value of the share of the
company before he purchases any from a shareholder, yet there are
cases where, by reason of special facts, such duty exists. 38
In the case, those special facts were that the director was not only such,
but held three-fourths of the shares of the company’s stock, as well as at the time,
being administrator general of the company with large powers and engaged in the
negotiations which finally led to the sale of the company’s lands at a price which
greatly enhanced the value of the stock. By being the chief negotiator, no one
knew as well as he the probability of the sale of the lands. 39 The director’s

37

Id. at 431-33.
213 U.S. at 431.
39
Id. at 432.
38
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conduct in working through an agent and paying for the stock using a check of a
third party was strong evidence of an intent to defraud the shareholder. 40
In the first significant SEC enforcement action under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 41 the SEC held an insider liable for
trades in the open market based upon two rationales:

the existence of a

relationship affording access to insider information intended to be available only
for a corporate purpose and the “inherent unfairness involved where a party takes
advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is
dealing. 42 The rule that emerged was that corporate insiders had a duty under the
antifraud rules to refrain from trading so long as they were privy to material
information that was not public.

This meant that there should be parity of

information among market participants and anyone in possession of material
inside non-public information was required to either disclose it to the investing
public or abstain from trading in or recommending the securities concerned while
such information remained undisclosed. 43

The Second Circuit, in SEC v. Texas

Gulf Suphur, 44 affirmed the rule and developed a further justification for it, the
equal access to information theory”, that the securities disclosure rules should be
construed to promote the “justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that
40

Id. at 433.
40 SEC 907 (1961).
42
40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
43
SEC v. Texas Gulf Suphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968)(en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005
(1971).
44
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968)(en banc), cert. denied 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
41
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all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to
material information.” 45 For these reasons, the duty to disclose or abstain from
trading applied not only to insiders, but to anyone in possession of material nonpublic information. 46 However, these theories were later rejected by the Supreme
Court in Chiarella v. U.S., 47

where the court held that not all instances of

unfairness amounts to fraud.

Instead, although Section 10(b) is a catchall

provision, what it catches must be fraudulent conduct.

Thus, as the Court

conceived it, fraud occurred where there was a false statement of a material fact,
knowingly made, with an intent that the hearer rely to his detriment. In the case
of nondisclosure, fraud occurs only if there is nondisclosure when there is a duty
to speak. A duty to speak arises in the case of a fiduciary relationship or similar
relationship of trust and confidence between the parties. In Chiarella, a printer
whose company printed documents used in impending tender offers, and who
bought shares based upon the information deciphered from these documents, did
not engage in fraudulent conduct toward the sellers of those shares by his silence
in the absence of any fiduciary relationship or relationship of trust and confidence
with the company whose shares were traded or with the shareholders. 48
45

401 F.2d at 848.
Id. at 84.
47
445 U.S. 222 (1980).
48
The scholarly debate on the merits, efficacy, efficiency, and fairness of insider trading rules is
legion. In general, see Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 233
(1966)(arguing insider trading should be permitted as a form of executive compensation; that
insider trading is a victimless crime, that insider trading does not cause the trades by the parties on
the other side of the transaction); Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fishel, The Regulation of Insider
46

17

How does the classical theory apply where the fiduciary is selling, as
opposed to purchasing the company’s stock on the basis of material, non-public
information? This is another anomaly in the classic insider trading theory, where
the insiders are selling shares based on bad news to persons who theretofore were
not shareholders of the company. This would seem to involve the classic arm’s
length transaction, involving no fiduciary duty on the part of the insider sellers.
The Court in Chiarella stated that it would not follow its own logic to such a
result. 49 In In re Cady, Roberts, 50 a broker-dealer was held liable for selling stock
on the basis of material information received from corporate insiders to persons
who previously were not stockholders in the corporation. The SEC embraced the
reasoning of Judge Learned Hand that “the director or officer assumed fiduciary
relation to the buyer by the very sale; for it would be a sorry distinction to allow
him to use the advantage of his position to induce the buyer into the position of a
beneficiary although he was forbidden to do so once the buyer had become

Trading, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 857(1983)(arguing ---------------------------------); Donald C. Langevoort,
Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading Regulation, 99 Colum. L.
Rev. 1319, 1326 (1999); David Haddock & Jonathan Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading,
80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1449 (1986)(arguing that insider trading represents a cost borne in the first
instance by market makers and passed along to other outsiders in the form of widened risk
spreads); Ian B. Lee, Fairness and Insider Trading, 2002 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 119 (2002)(arguing
that notions of fairness require disclosure of material information and necessary for efficient
market).
49
445 U.S. 222 (1980).
50
40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
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one.” 51 The result is an extension of fiduciary obligations before the fiduciary
relationship has been established.

Such a view runs counter to fiduciary

principles normally prevailing, but works to achieve the identified end behind the
prohibition on using inside information. 52
1. Outsider Trading by Tippees
After Chiarella, the SEC did not fully concede the rejection of the parity
of information and equal access to information theories, but argued that those
persons who acquired material non-public information from corporate insiders
(tippees) also acquired the fiduciary duties of their inside sources merely by
receiving inside information from them; that they stand in the shoes of their
sources. But this argument too was rejected by the Supreme Court in Dirks v.
SEC. 53 There, the court ruled that a tippee is only derivatively liable for trading
on the basis of material non-public information when the tippee knows or should
have known that the disclosure of the information by the insider was improper
and the tipper received some personal benefit from the disclosure. That benefit
could be direct as cash or indirect as a reputational advantage which could
translate into a personal gain in the future, or it could be evidence of a

51

Grafz v. Calughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 341 U.S. 920 (1951), quoted in Cady
Roberts, 40 SEC at 914, n.23, quoted in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980); see
also United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 565, n.2 (2d Cir. 19--).
52
CITE RESTATEMENT
53
Langevoort, supra note , at -----. In Dirks, an insider, one Secrist, disclosed to Dirks, a stock
analyst, that massive fraud was occurring at the company, Equity Funding. Dirks passed the
information along to some of his clients, who dumped $16 million worth of Equity Funding stock.
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“relationship between the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo.
Even an attempt to make a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or
friend can suffice, that being the same as the insider trading and giving the
proceeds to the relative or friend.

Thus, after Dirks, absent a showing of

improper disclosure or improper benefit enuring to the tipper/insider, no
Section10(b)(5) or Rule 10b-5 liability results from tippee trading. Nor would
liability arise to outsiders, such as Chiarella, who acquired and misused
information from sources other than the issuer and it insiders. 54
In the Dirks case, the Supreme Court thus refined the fiduciary principle
for the purposes of the disclose or abstain rule by stating that the essential element
of insider trading liability is the attempt by an insider-fiduciary to derive some
personal benefit from information entrusted to him. Tipper “liability could then
be rationalized as a means of prohibiting insiders from being able to do indirectly
(profit personally in some pecuniary, reputational, or gift-giving way from the
conveyance of information to others) what they are precluded from doing directly
(profit by trading). 55 Tippee liability, in turn, would be limited to those situations
in which the tippee had notice of the insider’s self-serving behavior and could be
seen as intentionally assisting it (as a participant after the fact).” 56

54

Switzer
Id. at ---.
56
Id. at ---. In Dirks, the Supreme Court, found Dirks was no liable because he had no
independent duty to Equity Funding--he was neither a traditional insider (officer, director), nor a
temporary insider (an investment advisor, accountant), nor did he have a derivative duty through
55
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As the court explained, “Section 10(b) is not an all-purpose breach of
fiduciary duty ban. 57 Instead, it “trains on conduct involving manipulation and
deception.” This manipulation or deception, i.e., fraud, “is consummated …
when…[the fiduciary] uses the information to purchase or sell securities” and
thereby “gains no-risk profits,” if the information is put to an “other” use, no
breach has occurred for purposes of the securities laws.58 In other words, Section
10(b) “does not catch all conceivable forms of fraud involving confidential
information, rather it catches fraudulent means of capitalizing on such
information through securities transactions.” 59

Adherence to an approach of

imposing liability merely because the outsider “harmed” the principal in some
way, however, would mean the outsider potentially could be liable for insider
trading where not even the slightest intent to trade on securities existed when he
disclosed the information. Hence, the requirement that all tippers both insiders
and outsiders must intend to benefit from the disclosure of confidential
information. 60
Then, what about remote tippees? Is it sufficient that the insider derive a
personal benefit from the immediate tippee or must it be shown that there was one
from the remote tippee as will. “[T]he false logic in Dirks is the assumption that
Secrist, since the latter did not disclose the fraud for an improper purpose and did not receive any
improper personal benefit for the disclosure.
57
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655.
58
Id. at 656-57.
59
Id. 656.
60
Id., cited in SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1278 (11th Cir. 2003).
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the tipper-tippee liability question can be viewed simply as a derivative form of
the basic question of trading liability. It is much more accurate to say that what is
wrong with tipping is it violates a fiduciary duty of impartiality-- duty not to
discriminate unfairly among investors or classes of investors. A tip unjustifiably
favors one shareholder over others, which alone provides the justification for
holding both tipper and tippee liable for any resulting profits.” 61
2. Rule 14e-3
The SEC responded to the potential loopholes and limitations left after
Chiarella and Dirks by adopting Rule 14e-3. 62 The rule provides that if any
person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has commenced a
tender offer, it shall be unlawful for any person who is in possession of material
information relating to such tender offer, who knows or has reason to know the
information comes from either the offering person or the target company, or any
insider (officer, director, partner of employee or any other person or such issuer of
shares of corporations whose shares are sought), to purchase or sell or cause to be
purchased or sold any of the securities, until the information is publicly disclosed.
This prohibition applies without regard to the existence of any common law
fiduciary relationship between the trader and the corporations whose shares are
traded or the shareholders, as required under Rule 10b-5. The Supreme Court
upheld the power of the SEC to adopt such a rule despite this omission on the
61
62

Id. at ---.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3.
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theory that the SEC’s prophylactic rulemaking power under Section 14(e) was
much broader than under Section 10(b); that the SEC could adopt measures to
prohibit acts not themselves fraudulent under common law or Section 10(b) if the
prohibition was reasonably designed to prevent acts and practices that are
fraudulent. 63
If Rule 14e-3 seemed to plug a loophole in the theory of insider trading, it
also resulted in the erratic treatment of insider trading by according different
treatment to tender offers than in other transactions. 64

E. Fraud on the Source of the Information
The other theory of insider trading is the misappropriation theory, which
holds that a person commits fraud “in connection with” a securities transaction,
and thereby violates §10(b) and Rule 10b-5, when he misappropriates confidential
information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source
of the information. “Under this theory, a fiduciary’s undisclosed, self-serving use
of a principal’s information to purchase or sell securities, in breach of a duty of
loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that
63

O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 at 671-73.
For example, in SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756, 758 (W.D. Okla. 1984), a famous football
coach overheard a discussion by a corporate insider about an impending tender offer, bought
shares in the target company then sold them in response to the tender offer announcement, at a
profit. He was convicted under insider trading laws, but his conviction was overturned as the
trading took place before the adoption of Rule 14e-3 and thus governed by Chiarella. Since he
had no duty to the corporation or the shareholders from whom he purchased his stock, he was not
liable under Rule 10b-5. But if Rule 14e-3 applied, his conviction would have stood.

64
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information.” 65 “In lieu of premising liability on a fiduciary relationship between
the company insider and purchaser or seller of the company’s stock, the
misappropriation theory premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader’s
deception of those who entrusted him with access to confidential information.” 66
The anomaly here is that, one avoids liability under the misappropriation theory
by disclosing an intent to trade to the source of the information before trading,
since this disclosure avoids the deception. 67 But this still leaves the party on the
other side of the transaction exposed and subject to injury if disclosure is also not
made to her.

Since disclosure to the source of the information does nothing

directly to avoid the harm to the individual trader on the other side, some other
justification or explanation for the misappropriation theory must be found. It may
be concerns about the integrity of the market, “absent an acceptable broad
prohibition on insider trading, investor confidence in the integrity of the …
trading markets would diminish, threatening their depth and liquidity.” 68
F. Selective Disclosure under Regulation FD
Until recently, selective disclosure of material nonpublic information by
corporate insiders to institutional investors, analysts and other market insiders was
not proscribed by statute or regulation, absent a showing that the selective
disclosure was made for the purposes of a personal benefit to the insider doing the
65

O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
67
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655.
68
Langevoort, supra note , at 1325, citing O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 658.
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disclosing. In effect, selective disclosure was a form of lawful tipping and tippee
trading by select persons based upon this material nonpublic information was not
actionable. In August 2000, the SEC enacted Regulation FD. 69 The SEC was
concerned with the apparent unfairness of this selective disclosures. The SEC
sought to address several concerns underlying selective disclosure, including that
issuers often disclosed important nonpublic information, such as advance
warnings of earnings results, to securities analysts and/or institutional investors
before making the information public, with the result that the investing public was
not on an equal footing with market insiders and would therefore lose confidence
in the integrity of the market place. Further, selective disclosure looked very
much like tipping inside information, although the practice was not covered by
the then state of insider trading theory. Also, the SEC saw a threat to the integrity
of the markets by insiders selectively disclosing information in hopes of favorable
reviews by analysts. Finally, recent technological advances in communications
meant no impediments to timely public disclosure. 70

The rule provides that

“when an issuer, or person acting on its behalf, discloses material nonpublic
information to [selective] persons…, it must make public disclosure of that
information.” 71 If the selective disclosure was intentional, the issuer must publicly

69

Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154 [2000 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶86,319, and 83,676 (August 15, 2000), 17 C.F. R. § 243.100(a).
70
Id. at 83, 677-78. See generally, Marc I. Steinberg, Insider Trading, Selective Disclosure, and
Prompt Disclosure: A Comparative Analysis, 22 U.Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 635, 648-59 (2001).
71
Id. at 83, 676. , 17 C.F. R. § 243.100(a).
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disclose the information simultaneously by filing or furnishing a Form 8-K to the
SEC or in a manner reasonably designed to provide broad distribution of the
information. If the disclosure was unintentional, the issuer must disclose the
information to the public promptly, but in no event after the later of 24 hours or
the opening of the next day’s trading on the New York Stock Exchange. 72

III. The Soundness of the Policy Behind the
Prohibition Against Insider Trading
Why prohibit insider trading? What is the harm caused by it? There are at
least three commonly offered justifications for the prohibition of insider trading:
1) to ensure fairness and equity-- based on the “inherent unfairness involved
where a party takes advantage of [inside] information, knowing it is unavailable

72

Id. at -----. Violation of the rule results in civil enforcement action by the SEC, but the rule
itself does not impose any Section 10(b) antifraud liability on the issuer or establish a private right
of action. The regulation applies by its express terms to “a person acting on behalf of an issuer”,
defined as a senior official of the issuer or any other officer, employee, or agent of an issuer who
regularly communicates with any of the enumerated recipients of information. However, a senior
official is not insulated from liability by directing non-covered personnel to make the proscribed
disclosures, but would be liable under Section 20(b) of the Exchange Act. The regulation
expressly excludes a “person who owes a duty of trust or confidence to the issuer”, such as a
temporary insider; a “person who expressly agrees to maintain the disclosed information in
confidence”; a credit rating agency, “provided the information is disclosed solely for the purpose
of developing a credit rating and the entity’s ratings are publicly available”; and with certain
exceptions, in connection with “a securities offering registered under the Securities Act.” Id. at -----------------. While not expressly mentioned, disclosures to the media or communications to
government agencies are not covered by the regulation. Id. at -----------------. Among other
things, “material information” includes information on earnings; mergers, acquisitions, tender
offers, joint ventures, or changes in assets; new products or discoveries, or developments
regarding customers or suppliers; changes in control or management; change in auditors; events
regarding the issuer’s securities; bankruptcies or receiverships, and other such information that
likely would be significant to a reasonable investor. Id. at -----------.
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to those with whom he is dealing;”73 2) to promote the flow of information to the
market, allowing it to better perform its function of evaluating securities and
allocating capital, the “integrity of the market” theory ; and 3) to protect the
property rights of the corporation whose information is the basis for insider
trading--“information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and
not for the personal benefit of anyone.” 74 All three justifications, though, have
been debated. First, the unfairness is questioned on the assertion that insider
trading does not cause trading by persons on the other side of the transaction, that
they would have been in the market anyway

75

that it is a victimless offense. 76

Professor Langevoort describes the restriction on insider trading as “largely
73

In re Cady, Roberts, 40 SEC 907, 912.
Id. at 912; See generally, Kenneth Scott, Insider Trading, Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate
Privacy, 9 J. Legal Studies 801 (1980).
75
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the
Production of Information, 11 Sup. Ct. Rev. 309 (1981). Easterbrook argues that even if insiders
causes some investors to sell in advance of the price rise that follows disclosure of material
information, and insider trading reduces the likelihood that an active trader will obtain the highest
possible price, investors might still not be harmed. If there is a chance that they will be shortchanged as a result of insiders’ purchases, shareholders will respond by bidding less for the stock
in the first place; the lower price compensating for the ex ante risk. Easterbrook explains: “If the
discount accurately reflects the odds, then it is hard to see any unfairness in the process.” And,
“because all traders, at any given time, deal at the same price, the self-protective moves of
sophisticated traders protect the unsophisticated as well.” The stockholders who lose out in one
round of insider trading are compensated by the increased gains they obtain if their shares
(purchased at a small discount) are not scooped up by insiders and thus appreciate more in other
cases.” But the fallacy in this argument is in the “ifs” and the assumption that purchasers are
knowledgeable about the frequency of insider trading; are sufficiently astute to discount the value
of the shares; and that shareholders know the odds.
76
Manne argued that insider trading harms no one because the people who buy when insiders are
selling and those who sell when insiders are buying, actually benefit from insider trading, since
they would have traded anyway and most likely at a less favorable price in the absence of insiders’
trades, the theory being that the insiders’ trades exerted a downward pressure on the stock price,
resulting in a lower purchase price to the outside investor and a smaller loss after announcement of
the information resulting in a decline in the stock price; and even assuming that insider trading did
expose outside investors to the risk of losses, the market price would adjust to ensure that
investors continued to receive an appropriate return.
74
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emotional in its genesis, a political response to the demand for an appearance of
equity in both the securities marketplace and society generally.” 77 He points out
that “[i]t is hard to make the case that the typical investor is systematically better
off, as far as his or her own particular trading opportunities are concerned, as a
result of an insider trading prohibition. Yet, the political rhetoric of insider
trading legislation and enforcement is largely directed to such investors (if not the
public at large).” 78 Professor Langevoort believes insider trading laws are of the
“same ideological roots underlying other legal rules that purport to neutralize
some of the execessive advantages of economic power, size, and status, in order
to satisfy those who feel unfairly disadvantaged by the absence of power, size, or
status.” 79
Some have criticized Chiarella in recognizing that anonymous trading on
an impersonal exchange or in the over the counter market, which contains no
communicative content as to possession of non-public information or anything
else, could be said to be fraudulent as to persons who are trading
contemporaneously in the sense of causing detrimental reliance. Professor

77

Donald C. Langvoort, Setting the Agenda for Legislative Reform: Some Fallacies, Anomalies,
and Other Curiosities in the Prevailing Law of Insider Trading, 39 Ala. L. Rev. 399 (1988).
78
Id. at ----. Professor Langevoort explains that professional investors are far more likely to
benefit from insider trading prohibition since they are “next in line” with respect to an opportunity
to trade immediately upon disclosure. While that group might well exercise some political
pressure for insider trading regulation, this alone would not seem to explain completely the
regulation. Instead, it seems the public fascination with recent insider trading scandals has
prompted the political reaction, legislators taking advantage of political gain from a regulatory
response. Id. at -----, n.6
79
Id. at ----.
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Langevoort argues that it is hard to conceive of the conduct as deceptive; 80 that
the anonymous trade on the open market or the over-the-counter market, does not
conjure up the elements of common law fraud where the trading is without
communicative content. Under the common law, it had long been the case that an
agent was required to disclose all material information when transacting with his
principal.

Functionally, the common law approach was designed to avoid the

detrimental reliance that might result from the trust actually placed in the agent by
the principal. In such face to face bargaining situation, self-serving conduct by the
fiduciary may in fact be deceptive. 81 But not so in the open market trading where
shareholders have no idea with whom they are trading, “and offers to purchase or
sell carry no communicative content.” 82

Professor Langevoort asks “is it a

relevant concept when trading is in the anonymous marketplace?”

Thus,

according to him, it is doubtful in what sense the trading has the capacity to
mislead those trading contemporaneously, “[f]inding the deception resulting from
the duty to disclose is conclusory, and begs the question of how the imposition of
such a duty prevents deception.” 83 In response to Langevoort, one could say that
purchasers of shares on an anonymous market are relying on a representation by
the seller by his failure to disclose, that the market price reflects all available
80

See Daniel C. Langevoort, Setting the Agenda for Legislative Reform: Some Fallacies,
Anomalies, and Other Curiosities in the Prevailing Law of Insider Trading, 39 Ala. L. Rev. 399
(1988).
81
Langevoort, supra note----, at ----.
82
Id. at ---.
83
Id. at ---.
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information necessary to setting a price, when in fact the insider/trader knows
otherwise. Therein lies the deception. At the same time, Professor Langevoort
argues that the rule requiring some sort of fiduciary relationship is underinclusive,
as the common law contained numerous circumstances where “an affirmative
disclosure was required where societal precepts of honesty and fair dealing
demanded it.” 84 Professor Langevoort states that such a restrictive approach was
probably not a misreading of the common law, “but rather the false assumption
that such a limited rule would give the law clarity by providing due notice to
those who trade in securities.” 85

But the cost is “a wedge [that] now separates

the intuitive sense of when instances of trading on the basis of material nonpublic
information are abusive and the doctrinal framework used to decide specific cases
involving such trading.” 86 It seems a more coherent basis for the prohibition is
founded on notions of fairness that insiders should not profit from information
obtained from their positions while the beneficial owners of the corporation are
disadvantaged, 87 and on the need to protect the integrity of the market;
proscribing trading while in possession of material non-public information is to
make investors confident that they can trade securities without being subject to

84

Id. at ---.
Id. at ---.
86
Id. at ---.
87
Id. at ---.
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30

informational disadvantages. 88 Under Chiarella, however, there are relational
limits to these ends, although the classical theory of insider trading applies not
only to directors, officers and certain employees, but also to attorneys,
accountants, consultants, and others who temporarily become fiduciaries of a
corporation, as well as their tippees. 89
But, in Professor Langevoort’s view, “the refinement [by the Dirks
analysis] of the insider trading prohibition further separated doctrine from reality.
“The intuitive sense of why the friend of a company’s chief executive officer
should not trade on the basis of information imparted to him during a golf outing
has little to do with the determination that the officer has somehow gained
something from the conversation.” 90 Yet, this seems to be the reasoning under
Dirks. Then, what if the issuer itself repurchases its securities in the open market
while possessing material nonpublic information indicating that a prevailing
market price is too low. “Assuming the managers of the corporation who cause
the repurchase have no significant ownership interest in the corporation, does the
fact that they act solely in what they perceive to be the corporation’s best interests
88

Joel Seligman, The Reformationof Federal Securities Law Concerning Non public Information,
73 Geo. L.J. 1083 (1985)(arguing that the basis of the integrity of the market policy is both
historical and theoretical, citing to President Roosevelt’s statement at the time of passage of the
1933 securities bill, that by “putting the burden of telling the whole truth on the seller,” the
proposed act “should give impetus to honest dealing in securities and thereby bring back public
confidence.” The assumption was that investors would be more willing to purchase securities
when compulsory disclosure of material information reduced the incidence of fraud, increased the
reliability of estimates of firm value, and reduced the volatility of securities price swings. Id. at --.
89
O’Hagan, citing Dirks v.SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655, n.14 (1983).
90
Id. at ---.
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(i.e., no personal benefit being sought) preclude the imposition of liability?”91
The answer should be no, but Dirks could be read to hold the opposite. 92
Second, under the integrity of the market theory, it is argued that
“proscribing trading while in possession of material nonpublic information is
necessary to ensure the integrity of the market. The assumption is that investors
will be more willing to purchase securities when compulsory disclosure of
material information eliminates the informational advantages held by insiders,
reduces the incidence of fraud, increases the reliability of estimates of firm value,
and reduces the volatility of securities price swings.

Investors will choose

investments which they perceive offers the least risk.” 93

Such investor

confidence has a larger economic consequence-- reducing the risk premium that
issuers would have to pay, thereby increasing the funds available for economic
growth and reducing the volatility of market price swings (caused by investor
ignorance of material information), which will tend to increase the allocative
efficiency of the market. 94
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Id. at ---.
Id. at ---.
93
Seligman, supra note at ---.
94
Seligman, supra note
at 1118. Faster dissemination of material information as would be
required by mandatory disclosure, improves allocative efficiency in that information on firms with
promising probable future earnings will cause the prices of these securities to rise; and the market
price for securities of firms with less promising prospects will decline. Thus, the market allocates
its resources towards investments with the greatest prospects. Seligman, at 1119. Easterbrook
asserts that the market price of stock will not move unless other traders guess that insiders are
trading based upon inside information; that while “purchases often convey information to the
market about the prospects of the firms, if the information indicates the firm’s prospects are better
than those previously perceived, the price of the shares rises.” But “large purchases give the
92

32

Some argue that insider trading provides a corrective function to the
market’s pricing mechanism; the market reacting to trading, causing the price of
shares gradually to reflect the information that was not public. 95 The argument is
that given that vast amounts of information are quickly available about corporate
issuers and electronic communication is instantaneous, the market themselves will
provide an adequate corrective for temporary informational advantage that
insiders may have by promptly reporting the trading that occurs. 96 Furthermore,

market a good deal of information. Traders find out or infer why one person is buying so much,
and the new knowledge causes prices to adjust. For this reason, large transactions for technical,
portfolio-adjustment reasons should have no effect on price, while smaller purchases based on new
information should have an effect, even a dramatic one. This seems the pattern in the market. The
insider’s trading thus may lead to price adjustments, but only to the extent that insider’s secret has
leaked to the market or been inferred by traders.” Easterbrook at ---.
Some scholars have identified a tension between the first two justifications for insider
trading that the SEC continues to strive to resolve. Allocative inefficiency results where the stock
is inaccurately priced, because capital is directed away from its most efficient use and distributive
unfairness results where an “insider” takes advantage of information made available for corporate
purposes and trades with an unknowing party on the other side. Yet, it is arguable that this
transfer may increase allocative efficiency by causing the price of the security to move in line with
what it would be valued in a fully informed market. To prevent distributive unfairness, the
securities laws seek to equalize access to material informational advantages, but only to the extent
the informational advantages result from a violation of a duty owed to another, the corporation or
the other trading party. This encourages investors to pay more for the same securities because
there is less risk that they will be exploited by those trading with informational advantages, which
in turn ensures corporations receive a higher price for the stock, and thus have a lower cost of
capital, thereby fostering allocative efficiency. The tension arises because if a rule of equal access
is strictly enforced, there is less incentive to search for new information (because the party who
finds it may not be able to use it lawfully). This reduced incentive for market participants may
result in allocative inefficiency because the market price of a security may be a less reliable
indication of what a firm’s value would be in a fully informed market. If market prices are less
certain or fluctuate widely, investors may lose confidence and invest otherwise. CHOPER,
COFFEE, & GILSON, supra note at 308.
95
See Carlton & Fischel, supra note ---, at ---.
96
See H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKETS (1966); Manne, Insider
Trading and the Law Professors, 23 Vand. L. Rev. 547 (1970).
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significant empirical evidence has shown that insider trading does not have a
significant impact on market prices. 97
Other scholars, however, find valid policy bases for the regulation of
unfair informational advantages, even in the impersonal, high speed securities
markets. There is the argument that there is the moral hazard, that if permitted to
trade, insiders will have an incentive to delay disclosures so as to increase their
opportunities to profit from the market’s ignorance, thus harming outsiders who
trade. 98 If it is the case that insiders will only buy stock when it is undervalued
and sell when it is overvalued, there can be no question of harm to uninformed
investors. 99 There is harm to unknowledgeable shareholders which is caused by
insider trading, because it deprives a blameless shareholder or potential
shareholder of the profits he or she otherwise would have enjoyed or make them
poorer by spending more than the stock is worth. 100

97

Management might also

Seligman, supra note --- at ---.
Lee, supra note ----- at 160.
99
Id. at 160. Lee goes on to refute Manne’s argument that outside investors are not harmed
because they would have traded anyway, finding Manne’s distinction between time-function and
price-function trading not meaningful, since at the critical time, of even a time-function trade, any
investor whose decision to buy, sell or hold, is at all sensitive to price, is injured because such
trader may find a match in the market only because of the presence of insiders generating
additional supply or demand on the other side. Id. at 164. Lee also refutes Manne’s argument that
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100
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seek to manipulate corporate press releases and other communications with the
press in order to accentuate stock volatility. Further, managers might be inclined
to adopt riskier new businesses ventures than they otherwise would have, on the
thinking that whether the new venture succeeds or fails is irrelevant so long as
they can trade their stock before news of failure becomes public.101 This may
very well describe the goings on in Enron in its final months where the board of
directors deviated from its very strict ethics policy about self-dealing transactions
allowing Faslow to deal with the company in off-book transactions that were a
drain on company revenues. Ken Lay, kept urging public investment in the
company’s shares, all the while disposing of millions of shares in his own
accounts, not disclosing what he knew about the underlying fraud and impending
collapse.
The third, rationale for the prohibition on insider trading, that is to protect
the information rights of the corporation has been debated on the ground that
state common law rules on theft and conversion are sufficient to address the
corporate business property concern. Also, it is said that express provisions in
employment and other written contracts could more efficiently limit the use of

commanded. At the most, potential shareholder B may find the new price too high and may not
purchase at all, thereby losing the profit he or she otherwise would have enjoyed as the stock price
rose from $10 to $20. But Seligman’s example is too narrow. Would shareholder A, even though
inclined to sell, have sold to the insider at $10, if she had the same information as the insider? The
rational seller would hold out for more.
101
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such information by insiders. Indeed, some have argued that insider trading
should be allowed as a form of executive compensation of social value, because it
encourages entrepreneurship and rewards analytic research and initiative. 102
However, there are many forms of performance-related or stock-price-based
compensation schemes available that do not depend on the executive’s capital
resources or skills or use of information to calculate the amount earned. Nor, is it
the case that the information is the result of

entrepreneurial innovation as

opposed to the fortuity of being an insider and privy to valuable information. 103
What if the corporation were to authorize insider trading? If the essence
of the liability is the misuse of corporate information for personal gain, it would
seem to follow that the board of directors of a corporation (or managers with
delegated authority) could properly insulate all subordinates from liability-absent a showing of conflict of interest-- by declaring that all insider trading is not
a breach of fiduciary duty, but rather a part of executive compensation. Once
again, according to Professor Langvoort, “this sort of privatization would effect a
radical break with our intuitive notion of the correct solution.” 104
Strudler and Orts, 105 argue that moral principles justify the prohibition
on insider trading; that the focus on fairness and economics concepts were not
102
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complete theories. They argue that the traditional insider trading theory, premised
on breach of fiduciary duty owed by the insider to the corporation’s shareholders
rests on an incorrect legal assumption. Technically, corporate directors, officers,
and employees do not owe fiduciary duties to shareholders, but rather to the
corporation as a legal entity. 106 The traditional theory further cannot account for
all of the relevant cases that the Supreme Court recognizes as insider trading, for
instance, “outsider trading.” 107

Then, there is the case of the insider who sells

shares to a person who is not yet a shareholder of the insider’s firm. Because the
prospective purchaser had no relationship with the firm before the transaction, the
corporation insider violates no corporate fiduciary duty.

To say that the

prospective shareholder will soon be a real shareholder, and it is therefore fair to
extend the corporate fiduciary obligations to soon-to-be shareholders, is an
extension, but one that is “an evasion”. 108 Though it would be unfair to allow an
insider to trade on this basis, the traditional insider trading theory cannot
adequately explain the nature of this unfairness. 109
Strudler and Orts also criticize the equal access and parity of information
theories. Under the parity of information rationale, fraudulent insider trading
occurs when one party to a securities transaction possesses significantly better
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information than does the other party to the transaction. 110 But, this theory is
questionable where it does not explain why taking advantage of an acute
asymmetry of information is wrong in the trading of securities, or why the use of
unequal information amounts to fraud. 111 It may be wrong under very limited
circumstances, but it is not inherently wrong. The early rationale espoused in In
re Cady, Roberts, 112 is misguided, they say. First, securities markets depend by
their very nature upon some traders having better information than others;
markets are not perfectly efficient and a relatively efficient securities market
requires a “critical mass of person believing that it is worthwhile to try to beat the
market” with better information. 113 Thus, even the most efficient markets will
therefore be characterized by a dynamic flux in the distribution of information,
not by equality of information. 114 Second, information disparity may arguably be
desirable on economic grounds where it is likely to encourage the development of
traders specializing in particular industries and companies.

Society should

encourage people and business to seek out valuable information by establishing
disclosure rules that provide incentives to invest time and effort to search for such
information. 115

Third, and most importantly, the reason to reject the equal

information rationale is that an informational advantage may be morally deserved
110
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or at least morally neutral. 116 If one works hard to discover or produce valuable
information, or otherwise legitimately acquires a right in information, then one
deserves to enjoy the benefits, including the right to use that information to a
bargaining advantage. 117 However, Strudler and Orts qualify their license to use
information in cases where the acquisition of the information is illicit. They argue
though, that the illicit acquisition rationale 118 also does not provide a complete
justification for the prohibition on insider trading.

First, the economic

consequences are disputed and perhaps unknowable; the relevance of economic
concerns cannot be established without determining whether insider trading
morally wrongs those who are its alleged victims; an intuitive sense of fairness is
too vague and unreliable to serve as a basis of legal decisionmaking. The illicit
acquisition rationale requires a moral principle or set of principles more precise
than a simple appeal to an intuitive sense of fairness. 119 Yet, not every wrong is a
fraud and the theory does not connect the wrongful acquisition of the information
to a victim in a securities transaction. 120 The wrong is probably best understood
as a violation of a principle proscribing unjust enrichment. 121 But a prohibition
based on notions of unjust enrichment would prove too much, covering instances
in which any ill-gotten advantage, such as embezzlement not misuse of
116
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information, would be securities fraud. The point of unjust enrichment is to block
a person from enjoying a wrongfully obtained benefit by forcing people to
disgorge ill-gotten gains, the point of the law of fraud is to protect people from
becoming victims of trickery or deception. An adequate moral theory of securities
fraud in insider trading must show not merely why corrective actions should be
taken against someone who wrongfully gains from using stolen information in a
securities transaction, it must also show an essential link between taking such
corrective action and vindicating the rights of a victim of securities fraud. 122
Unjust enrichment fails in this regard. At the heart of securities fraud by insiders
trading is the idea of deception. A person who has been defrauded is a victim of
deceit. 123

Yet, trading on the basis of information obtained by luck is not

actionable, nor morally wrong. Because either disclosure rule gives someone a
benefit and someone a loss, equitable considerations are compromised no matter
which rule is adopted. Strudler and Orts offered an alternative basis for the
prohibition against insider trading, based upon an “equitable disclosure rationale”.
They argue that nondisclosure violates the other party’s autonomy in making a
fully informed decision. Insider trading liability should be premised on the moral
wrong of improperly acquiring inside information to a misuse that is inconsistent
with the autonomy of the person with whom the wrongdoer trades.124 They argue
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that there is nothing wrong with a rule that permits people who are lucky enough
to stumble on valuable information from using the information to their advantage
on the market. Shifting the focus away from fiduciary duty between insider and
trader on the other side to fiduciary and the party regarding his autonomy trading
is wrong not because of the wrong to the source of the information, but because
the conversion and misuse of otherwise legitimately possessed information
compromises the automony of public investors.125 Strudler and Orts, perhaps
make too much of the two asserted rationale for the prohibition against insider
trading, since both have been rejected by the Supreme Court. 126 Further isn’t a
trader who is denied an autonomous decision deceived? Isn’t the point of Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to ensure an informed intelligent, hence autonomous
investment decision?

Beyond this should federal securities laws be concerned

with the individual autonomy of investors?
The debate over the merits of the prohibition of insider trading takes on a
wholly different dimension when it is asserted by employee-shareholders that not
all trading on the basis of material non-public information should be prohibited,
that is, they should be permitted to dispose of company stock on this basis when
necessary to safeguard their pension plans funded primarily by company stock.
They would extend the rationale for not prohibiting trading in the absence of a
duty, to not prohibiting trading where there is a dual duty, such as that owed by a
125
126
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plan fiduciary who is also a corporate insider privy to material non-public
information.

IV. ERISA and Fiduciary Duty to Plan Participants
In 1974, Congress adopted the Employer Retirement Income Security
Act, 127 designed to regulate employee investment, pension, and health benefit
plans by setting certain minimum standards for participation, vesting, and
funding, and imposing various fiduciary duties on those who manage such
plans. 128 Under ERISA, “Congress sought to protect and strengthen the rights of
employees, enforce uniform fiduciary standards, and encourage employers to
create and maintain benefit plans for their employees.” 129

A. Defined Contribution Plans and Defined Benefit Plans Under ERISA
There are two basic types of pension plans contemplated by ERISA:
defined-benefit and defined-contribution plans. Defined-benefit plans pay fixed
or determinable benefits. The benefits ordinarily are described in a formula
which specifies the amount payable in monthly or annual installment to
participants who retire at a certain age. As long as the plan and the employer
contributing to the plan remains solvent, and the plan continues to be operated,
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vested participants will receive the benefits specified.

In the event that

investment results of the plan do not meet expectations, the employers usually
will be required, on the basis of actuarial computations, to make additional
contributions to fund the promised benefits. If, on the other hand, the plan’s
earnings are better than anticipated, the employer may be permitted to make
contributions that are less than the projected amounts. 130

The employer

determines the amount of its future pension obligations and sets aside the funds
needed to meet those obligations. 131
A defined-contribution plan, on the other hand, does not pay any fixed or
determinable benefits.

Instead, benefits vary depending upon the amount of

contributions, the investment success of the plan, and allocations made of benefits
forfeited by non-vested participants who leave their employment.

132

Often, a

defined contribution plan is supplemented by a matching contribution from the
employer. The joint contributions are then allocated to employees’ individual
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account. 133

Under most defined-contribution plans, the employee, not the

employer, decides how their contributions will be invested. This power applies to
both the employee contributions and those made by the employer. 134 The trend in
recent years had been toward establishing defined contribution plans and away
from defined-benefit plans. 135 This trend is remarkable in that the two types of
plans differ in the allocation of investment risk.
Under the defined-benefit plan, the employer obligates itself to a defined
payout, which means that if it sets aside insufficient funds or if those funds are
invested in securities that perform poorly, the employer bears the risk and may
find itself unable to meet its commitment under the plan. 136 In contrast, under a
defined-contribution plan, the employee who directs investments, will realize
benefits based upon the value created by those investment choices. 137 The 401(k)
plan, named for the Internal Revenue Code provision under which employees are
allowed to defer taxation on contributions to qualified pension plans, is the most
common type of defined contribution pension plan and the primary vehicle for
retirement security in this country-- approximately forty million Americans
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participate in such plans. 138 Defined contribution plans also include Employee
Stock Ownership Plans (“ESOP”), a plan that primarily invests in shares of stock
of the employer. 139
Typically, the defined contribution plan gives the employee a menu of
diversified mutual funds and other investment options selected by the employer,
which can include the employer’s own stock.

The employer’s matching

contribution can and is typically in the form of company stock and under many
such plans, this is the only option. 140 When this occurs, typically, the employee
will not be allowed to sell those shares and reinvest the proceeds until he or she
reaches a defined age, often fifty, fifty-five, or sixty. 141 Diversification is not
required under ERISA for defined-contribution plans, but is required for defined
benefit plans, and such plans may not hold more than ten percent of plan assets in
company stock. 142

In creating ESOP’s Congress sought to develop plans that

would function as both “‘ employee retirement benefit plan and a technique of
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corporate finance’ that would encourage employee ownership of a company. 143
As a result of these dual purposes, ESOPs are not intended to guarantee retirement
funds and they place employee retirement assets at a greater risk than the typical
diversified, ERISA-regulated plan. 144
It was reported that for all plans offering company stock as an option, the
average amount of plan assets allocated to that investment option is nearly fortytwo percent; that number is higher at some companies. 145 At Enron, it was nearly
two-thirds. 146 This over-investment is unduly risky and may result not only from
the naiveté of the employee-investor, but from encouragement from management
as occurred in Enron. 147 Employee naiveté in the overinvestment in the company
stock may be based upon unrealistic expectations of growth based on the
historical growth rate of the company. 148

Yet, a stock price collapse, even one

that is not a total collapse, may have disastrous consequences for the employee
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plan participant. 149

A recent paper attempted to quantify the cost of over-

investment of pension plan assets in company stock: under reasonable
assumptions, the study concluded, company stock in a non-diversified portfolio
may actually be worth as little as forty-two percent of its market value.150 At the
same time that the employer’s stock represents a large percentage of the
employee’s pension trust, the same investment represents only a small percentage
of the company’s total outstanding shares-- at Enron only two percent--meaning
that employees have little or no power within the corporation by virtue of
shareholder status. 151
B. Fiduciaries Under ERISA
Congress mandated that private pension plan assets be held in trust for the
exclusive benefit of plan participants and beneficiaries. 152 This mandate has the
corollary effect of imposing personal liability upon pension plan fiduciaries for
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violation of their duties to plan participants. 153 But, unlike under the securities
laws, where it can safely be said that directors and officers are fiduciaries of the
corporation, the question of who is a fiduciary under ERISA is not readily
determined by reference to title within the corporate sponsor of a pension plan.
“The ‘threshold question’ in an action charging breach of fiduciary duty under
ERISA is ‘not whether the actions of some person employed to provide services
under a plan adversely affected a plan beneficiary’s interest, but whether that
person was acting as a fiduciary (that is, performing a fiduciary function) when
taking the action subject to complaint.” 154 A fiduciary may be either a named
fiduciary or a de facto fiduciary. In any event, fiduciary status is to be construed
liberally, consistent with ERISA policies. 155
1. Named Fiduciary
A named fiduciary is one “named in the plan instrument, or identified as
a fiduciary (A) by a person who is an employer or employee organization with
respect to the plan or (B) by such an employer and such as an employee
organization acting jointly.” 156 The corporate sponsor itself may be a named or
functional fiduciary under a plan, where it is given the power and discretion “to
establish and change the investment alternatives among which participants may
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direct the investment of their accounts; and review the status of the investment
policy and the selection and performance of the investment alternatives offered
under the plan.” 157 Typically, the employer, its board of directors and chief
executive officer will be named fiduciaries with power of management and
investment over plan assets. As this language shows, under ERISA, a fiduciary
need not be an independent party.
Also, there may be a plan administrator or administration committee
(made up of members of the employer’s board of directors) and an investment
committee (usually appointed by the employer) with the power of general
administration of the Plan, including allocating the assets of the Fund among
separate accounts, monitoring the diversification of the Fund and ensuring
compliance with ERISA.

Usually, there is a plan Trustee with direct

management, investment and disposition powers over the plan’s assets. 158 The
power to appoint, retain, or remove the trustee typically resides in the named
fiduciary, a power itself resulting in the fiduciary duty to monitor the acts of the
trustee. 159
2. Functional or De facto Fiduciary
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Alternatively, a person may be deemed a fiduciary on the basis of his or
her functional authority and control relative to the plan. 160 Under this functional
or de facto method, “[a] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent
(i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting the
management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting
management or disposition of its assets; (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee
or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other
property of such plan or has any discretionary authority or discretionary
responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary
responsibility in the administration of such plan.” 161 “A fiduciary within the
meaning of ERISA must be someone acting in the capacity of manager,
administrator, or financial adviser to a plan.” 162

This means that a fiduciary is

one who exercises discretionary control over some aspect of the management or
administration of an ERISA plan, or any control whatsoever over plan assets. 163
Fiduciary status is to be determined by looking at the actual authority or power
demonstrated, as well as the formal title and duties of the parties at issue.164 Yet,
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“‘a person is a fiduciary only with respect to those aspects of the plan over which
he exercises authority or control.’” 165 Because ERISA defines a fiduciary “in
functional terms of control and authority over the plan,” 166 an individual may be
a fiduciary in some of his or her actions, but not in regard to others. 167

“A

fiduciary’s obligations can apply to managing, advising, and administering an
ERISA plan….” 168
Where a person actually exercises any authority or control over the
management or disposition of the assets of the plan, formal or delegated
discretion to do so is not required for a finding that that person is a fiduciary. 169
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defendants were named fiduciaries and also that the plan documents did not effectively delegate
the named fiduciaries’ duty to other persons or entities, and also that even if the plan was read as
effectively delegating fiduciary responsibilities and that defendants were functional fiduciaries in
that the defendants in fact, selected and monitored the investment options and actually exercised
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The text of ERISA makes no distinction between the functional definition of a
trustee and the formal designation of a fiduciary named by the plan document or
by following the procedure in those documents for designating a fiduciary. As
such, the liability section of ERISA applies to both. 170
3. Two Hats
Can individual officers of a corporate plan fiduciary be personally liable
for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA?

While ERISA’s definition of

fiduciary is “to be broadly construed,” an individual cannot be liable as an ERISA
fiduciary solely by virtue of her position as a corporate director, officer,
shareholder or manager. 171 Instead, one is a fiduciary only “to the extent that he

the fiduciary functions of managing plan investments; that the Board defendants were functional
ERISA fiduciaries; that they had the authority to appoint other fiduciaries and had “final review
and authority over all fiduciary actions taken and decisions made by the Administration
Committee Defendants, were sufficient to show that defendants exercised fiduciary duties beyond
the appointment duty by reviewing the Administration Committees’ fiduciary functions.
Defendants argued that only the Investment Committee, and not EDS, the Board Committee,
BAC, nor CEO Brown, could be liable for failing to prudently manage the plan assets, because the
Plan allocated all investment responsibility to the Investment Committee. The court rejected that
argument pointing out that defendants had not appreciated the difference in the types of fiduciary
authority at issue. Plaintiffs alleged not only that defendants were named fiduciaries, but also
functional fiduciaries, liable to the extent they actually exercised control over investment decisions
or the investment of plan assets, such that delegation of fiduciary duty was irrelevant to
defendants’ liability. Moreover, the court found that as a matter of law, courts of the Fifth Circuit
had imposed a duty to monitor appointees on fiduciaries with appointment power. Id. at 666. The
defendants apparently did not dispute that the Administration Committee and Investment
Committee defendants were functional ERISA fiduciaries, since they were primarily responsible
for exercising the traditional fiduciary functions, managing the day-to-day Plan operations, as well
as exercising discretionary authority and control over disposition of Plan assets and Plan
administration.
169
Id. at 671, citing Goyne & Delany Co. v. Selman, 98 F.3d 1457, 1465 (4th Cir. 1996); Martin
v. Feilen, 965 F.2d 660, 669-70 (8th Cir. 1992); Enron, 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 553, 661.
170
284 F. Supp.2d at 545-46.
171
Sommers I, 793 F.2d 1460 (
); Dynergy at 899.
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acts in such capacity, in relation to the plan.” 172 A plan administrator is a
fiduciary, as well as individual officers of the corporate employer to the extent
they exercised authority or discretion over plan assets. 173 Courts have recognized
that a corporation and its board may wear two “hats”-- that of employer and of
ERISA fiduciary.

ERISA liability arises only from actions taken or duties

breached in the performance of ERISA obligations. 174

Some courts have

recognized the conceptual difficulties in imposing personal liability in such
instances where the corporation can only act through its officers. The traditional
rule is that a corporate officer is not personally liable for his actions while acting
within the course and scope of his employment. Some courts have held that an
individual corporate employee must have individual discretionary role in the plan
administration to be liable as a fiduciary under ERISA. 175
solely by reason of holding office. 176

They are not liable

Other courts stressing the functional

definition of a fiduciary under ERISA, have held that the individuals within the
corporations who actually exercised the fiduciary discretionary control or
172

Dynergy at 899.
Enron
174
Pegram, 530 U.S. at 225-26; Worldcom, 263 F. Supp.2d 745, 760 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)(holding
member of board of company, which was the plan administrator with the power to appoint
individuals, including “any” Worldcom officer as fiduciary were not fiduciaries by virtue of their
powers under state law to manage the corporation)
175
284 F.Supp. 2d at 567, citing Confer v. Custom Engineering Co., 952 F.2d 34, 37 (3d Cir.
1991)(“when an ERISA plan names a corporation as a fiduciary, the officers who exercise
discretion on behalf of the corporation are not fiduciaries within the meaning of [29 U.S.C. §
1002] 3(21)(A)(iii) unless it can be shown that these officers have individual discretionary roles
as to plan administration.”); Hull v. Policy Management Systems Corp., (D.S.C. Feb. 9,
2001)(absence of investment powers in plan documents, and evidence that director made any
investment decision meant director was not a fiduciary).
176
Id. at 568, citing Department of Labor regulations at 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 at D-5 (1991).
173
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authority in their official capacity may also be personally liable, depending on the
facts of the particular case. 177 Thus, where the plan document empowered only
the “Plan Committee” to make investment decisions, and only gave the board of
directors the authority to cause the corporate sponsor to make contributions to the
Plan, to appoint and remove members of the Plan Committee, and to terminate the
Plan in whole or in part, the board of directors of the corporate sponsor of the plan
would not be held to be fiduciary regarding investment decisions. 178

Similarly,

in the case of defined contribution plans, that the Board of Directors whose
responsibilities did not include the selection of investments, but merely the
selection of the members of the Plan Committee, where they otherwise did not
control investment decisions or communicate Plan information, was not a

177

Id. at 568, citing Kayes v. Pacific Lumber Co., 51 F.3d 1449, 1459-61 (9th Cir. 1995)(rejecting
the Third Circuit rule in Confer that an officer who acts on behalf of a named fiduciary
corporation cannot be a fiduciary if he acts within his official capacity and if no fiduciary duties
are delegated to him individually, since such a rule would allow a corporation to “shield its
decision-makers from personal liability merely by stating in the plan documents that all their
actions are taken on behalf of the company and not in a fiduciary capacity.”); Stewart v. Thorpe
Holding Co. Profit Sharing Plan, 207 F.3d 1143, 1156 (9th Cir. 2000)(“where, as here, a
committee or entity is named as the plan fiduciary, the corporate officers or trustees who carry out
the fiduciary functions are themselves fiduciaries and cannot be shielded from liability by the
company.”); Rankin v. Rots, 278 F.Supp. 2d 853 (E.D.Mich. 2003)(Although company, Kmart,
was named plan Administrator, Kmart, in that status had the authority to appoint an investment
manager or managers with regard to an Investment Fund and may employ one or more persons to
render advice with regard to any of the company’s responsibilities under the plan; and could
delegate any of the such powers to any person or persons or committee or committees, whether
existing or newly-created, thus making those appointed fiduciaries and so also the members of the
board under the plan documents which gave a level of control to the board and finance committee,
to the extent they exercised discretionary authority or control respecting management or
disposition of assets and by appointing individuals to the employee benefits plans investment
committee, giving rise to a duty to monitor those appointed).
178
Hull v. Policy Management Systems Corporations, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22343 (D. S.C. 2001).
The court also refused to find a general duty to supervise the activities of the Plan committee. Id.
at *18.
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fiduciary under the plan. 179

However, while Board members, not named as

fiduciaries, to the extent that they served on the compensation committee of the
corporate sponsor of the plan, which under the plan was responsible for
investment policy for the plan, the selection of Trustees and investment advisors
and managers for overall investment policy, could be regarded as plan
fiduciaries. 180
Where also, any officer, the president and chief executive officer, had
authority to perform the company’s functions as plan administrator and
investment fiduciary, and other officers, such as the employee benefits director,
who exercised day-to-day authority or control regarding management of the plan,
management or disposition of the Plan’s assets, and administration of the Plan,
they could be held as fiduciaries under ERISA. 181
179

Further, where the evidence

Hull v. Policy Management Systems Corporations, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22343 (D. S.C. 2001);
In re Williams Companies ERISA Litigation, 271 F. Supp.2d 1328 (ND. Okla. 2003); but see In re
CMS Energy ERISA Litigation, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8713 (E.D. Mich. March 31,
2004)(refusing to dismiss complaint against individual board members where plan provided that
company shall be responsible for the general administration of the plan and for carrying out the
provisions thereof…[and the] Board of Directors [of one employer] shall appoint such persons,
who may be Members under the plan, as it determines at any time to act as Plan Administrators in
all dealings under the plan, where even though individual board members were not named
fiduciaries, whether they had discretion or responsibilities would be determined by evidence
developed in the litigation).
180
In re Mckesson HBOC, Inc. ERISA Litiga., 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19473, *33 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
Also, in that case, the Master Trust conferred on the board the authority and responsibility for
determining the investment policy to be implemented by the Compensation Committee. Though
there appeared to be a conflict between the Master Trust, giving the Board investment
responsibility and the Plan Documents, giving the Compensation Committee that authority, giving
fiduciary a broad reading, the court concluded that it could not rule that the board was not a
fiduciary regarding investment policies on a motion to dismiss.
181
Worldcom, 263 F. Supp.2d 745, 760 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), There the court found that Worldcom
had and did exercise discretionary authority or discretionary control over the management of the
Plan, the disposition of the Plan’s assets, and the administration of the Plan. Under the plan, any
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suggests that the board of directors had the authority to appoint other fiduciaries
and had “final review and authority over all fiduciary actions taken and decisions
made by the administration committee, individual board members can be held
liable as fiduciaries, by that fact and based upon a failure to monitor
appointees. 182
4. Delegation of Duties to Other Fiduciaries
ERISA provides a safe harbor from liability for a named fiduciary to the
extent it has allocated or designated its fiduciary responsibilities to another. 183
Named fiduciaries typically delegates to investment committees or plan
administrators such duties as the administration of the plan, including day to day
administration, investment of the plan’s assets and authority to interpret the
provisions of the plan.

However, notwithstanding the safe harbor, a named

Worldcom officer could be appointed to perform Worldcom’s functions as Plan Administrator and
Investment Fiduciary, although Worldcom did not appoint any officer. The chief executive offier
did exercise discretionary authority or discretionary control, regarding management of the Plan.
Id. at 759. Of Worldcom employees, only the employee benefits director, who exercised day to
day authority or control regarding management of the plan, management or disposition of the
Plan’s assets, and administration of the Plan, and to have provided direction to the Plan’s Trustee
was a fiduciary. The allegations against the defendant directors were otherwise insufficient to
establish that they were fiduciaries, where the complaint only alleged that they signed documents
filed with the SEC and the mere holding of office to direct the management of the corporation was
not sufficient. Id. at 760.
182
In re Electronics Data System Corp. “ERISA” Litig., 305 F. Supp.2d 658 (E.D.Tex. 2004); In
re Xcel Energy, Inc Securities, Derivative & ERISA Litigation, 312 F. Supp.2d 1165, 1176 (D.
Minn. 2004).
183
29 U.S.C. § 1105(c)(2). This section provides--------------------.
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fiduciary may be liable for continuing the allocation or designation if the
continuation is not prudent. 184
5. Directed Trustee
A directed trustee is defined under ERISA as one who is required to invest
funds and follow in every material way directions by the plan administrator.

185

However, the directed fiduciary or trustee is not absolved from a duty of inquiry
regarding investment of plan assets, where it adheres to directions when public
information of which it knows or should know calls into question the wisdom of
the instructions. 186

184

See e.g., In re Westar Energy, Inc. ERISA Litigation, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 28585 (D. Kansas.
September 29, 2005)(named fiduciary which allocated investment decisions to Investment and
Benefits Committee could be liable for continuing the allocation and failing to remove fiduciaries
where it knew or should have known the fiduciaries were not qualified to loyally and prudently
manage plan’s assets and by failing to conduct an independent investigation into or monitor the
merits of investing the Plan’s assets in company stock, where facts showed fiduciaries embarked
upon acquisitions or unregulated businesses, resulting in a substantial decline in the company’s net
income and an increase in total debt; a restructuring plan which ended up saddling the company
with substantial debt; spending abuses by corporate executives; and a precipitous decline in the
stock price).
185
29 U.S.C. §1103(a)(1). 403(a)
186
In re Worldcom, supra (2005). However, in that case, the court found the complaint sufficient
with respect to Merrill Lynch’s administration of the Plan, but not with respect to its role as an
investment advisor. Under the terms of the plan, Merrill Lynch was required to follow the
directions as to investments given to it by the Investment Fiduciary, that is, Worldcom, and the
plan participants. Still, Merrill Lynch retained the discretion and even the obligation as a directed
trustee to abide by duties imposed by ERISA. On this point, ERISA provides that the directed
trustee is subject to the direction of a named fiduciary who is not a trustee, in which case the
directed trustee shall be subject to proper directions of such fiduciary which are made in
accordance with the terms of the plan and which are not contrary to [ERISA]. 29 U.S.C. §
1103(a). Thus, as a directed trustee, Merrill Lynch was deprived of discretion to manage and
control the Plan’s assets generally, but retained the discretion, and indeed the obligation, to follow
only “proper” directions of the Investment Advisor, directions which were made in accordance
with the terms of the Worldcom Plan and which were not “contrary to” the ERISA statute. This
meant that as a directed Trustee, Merrill Lynch was not required to exercise its independent
judgment in deciding how and whether to invest employee funds as directed; it had only to make
sure that [Worldcom’s] directions were proper, in accordance with the terms of the plan, and not
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C. The Fiduciary Duties Under ERISA
Section 1104(a)(1) of ERISA expressly imposes three general duties on
pension plan fiduciaries: (1) “to discharge their duties with prudence; (2) to
diversify investments to minimize the risk of large losses”; and (3) to act “solely
in the interest of the participants” and for the “exclusive purpose” of providing
benefits to those participants. 187 This list does not purport to be an exhaustive list
of duties owed.
Instead, the common law of trusts is engrafted upon ERISA to define the
general scope of fiduciary authority and responsibility. 188 The ordinary trust law
understanding of fiduciary administration of a trust is to perform the duties
imposed, or exercise the powers conferred, by trust documents.” 189

It also

includes the activities that are “ordinary and natural means’ of achieving the
contrary to ERISA.” Id. at 761. A directed trustee’s conduct is still measured by the prudent
person standard, meaning a directed trustee is not justified in complying with directions if the
trustee knows or ought to know that the holder of the power is violating his duty to the
beneficiaries as a fiduciary in giving directions. Id. at 762. Here, the facts did not show that the
decline of Worldcom was generally out of step with other large companies and the directed trustee
had no duty to inquire whether Worldcom was undertaking prudence reviews of plan’s
investments, such as where the plan administrators request investment in company stock where
public information calls into question short term viability as a going consensus
187
29 U.S. C. § 1104(a)(1). ERISA also expressly prohibits certain transactions where the
potential for abuse is particularly acute. Section 1106 forbids a fiduciary from engaging in a
transaction that the fiduciary “knows or should know” is a transaction with a party in interest. 29
U.S.C. § 1106(a). Furthermore, employer securities ordinarily may not comprise more than ten
percent of the aggregate fair market value of plan assets. Finally, ERISA requires fiduciaries
discharge their duties in accordance with the terms of the plan, except when such terms conflict
with titles I and IV of ERISA.
188
Varity Corporation v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496 (1996), citing H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, pp. 3-5,
11-13 (1973); 2 Legislative History of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(Committee Print Compiled for the Senate Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare by the Library of Congress, Ser. No. 93-406,pp. 2350-2352, 2358-2360
(1976); G.Bogert & G. Bogert, Law of Trusts and Trustees § 255, p. 343 (rev. 2d ed. 1992).
189
Worldcom, 263 F. Supp. 2d 745 at 758 citing Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 502.

58

‘objective’ of the plan.” 190 Although Congress expected that the courts would
interpret the common law standard with regard to the special nature and purpose
of employee benefit plans. 191 The common law of trusts, however, does not
provide a complete answer to the question of the scope of a fiduciary’s duties. In
some cases, trust law will only provide a starting point for analysis, after which a
court must ask “whether or to what extent, the language of the statute, its
structure, or its purposes require” a departure from the common law trust rules. 192
In this endeavor the competing congressional purposes become evident: on the
one hand, Congress’ desire to offer employees enhanced protection for their
benefits and on the other, its desire not to create a system that is so complex that
administrative and litigation costs unduly discourage employers from setting up
pension plans. 193
1. The Duty to Act Prudently
Section 404(a) of ERISA holds fiduciaries to the “prudent man” standard,
which includes the duty to act “for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to
participants and their beneficiaries… with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence
under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like

190

Id. at 758, citing Varity Corp. 516 U.S. at 504.
Varity Corporation, 516 U.S. at 497, citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S.
101, 110-111 (1989); see also In re Enron Corporation Securities, Derivative & “ERISA”
Litigation v. Enron Corporation, 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 546 (S.D. Tex. 2003), citing Pegram v.
Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 224 (2000).
192
Varity Corporation, 516 U.S. at 497.
193
Id. at 497.
191
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capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise
of a like character and with like aims, 194 and in accordance with the documents
and instruments governing the plan.” 195
To meet the “prudent man” standard, 196 fiduciaries must act with care, and
“with single-minded devotion” to plan participants and beneficiaries. 197

In

evaluating the conduct of a fiduciary to determine compliance with the prudent
man standard, courts objectively assess whether the fiduciary, at the time of the
transaction, utilized proper methods to investigate, evaluate and structure the
investment; acted in a manner as would others familiar with such matters; and
exercised independent judgment when making investment decisions. The test is

194

Id. at § 1104(a)(1)(A)(B).
Worldcom, 263 F. Supp.2d at 758.
196
Under 29 U.S.C. §1104(a)(1)(B).
197
284 F.Supp. 2d at 547. citing Department of Labor regulations at 29 C.F.R. 2550.404a-1(b),
explaining when requirements are satisfied including having given appropriate consideration to
those facts and circumstances that given the scope of such fiduciary’s investment duties, the
fiduciary knows or should know are relevant to the particular investment or investment course of
action, including the role the investment or investment course of action plays in that portion of the
plan’s investment portfolio with respect to which the fiduciary has investment duties.
“[A]ppropriate consideration” includes but is not limited to (1) a determination by the fiduciary
that the particular investment or investment course of action is reasonably designed as part of the
portfolio, to further the purpose of the plan, taking into consideration the risk of loss and the
opportunity for gain (or other return) associated with the investment or investment course of
action. Consideration of the composition of the portfolio with regard to diversification, the
liquidity and current return of the portfolio relative to the anticipated cash flow requirements of
the plan; the projected return of the portfolio relative to the funding objectives of the plan. Thus,
because every investment necessarily causes a plan to forego other opportunities, an investment
will not be prudent if it would be expected to provide a plan with a lower rate of return than
available alternative investments with commensurate degrees of risk or is riskier than alternative
available investment with commensurate rates of return.
The Department of Labor regulations reflects the modern portfolio theory rather than the
common law of trusts standards, which examined each investment with an eye toward its
individual riskiness.
195
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one of conduct, not the result of performance. 198 Thus, the appropriate inquiry is
“whether the individual trustees at the time they engaged in the challenged
transactions, employed appropriate methods to investigate the merits of the
investment and to structure the investment.” 199

Prudence is measured by an

objective standard. 200 Because the “prudent man” standard focuses on whether
the fiduciary utilized appropriate methods to investigate and evaluate the merits of
a particular investment, the appropriate methods in a particular case depend on the
“character” and “aim” of the particular plan and decisions at issue and the
“circumstances prevailing” at the time a particular course of action must be
investigated and undertaken. 201

While a fiduciary may have some duty to

investigate the wisdom of an investment, a failure to investigate will not result in
liability unless an adequate investigation would have revealed to a reasonable
fiduciary that the investment at issue was improvident. 202
a. Duty to Follow Directives
While the “prudent man” standard that requires the fiduciary to act “with
single-minded devotion” to the plan participants and beneficiaries 203 would seem
to mean a duty to follow the directives of the plan documents, this is so only
198

284 F. Supp.2d at 548. Laborers National Pension Fund v. Northern Trust Quantiative
Advisors, Inc. , 173 F.3d 313, 317 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 528 U.S. 967 (1999)
199
Id.
200
Fink v. Nat’l Sav. & Trust Co., 249 U.S. App. D.C., 772 F.2d 951, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
201
Bussian, 223 F.3d 299.
202
Kuper v.Iovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1460 (6th Cir. 1995); Barker v. Am. Mobil Power Corp, 64 F.3d
1397, 1403 (9th Cir. 1995)(ERISA fiduciary has duty to investigate suspicion he has with respect
to plan funding and maintenance); Dynergy-----------------------------.
203
284 F. Supp.2d at 546,
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insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions of
ERISA.” 204

This means that fiduciaries do not fulfill the duty of prudence

merely by following the governing plan documents. Instead, they “must exercise
their judgment and refuse to follow the plan direction if their analysis leads them
to believe that the plan-directed investment would be imprudent and inconsistent
with ERISA.” 205
b. Duty to Monitor
Another duty falling generally under the duty to act prudently is the duty
to monitor those appointed under a power to appoint and remove plan fiduciaries.
A person with discretionary authority to appoint, maintain, and remove plan
fiduciaries is himself deemed a fiduciary with respect to the exercise of that
authority. 206 However, the scope of the duty to monitor appointees is relatively
narrow 207 and is said to require only oversight of appointees to ensure that their

204

29 U.S.C. §1104(a)(1)(D); see also Xcel, 312 F.Supp.2d 1165 (D.Minn. 2004).
Id. at *11, citing Herman, 126 F.3d at 1369; In re Enron Corp., 284 F.Supp.2d 511, 549
(S.D.Tex. 2003). However, a “directed trustee” is not required to exercise independent judgment
in deciding how and whether to invest employee funds as directed, but is required to make sure
that the directions are proper, in accordance with the terms of the plan and not contrary to ERISA.
In re Worldcom, Inc. ERISA Litigation, 263 F. Supp.2d 745, 762, citing Herman v. Nationsbank
Trust Co., 126 F.3d 1354, 1371 (11th Cir. 1997). A “directed trustee” is nonetheless, still a
fiduciary, the prudent man standard only modified in this particular. Id. , citing Maniace
v.Commerce Bank, N.A.., 40 F.3d 264 (8th Cir. 1994).
206
Coyne v. Delany Co. v. Selman, 98 F.3d 1457, 1465 (4th Cir. 1996); In re Enron, 284
F.Supp.2d at 562 (“the complaint alleged facts, which had the fiduciary cared to investigate, (as
was their duty) regulatory filings would have revealed that Enron was in deep trouble.”) .
207
Coyne, 198 F.3d 1466, n. 10; In re Enron, 284 F. Supp.2d at 554-55.
205
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performance has been in compliance with the terms of the plan and statutory
standards, and satisfies the needs of the plan. 208
2. The Duty to Diversify
Under the common law of trusts, a fiduciary is duty-bound “to make such
investments and only such investments as a prudent [person] would make of his
own property having in view the preservation of the estate and the amount and
regularity of the income to be derived….” 209 A fiduciary is required to exercise
due care, meaning he must investigate the safety of the investment and its
potential for income by securing reliable information, and taking into
consideration the advice of qualified others, as long as he exercises his own
judgment in the final decision. 210 The specific provisions of ERISA are parallel
to the common law of trusts as it specifically requires that a plan fiduciary
208

Id. at 553; EDS------------(On plaintiffs’ allegation that defendants failed to monitor
appropriately the Administrator defendants, and the investment committee defendants, the court
also rejected defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that a duty to monitor appointees by
fiduciaries with appointment power is imposed by ERISA. Id. at 670, citing Leigh v. Engle, 727
F.2d 113, 135 (7th Cir. 1984), holding that two fiduciaries responsible for selecting and retaining
the plan administrators had a duty to monitor appropriately the administrators’ actions.” The two
fiduciaries could not “abdicate their duties under ERISA merely through the device of giving their
lieutenants [appointees] primary responsibility for the day to day management of the trust.” Id. at
666-67. Rather, the two fiduciaries “were obliged to act with an appropriate prudence and
reasonableness in overseeing” the appointees’ conduct. Id. at 135. Indeed, the Department of
Labor Interpretive Bulletin, further explains: “at reasonable intervals the performance of trustees
and other fiduciaries should be reviewed by the appointing fiduciary in such manner as may be
reasonably expected to ensure that their performance has been in compliance with the terms of the
plan and statutory standards, and satisfies the needs of the plan.” 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 at FR-17.
Other courts, adopting this reasoning have imposed a duty to monitor appointees. The court,
however, decline to define the scope of the duty to monitor on a motion to dismiss, finding only
that plaintiffs had broadly alleged a cause of action on this theory sufficient to entitle it to
discovery on the issue. Id. at 671.
209
Restatement (Second) Trusts § 227 (1959).
210
Id., cmts. (a)-(c), e.
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diversify the plan’s investment to minimize risk of loss. However, the duty to
diversify under ERISA is limited in three ways: First, plan investments must be
diversified unless it is clearly prudent not to diversify. 211 The evaluation of
diversification is not be done solely on the basis of hindsight, nor on the basis of
the results of investments. 212 To prevail, plaintiff must show that the portfolio, on
its face, was not diversified. The burden then shifts to defendant to demonstrate
that it was “clearly prudent” not to diversify, the express statutory exception. 213
At the same time, the plan fiduciary must follow the documents and instruments
governing the plan, which may direct the fund be funded solely with company
stock, to the extent they are consistent with ERISA. 214 In case of a conflict, the
fiduciary must act in accordance with provisions of ERISA which above all
requires fiduciaries to act solely in the best interests of the beneficiaries. In
determining whether a trustee has breached his duties in this regard, the court

211

29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C). ERISA’s duty to diversify, however, is not measured by hard and
fast rules or formulas. Instead, Congress recognized that the degree of investment concentration
will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Among the considerations are: the
purposes of the plan; the amount of the plan assets; financial and industrial conditions; the type of
investment, whether mortgages, bonds or shares of stock or otherwise; distribution as to industries;
the dates of maturity. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1280,93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5038, 5085
212
In re: Unysis Savings Plan Litigation, 74 F.3d 420, 434 (3d Cir. 1996).
213
Id. at 548-49. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(1)(C).
214
See Dynergy, at 892 (where plan required the employer match to be made in the form of shares
of the company stock, and precluded the committee defendant from serving as plan administrator
or named fiduciary regarding investment of trust assets, the fiduciary will not be held to have
breached a duty because its fiduciary duties could not be said to extend to either the acceptance or
the investment of employee matching contributions)

64

must examine both the merits of the challenged transaction and the thoroughness
of the fiduciary’s investigation into the merits of the transaction. 215
Second, in the case of an ESOP, where ownership of company stock is a
principal purpose of the plan, fiduciaries are generally not obligated to diversify
unless the failure to diversify would not be in the interests of the plan
participants. 216

This is an express statutory exemption from the

requirement of diversification for ESOP’s, which are typically funded solely in
the form of company stock. Congress envisioned that an ESOP would function
both as an “employee retirement benefit plan and a ‘technique of corporate
finance: that would encourage employee ownership.’”

217

Thus, there is a

presumption that continued investment in the company’s stock is proper and a
plan participant has the burden of showing that under all the circumstances
continued investment was not prudent. 218

However, the mere showing of a

decline in stock price is usually held not sufficient to demonstrate imprudence.
Instead, to overcome the presumption, plaintiff must show a precipitous decline in

215

Id. at 549-50; In re: Unysis Savings Plan Litigation, 74 F.3d at 434. (reliance upon advisor’s
recommendation to invest failed to satisfy fiduciary duty, where plan administrators did not
inquire into the basis for the recommendation). The Department of Labor regulations provide that
the requirements of diversification are satisfied if fiduciaries give “appropriate consideration to
those facts and circumstances that, given the scope of such fiduciary’s investment duties, the
fiduciary knows or should know are relevant to the particular investment or investment course of
action involved, including the role the investment plays in that portion of the plan’s investment
portfolio. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1(b)(i).
216
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2).
217
Martin v. Feilin, 965 F.2d 660,664 (8th Cir. 1992), cert denied, 113 S.Ct. 979 (1993).
218
Moench v.Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 570 (3d Cir. 1995); Kuper, 66 F.3d at 1459 (6th Cir. 1995).
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the employer’s stock, along with evidence that the company is on the brink of
collapse or undergoing serious mismanagement. 219
However, where a plan’s documents require the employer match to be
made in company stock, a fiduciary cannot be liable for not diversifying
investments. 220
Third, fiduciaries may be absolved of liability where a plan participant’s
exercise of individual control over the assets of an individual account resulted in a
loss. 221 In order for this exemption to apply, however, the plan participant must
have been given adequate information in order to make informed decisions.222

219

Moench v.Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 570 (3d Cir. 1995); Kuper, 66 F.3d 1447, 1460 (6th Cir.
1995). In Lalonde v Textron, 270 F. Supp. 2d 272 (D.R.I. 2003), the court granted defendants’
motion to dismiss claims alleging breach of fiduciary duty in the management of an ESOP plan,
where the plan administrator continued to invest in the company stock despite fluctuation and
eventual decline in the stock value (between 9 and 22%) where the evidence did not show the
decline was anything unusual or specifically related to the company’s viability. But see Lalonde v.
Textron, 369 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004), affirming in part and reversing in part. The court ruled that
as to certain claims, the district court failed to take into account plaintiff’s allegation that, during
the relevant period, the employer artificially inflated its stock price by concealing the “disparate
problem throughout the company’s segments and their adverse effect on Textron. The court
believed that because of the seeming conflicting purposes of an ESOP, further development of the
record was in order.
220
Dynergy,, at 896(fiduciary not liable for failing to comply with plan documents and instruments
governing the plan where it refused to direct the diversification of employer matching grants out
of employer stock or into diversified investments.
221
29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(B). Notwithstanding the general fiduciary duties imposed by the
common law and by the ERISA general provisions, ERISA provides specifically that a fiduciary is
not liable for losses that result from the exercise of control by the plan participants. But Section
1104(c) does not provide an automatic exemption. Instead, the fiduciary invoking this section has
the burden of showing that the plan falls within the language of the Section, including that it offer
a broad range of investments and “that the plan provided information sufficient for the average
participant to understand and assess: the control the plans permitted to a participant and the
financial consequences he or she assumed by exercising that control; the rights that ERISA
provided to participants and the obligations that the Act imposed upon fiduciaries; the plan’s terms
and operating procedures; the alternative funds the plans offered; the investments in which assets
in each fund were placed; the financial condition and performance of the investments; and
developments which materially affected the financial status of the investments.” 29 U.S.C. §
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1104(c) provides: “In case of a pension plan which provides for individual accounts and permits
a participant or beneficiary to exercise control over assets in his account, if a participant or
beneficiary exercises control over the assets in his account (as determined under regulations of the
Secretary)--(1) such participant or beneficiary shall not be deemed to be a fiduciary by reason of
such exercise, and (2) no person who is otherwise a fiduciary shall be liable under this part for any
loss, or by reason of any breach, which results from such participant’s or beneficiary’s exercise of
control.” The Department of Labor has promulgated regulations specifying the kinds of plans that
are plans under ERISA Section 1104 (c), the circumstances in which a participant or beneficiary is
considered to have exercised independent control over the assets in his account as contemplated by
Section 1104 (c), and the consequences of a participant’s or beneficiary’s exercise of control.” 29
C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(a). In particular, the regulations require that the plan inform the participants
or beneficiaries that the plan is intended to constitute a plan described in Section 1104(c) of
ERISA and that “fiduciaries…may be relieved of liability for any losses which are the direct and
necessary result of investment instructions given by such participant or beneficiary.” Id. at
§2550.404c-1(b)(2)(1)(i). And, the plan must also allow participants the opportunity to choose
from a broad range of investment alternatives, give investment instruction with appropriate
frequency, diversify investments, and obtain sufficient information to make informed investment
decisions. Section 1104(c) requires the defendant establish that the plans provided information
sufficient for the average participant to understand and assess; the control the plans permitted and
participant to exercise and the financial consequence he or she assumed by exercising control; the
rights that ERISA provided to participants and the obligations that the Act imposed on fiduciaries;
the Plan’s terms and operating procedures; the alternative funds the plans offered; the investments
in which assets in each fund were placed; the financial condition and performance of the
investments; and developments which materially affected that financial status of the investments.
Unisys at *447. In Unisys, the company failed to make this threshold showing; the evidence
failed to show the breadth of actual plan investments or assess all of the investment alternatives
available to participants. And, while participants’ ability to make initial contributions to the
plan’s various investment funds was unfettered, transfer restrictions were problematic, one could
conclude that these restrictions so significantly limited their ability to decide in which funds their
respective assets were allocated, that the restrictions were antithetical to the concept of
“independent control” that Congress enacted in Section 1104(c). Further, the company’s
agreement with one investment fund not to honor employee requests for withdrawal in exchange
for that investment’s consent to a reduction in the waiting period for asset transfers between noncompeting funds and another fund, control within the meaning of 1104(c) was no longer available
to the participants under the plan from that point forward. Id. *447-48.
Moreover,
notwithstanding a breach of duty, a fiduciary may not be held liable to plan participants or
beneficiaries absent a showing of a causal connection between the failure to fulfill the duty and the
harm caused. Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc., 974 F.2d 270, 279 (2d Cir. 1992). In
the case of an allegation that an investment was imprudent, to establish the causal connection, a
complaining plan participant must demonstrate that an adequate investigation would have revealed
to a reasonable fiduciary that the investment at issue was improvident. Fink v. National Savings &
Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also --------------.
222
Westar--------------------------------------
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3. Duty of Loyalty
Perhaps the most fundamental duty of ERISA plan fiduciaries is a duty of
complete loyalty, 223 to insure that they discharge their duty “solely in the interests
of the participants and beneficiaries,” and to “exclude all selfish interest and all
consideration of the interests of third persons.” 224 This duty has its source in the
common law of trusts, 225 which as stated earlier only offers a starting point for
analysis of ERISA. 226
The duty of loyalty is compromised to an extent by the “two hat” rule,
which exists in recognition that employer-fiduciary may wear “two hats,” acting
both as a fiduciary to an ERISA plan and as an employer with an obligation to the
company. Not every action of an ERISA fiduciary that affects a plan participant
need to be undertaken in the participant’s best interests. 227 As such, employers
are permitted to act in accordance with their interests as employers, even when
adverse to the interest of the beneficiaries, so long as they are not at the time
acting as an ERISA fiduciary. Thus, purely business decisions by an ERISA

223

29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
284 F. Supp.2d at 547.
225
Pegramv. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, quoting Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas
Pension Fund v. Central Transport, Inc, 472 U.S. 559 (1985)(rather than explicitly enumerating
all of the powers and duties of trustees and other fiduciaries, Congress invoked the common law of
trusts to define the general scope of their authority and responsibilities).
226
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432 (1999).
227
In re Xcel Energy Inc. Securities Deriviative & ERISA Litigation, 312 F. Supp. at 1175.
224
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employer are not governed by the duty of prudence or loyalty requirement. 228
This means that a decision to amend or terminate a plan is a business decision, not
the function of a fiduciary. 229

Similarly, decisions characterized as settlor

functions, “regarding the form or structure of the Plan, e.g., who is entitled to
receive benefits and in what amounts, how benefits are calculated, allowing plan
participants the ability to direct plan’s fiduciaries to purchase company stock,
imposing age and other restrictions on the ability of the participants to direct the
plan’s fiduciaries to transfer plan assets out of company stock, do not trigger
fiduciary duties. 230
Thus, an employer-sponsor of a pension plan may fire an employee for
reasons not related to the ERISA plan or may need to modify the terms of a plan
to be less generous to the beneficiary. 231 When making fiduciary decisions, a
fiduciary may wear only his fiduciary hat.
228

The statute states that one is a

Kuper v. Iovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1456 (6th Cir. 1995)(decision to arrange trust to trust transfer
was not a fiduciary decision), citing Berlin v. Michigan Bell Tele. Co., 858 F.2d 1154,1163 (6th
Cir. 1988).
229
In re CMS Energy ERISA Litigation, 312 F.Supp.2d 898, 911 (E.D. Mich. 2004) 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8713 at *19-20.
230
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432 (1999); see also Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517
U.S. 882 (1996)(nothing in ERISA requires employers to establish pension plans, nor mandate
what kind of benefits employers must provide if they chose to have such a plan); In re Enron, 284
F.Supp.2d at 655. (nothing in ERISA requires employers to establish employee benefit plans, nor
mandate the creation of pension plans, nor dictate the benefits to be afforded once a plan is
created, citing Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 887 (1996); Smith v. Contini, 205 F.3d 597,
602 (3d Cir. 2000); Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S.211, 226 (2000)(“specific payout detail of the
[ERISA] plan was, of course a feature that the employer as plan sponsor was free to adopt without
breach of any fiduciary duty under ERISA since an employer’s decisions about the content of a
plan are not themselves fiduciary acts).
231
To the extent an employer is not required to establish a plan to start with, once set up, when
they undertake the actions of plan design or modification, “they do not act as fiduciaries, but are
analogous to the settlers of a trust.” Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. at 890.
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fiduciary only “to the extent” that he acts in such a capacity in relation to a
plan. 232 “ERISA does require, however, that a fiduciary with two hats wear only
one at a time, and wear the fiduciary hat when making fiduciary decisions. 233
However, “a growing number of circuits have found the distinction
between the employer and fiduciary ‘hats’ begins to blur when company
circumstances are such that business details impact the administration of the
ERISA plan.” 234 Arguments that a decision to provide a company stock fund as
an investment option, and to make contributions to employees’ retirement funds
with company stock were not decisions made in a fiduciary capacity, but were
business decisions concerning plan design have been rejected on a motion to
dismiss. 235

In any event, when wearing its ERISA hat, the fiduciary must have

sole regard for the interests of the beneficiaries. 236

232

Id. at 550, citing Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. at 225-26. Thus, the act of amending a plan
does not constitute a fiduciary act and no duty to the beneficiary of the plan is raised.
233
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432 (1999).
234
Hill v. BellSouth, 313 F.Supp. 2d 1361 N.D. Ga. 2004) citng Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S.
489 (1996)(finding fiduciary duty existed as to dissemination of information). In Varity Corp., the
Court held that an employer acted as a fiduciary when it “intentionally connected its statements
about [a new division’s] financial health to statements it made about the future of benefits, so that
its intended communication about the security of benefits was rendered materially misleading.”
The Court left intact the distinction between ordidnary business decisions made by an employer
which might have an adverse collateral effect on a plan and actions specifically directed toward
the plan or its beneficiaries).
235
In re CMS Energy ERISA Litigation, 2004 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 8713 at *32-33; In re Sprint Corp
ERISA Litigation, 388 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D.Kan. 2004)(refusing to dismiss complaint where it
alleged a breach of duty of prudence by allowing fund to invest so heavily in company stock).
236
In re Enron Corp. Sec., Deriv. & ERISA Litigation, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 511,540 (S.D. Tex.
2003).
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a. The Duty to Disclose
ERISA requires a plan administrator to provide a summary plan
description to each plan participant within ninety days of becoming a
participant. 237 A summary plan description must be “calculated to be understood
by the average plan participant” and be “sufficiently accurate and comprehensive
to reasonably apprise such participants and beneficiaries of their rights and
obligations under the plan.” 238 After initial disclosure, ERISA requires the plan
administrator to supply an updated summary plan description to each participant
every five years if the plan contains amendments, or every ten years if not. A
plan administrator is also required to provide a summary description of material
modifications to the plan or other plan related information within seven months
after the end of the plan year in which the modification or change was adopted. 239
But the fiduciary’s duty to disclose is not so limited to such formal kinds of
information. Instead the duty is informed by the common law. The duty to
disclose under ERISA has been described as an “area of developing and
controversial law.” 240 It needs not be stated, that a fiduciary may not materially

237

29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(1)(A).
29 U.S.C. § 1022 (a)(1); 1022(b); see also 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-2(a)(requiring plan
administrators to exercise “considered judgment and discretion by taking into account such factors
as the level of comprehension and education of typical participants in the plan.”
239
29 U.S.C. § 1024(a)(1)-1024 (b)(3).
240
In re Enron Corp. Sec., Deriv. & ERISA Litigation, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 555.
238
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mislead those to whom fiduciary duties are owed.241

“[W]hen a plan

administrator speaks, it must speak truthfully.” 242 “Courts have generally agreed
that where an ERISA fiduciary makes statements about future benefits that
misrepresent present facts, these misrepresentations are material if they would
induce a reasonable person to rely on them.” 243 The duty to disclose has been
stated as “a constant thread in the relationship between beneficiary and trustee;
which entails not only a negative duty not to misinform, but also an affirmative
duty to inform when the trustee knows that silence might be harmful.” 244 Under
the common law, a fiduciary’s duty to disclose was generally triggered by a

241

In re: Unisys Savings Plan Litigation, 74 F.3d at 440; In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Medical
Benefit “ERISA Litigation,” 57 F. 3d 1255, 1261 (3d Cir. 1995)[other cases cited on page
440041?]
242
Fischer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 130, 135 (3d Cir.), cert denied 126 L. Ed. 2d 586
(1993); In re Dynergy, Inc. ERISA Litigation, 309 F. Supp.2d 861 (S.D.Tex. 2004); Varity Varity
Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 493 (1996); Peoria Union Stock Yards Co. Retirement Plan v. Penn.
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 698 F.2d 320, 326 (7th Cir. 1983); Xcel------------- at 1176;; Martinez v.
Schlumberger, Ltd., 338 F.3d at 425 (“When an ERISA plan administrator speaks in its fiduciary
capacity concerning a material aspect of the plan, it must speak truthfully”); McCall v. Burlington
Northern/Santa Fe, 237 F.3d at 510-11; Mullins v. Pfizer, Inc., 23 F.3d 663, 668 (2d Cir.
1994)(“when a plan administrator speaks, it must speak truthfully”).
243
Id. at 556, citing Ballone v. Eastman Kodak Co., 109 F.3d 117, 122-23 (2d Cir. 1997); Mullins
v. Pfizer, 23 F.3d at 669; Kurz v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 994 F.2d 136, 140 (3d Cir. 1993), cert.
denied sub. nom Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Fischer, 510 U.S. 1020 (1993); James v. Pirelli
Armstrong Tire Corp., 305 F.3d 439, 439 (6th Cir. 2002)(“[A] misrepresentation is material if
there is a substantial likelihood that it would mislead a reasonable employee in making an
adequately informed decision in pursuing… benefits to which she may be entitled.”), cert. denied
123 S.Ct. 2077 (2003).
244
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, §173, cmt.d; see also Bixler v. Central Pennsylvania
Teamsters Health and Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292 (3d Cir. 1994); Adams v. Freedom Forge
Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 480 (3d Cir. 2000); Watson v. Deaconess Waltham Hosp., 298 F.3d 102, 114
(1st Cir. 2002); Griggs v. E.I.DuPont DeNemours & Co., 237 F.3d 371, 380-81 (4th Cir. 2001);
Bowerman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 226 F.3d 575, 590 (7th Cir. 2000); Bins v. Exxon Co. U.S.A.,
220 F.3d 1042, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 2000)(en banc); Krohn v. Huron Mem’l Hosp., 173 F.3d 542,
547-48 (6th Cir. 1999)
[CONTINUED LEXIS P. 15]

72

specific request from a beneficiary. 245 However, given that this duty is founded
upon the recognition of the disparity of training and knowledge between the lay
beneficiary and the trained fiduciary, 246 even in the absence of a request for
information, the fiduciary may be under a duty to provide material information to
his beneficiary. 247 This does not mean that the fiduciary is obligated to disclose
everything it knows about an investment, but only that which is material of which
it has knowledge that is sufficient to apprise the average plan participant of the
risks associated with a particular investment.
Courts have taken varying positions on the question whether a plan
fiduciary’s general duty of loyalty expands the duty to disclose -- to include
matters other than those specified under the disclosure rules. Some courts refuse
to read an additional disclosure obligation into the fiduciary duty provisions
because ERISA deliberately defined fiduciary and disclosure obligation appearing
in separate sections of the statute, 248 these courts holding that an employer has no
affirmative duty to communicate any information about future plans as to plan
design to its employees, either before or after it gave serious consideration to
245

Restatement (Second) Trusts §173.
In re Unisys Savings Plan Litigation, 74 F.3d at 441 (3d Cir. 1996).
247
Id. 441.
248
See Bd. of Trs. of the CWA/ITU Negotiated Pension Plan v. Weanstein, 107 F.3d 139, 147 (2d
Cir. 1997)(finding Congress intentionally structured disclosure obligations to limit categories of
documents that administrators must disclose such that disclosure duties are not extended by
general fiduciary duties); Porto v. Armco, Inc., 825 F.2d 1274, 1276 (8th Cir. 1987)(“an
administrator who complies with the statutory standard for disclosure cannot be said to have
breached the fiduciary duty by not providing earlier disclosure”); Faircloth v. Lundy Packing Co.,
91 F.3d 648, 657 (4th Cir. 1996)(finding precedent does not recognize general fiduciary obligation
under ERISA to provide information related to plan on request).
246
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those programs. 249 Other courts have held that the fiduciary duty section of
ERISA codifies and makes applicable to the ERISA fiduciary the law of trusts. 250
These courts have ruled that trust principles impose a duty of disclosure upon an
ERISA fiduciary when there are “material facts affecting the interest of the
beneficiary which [the fiduciary] knows the beneficiary does not know, but needs
to know for his protection.” 251 This means that in some circumstances a fiduciary
may have an expanded duty to disclose even in the absence of a specific request
for information from the fiduciary, where the participant has “no reason to suspect
that it should make inquiry into what may appear to be a routine matter.” 252

By

incorporating the principles from the law of trusts, these courts have broadened
considerably the disclosure duties of fiduciaries. The broadening should be of
concern since the courts have not identified any clear limiting lines.

249

Martinez v. Schlumberger Technology Corp., 338 F.3d 407 (5th Cir. 2003)(discussing the cases
that have ruled on the question).
250
Courts have relied on the legislative history that “the principles of fiduciary conduct are
adopted from existing trust law, but with modification appropriate for employee benefit plans.”
H.R. Rep. 93-533 at 12-13 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4650-51.
251
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TRUSTS, §173, cmt. d (1959).
252
Id. at 556, quoting Glaziers and Glassworkers Union Local No. 225 Annuity Fund v.
Newbridge Securities, Inc., 93 F.3d 1171, 1181 (3d Cir.1996); Griggs v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours
& Co., 237 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2001)(fiduciary may have affirmative duty to provide material facts
affecting the interest of the beneficiary which he knows the beneficiary needs to know for his
protection); Bins v. Exxon Co. U.S.A., 189 F.3d 929 (1999)(“once a fiduciary has material
information relevant to a plan participant or beneficiary, it must provide that information whether
or not it is asked a question.), on rehearing en banc, 220 F.3d 1042, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 2000);
Schmidt v. Sheet Metal Workers’ Nat. Pension Fund, 128 F.3d 541, 546-47 (7th Cir. 1997)(“plan
fiduciary may violate its duties…either by affirmatively misleading plan participants about the
operations of a plan, or by remaining silent in circumstances where silence could be misleading);
see also Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co., 919 F.2d 747, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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The Supreme Court spoke on this issue in Varity, where it stated that the
“fiduciary duty primarily functioned ‘to constrain the exercise of discretionary
powers which are controlled by no other duty imposed by the trust instrument or
the legal regime. If the fiduciary duty applied to nothing more than activities
already controlled by other specific legal duties, it would serve no purpose.” 253
Yet, the court chose not to “reach the question whether ERISA fiduciaries had a
duty to disclose truthful information on their own initiative, or in response to
employee inquiries. 254 One of the strongest assertions of an affirmative duty to
disclose is found in the Seventh Circuit opinion in Anweiler v. Am.Elec. Power
Svc. Corp., 255 where the court stated “fiduciaries must also communicate material
facts affecting the interests of beneficiaries. This duty exists when a beneficiary
asks for information, and even when he or she does not. 256 The Third Circuit
also has weighed in on the issue, in Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp. 257 ruling that

253

Varity, 516 U.S. at 504.
Id. at S.Ct. 1075 (The court refused to dismiss a complaint which alleged a failure to disclose
negative information about the company’s financial condition, noting the unsettled nature of the
question, that the issue was more amenable to resolution on a motion for summary judgment after
discovery). See also In In re Xcel Energy, Inc. Securities Derivative & ERISA Litigation, 312 F.
Supp.2d 1165, 1176 (D. Minn. 2004). the court described the duty of disclosure under ERISA as
“an area of developing and controversial law. Id. at *1176, citing Watson v. Deaconess Waltham
Hosp., 298 F.3d 102, 114 (1st Cir. 2002); Griggs v. E.I.DuPont DeNemours & Co., 237 F.3d 371,
380-81 (4th Cir. 2001); Bowerman v. Wal-Mart-Stores, Inc., 226 F.3d 574, 590 (7th Cir. 2000);
Bins v. Exxon Co. U.S.A., 220 F.3d 1042, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 2000)(en banc) [other cases lexis
p.15??]
255
3 F.3d 986, 991 (7th Cir. 1993).
256
Id. at 991.
257
204 F.3d 475, 480 (3d Cir. 2000).
254
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a plan fiduciary had “‘an affirmative duty to inform when the [fiduciary] knows
that silence might be harmful.’” 258
Some courts have limited the duty of affirmative disclosure to
circumstances where the information would have an “extreme impact” on plan
beneficiaries. 259 In In re Unisys Savings Plan Litigation, 260 the court found that
the plan administrator had a duty to inform the plan participants of the precarious
financial position of a company in which it had invested more than 30% of the
plan funds, although the court specifically did not hold that the plan administrator
had any duty in the first place, under Section 1104(a) of ERISA, to communicate
anything at all to plan participants as to the risks accompanying the investments,
nor give investment advice or its opinion on the financial condition of the
investment option. 261 The court held that the plan administrator had a duty to
disclose and that duty was not limited only to public information, but might
include non-public information. 262 But what did the Third Circuit mean by the last
statement? 263

258

312 F.3d at 1177, citing Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 480 (3d Cir. 2000),
quoting In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits “ERISA” Litig., 57 F.3d 1255, 1262 (3d Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1103 (1996).
259
Ehlmann v. KaiserFound. Health Plan of Tex., 198 F.3d at 552, 556 (5th Cir. 2002).
260
74 F.3d 420 (3d Cir. 1996).
261
Id. at 443.
262
Id. at 443. See also Dynergy, ------------------------------- Where plaintiffs alleged among other
things that the defendant, Benefits Plan Committee, breached a fiduciary duty of disclosure where
it failed to disclose accounting improprieties and other financial problems at the company. The
court found that a fiduciary may have a duty to disclose facts affecting the interest of the
beneficiary which he knows the beneficiary does not know, and which the beneficiary needs to
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VI. Irreconcilable Decisions from the Courts on an Irreconcilable Conflict
Where a fiduciary is privy to material non-public information about the
company’s health, do the general duties of prudence and loyalty require that
fiduciary to cause the company to cease making contributions to pension plans in
the form of company stock or to advise plan participants to sell company stock?
Would such disclosure amount to prohibited insider trading? Is the ERISA
fiduciary an insider under the securities laws? In Dirks, 264 the Supreme Court
explained that persons who are not traditional insiders of corporations, i.e.,
directors, officers, and controlling shareholders, may be regarded as insider for
purposes of insider trading prohibitions. 265 These other persons mght include
accountants, lawyers and advisers who become privy to corporate information on
a confidential basis. Would this definition also include an ERISA fiduciary. If
the fiduciary is the chief executive officer, a member of the board of directors or
other high officer, such as a director of benefits, then the answer is obvious.
If fiduciaries were to follow the duty of disclose literally, they would
disclose to plan participants all forms of material non-public information on
which the plan participant could decide to divest itself of company stock in its
fund. The plan participant would not want to make a public disclosure of this

know for his protection _______ at 889 However, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant had
actual knowledge of the material information they allegedly should have disclosed. Id.
263
Id. at 889.
264
See text accompanying notes to , supra.
265
Dirks v. SEC, U.S. at .
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information, so as to avoid the losses from a precipitous in the stock price once
the information becomes public or is otherwise disclosed. On the one hand the
fiduciary is obligated to communicate the information to the plan participant. On
the other, the fiduciary is constrained by the securities laws not to trade or cause a
trade without public disclosure. District courts have taken conflicting views on
the issue, some courts finding no general duty to communicate the information to
plan participants, others finding such as duty as limited by prohibitions on insider
trading, and others finding a duty to communicate all information material to an
informed investment decision. What is a fiduciary to do?
A. No Breach of Duty to Act Prudently or to Disclose
In Hull v. Policy Management Systems Corporations: 266 the plan was an
employee stock ownership plan whereby employees contributed a percentage of
their salary to their individual accounts and employee decided how these
employee-contributed funds were invested; the employer matched some of the
employee contributions in company stock; these matching funds did not, however,
vest immediately and the employee lacked control over the funds until they vested
267

A committee of three individuals appointed by

the

board

made

the

investment decisions as to the nonvested employer-matching funds. The plan
empowered the Board of directors to appoint and remove members of the
266
267

2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22343 (D. S.C. 2001).
Id. at *4-5.
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committee, but provided that the “Board shall have no other responsibilities with
respect to the plan.” 268
Plaintiffs alleged a breach of fiduciary duty by the plan fiduciaries by
providing misinformation and omitting to provide information relating to the
corporation’s value 269 while the corporation continued to contribute company
stock, which price dropped sharply after certain negative information was
released to the general public. 270

[EXPLAIN THIS BREACH MORE

CLEARLY] 271
The court refused to read in the language creating the board’s authority
over the plan, a requirement that the corporation keep the Plan Committee
“informed of what [could] only be characterized as ‘inside information’ for use in
the making of its investment decisions. 272 The court found no general fiduciary

268

Id. at *18.
Id. at *4-5.
270
Id. at *4-5.
271
As to the claim against the corporate defendants, the complaint was dismissed. The grounds
included that they were not fiduciaries under ERISA, on the basis that they had no investment
authority over the plan assets. Thus, the first question for the court was whether the complained of
actions were taken in a fiduciary role and the court found that they were not. Id. at *13. The court
found that the authority to make investment decisions as to employer-matching contributions was
not vested with either the corporate employer or the Board, but with the Plan Committee. The
terms of the plan empowered only the Plan Committee to make investment decisions. Id. at *1718. The board’s authority was limited to causing the Company to make contributions to the Plan,
to appoint and remove the members of the Committee, and to terminate the Plan in whole or in
part. The court found no general duty to supervise the activities of the Plan Committee as plaintiff
had alleged. Id. at *18. Moreover, the court failed to find any allegations that any duty to
supervise had been breached. Id. at *21.
272
Id. at 22.
269
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duty to disclose owed by the employer to the Plan and dismissed the claims
accordingly. 273
In essence, the court found, plaintiff sought to hold the Plan Committee
defendants liable under a standard which would “put the Committee in the
untenable position of choosing one of three unacceptable (and in some instances
illegal) courses of action: (1) obtain ‘inside’ information and then make stock
purchase and retention decisions based on this ‘inside’ information; (2) make the
disclosures of ‘inside’ information, overstepping its role and in any case, likely
causing the stock price to drop; or (3) breach its fiduciary duty by not obtaining
and acting on ‘inside’ information.” 274

The court did not decide whether

plaintiff’s assertion that at least the decision to refrain from additional purchases
would not violate securities laws, although in the court’s view, plaintiff’s theory

273

Id. at *17. While the court found that the Plan documents demonstrated that the corporate
defendants owed certain limited fiduciary duties (to appoint and remove plan committee members;
supply full and timely information of all matters relating to the Compensation and length of
service of all Participants, their Retirement, death or other cause of Termination of Employment),
and the plaintiff included numerous allegations of wrongdoing by the corporate defendants, the
court found no connection between the two. If the allegations of providing misinformation and
failing to provide accurate information, ultimately proved true, the Plan’s remedy would be the
same as for the plaintiffs class action suit in the related securities action. This result would not be
unreasonable as the duties of disclosure owed to the Plan by the corporate defendants were not
based on the duties owed by an ERISA fiduciary to a Plan and its participants, but the general
duties of disclosure owed by a corporation and its officers to the corporation’s shareholders. Id. at
*23.
The court finally dismissed claims against the Plan Committee, finding the plaintiff
essentially alleged that the Plan Committee breached its fiduciary duties by failing to discover the
truth about the company stock’s value. The plaintiff did not allege that the Committee defendants
had any actual knowledge of any misinformation or that they participated in the dissemination of
information which they knew or should have known was misleading, or that the Plan Committee
failed to act independently or yielded to any pressure by the corporate defendants to make any
particular investment decision. Id. at *25.
274
Id. at *26.
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would nonetheless violate the spirit of those laws, and at the least, impose a
higher standard on ERISA fiduciaries as to Plan purchases of employer stock than
would be applied to other stock purchases. 275

The court dismissed the complaint

in all respects.
In In re McKesson HBOC, Inc. ERISA Litigation 276 , the plan was a 401(k)
and

Employee Stock Ownership Plan (“ESOP”).

Participating employees

contributed deferred compensation and the employer made various contributions
to the plan, including matching contributions, in the form of company stock or
cash, at the company’s election, but any cash contributions were to be converted
to company stock as soon as practicable. 277 An Administrative/Investment
Committee managed the plan.
Plaintiffs alleged inter alia that the plan fiduciaries breached their duty to
the plan participants by: 1) establishing and maintaining an investment policy in
which all company contributions were invested in company stock and by
continuing to hold a substantial portion of Plan assets in company stock even after
the announcement of accounting irregularities and improprieties; 2) failing to
275

Id. at *26-27.
cite
277
2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19473 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
Plaintiff sued McKesson Corporation
(“McKesson”) which as a result of a merger became McKesson HBOC, Inc., with HBOC
becoming a subsidiary. Prior to the merger McKesson and HBOC as separate companies, each
had its own ERISA employee pension benefit plans. The McKesson Corporation Profit-Sharing
Investment Plan (“McKesson Plan”) was a Prior to the merger, HBOC also sponsored its own
401(k) plan which also provided for employee contributions and various contributions by HBOC
on the employee’s behalf. Unlike the McKesson Plan, however, the HBOC participants were to
be invested by selecting from among seven available investment funds, one of which was an
HBOC company stock fund.
276
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monitor the performance of the Administrative/Investment Committee of the
HBOC plan; 3) failing to communicate truthful information to the
Administrative/Investment Committee; and 4) failing to provide a mechanism in
which participants could be provided with truthful information. 278
The court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint

279

agreeing with defendants that there was no discretion regarding how the company
contributions were to be invested, and hence there was no fiduciary duty under
ERISA to invest in any manner inconsistent with the plan; that while there was
generally a duty of diversification, ERISA contains a statutory exemption to the
diversification requirement for ESOP’s. 280 There was a presumption that the
fiduciary’s decision to follow the plan was reasonable and that presumption must
be rebutted by a showing that a prudent fiduciary acting under similar
circumstances would have made a different investment decision and that the

278

Id. at *8, *41. Id. at *9. After the two companies merged, McKesson publicly announced
that the company had engaged in improper and illegal accounting practices, had materially
misrepresented the financial condition of the company and the financial results would be restated
downward. As a result, the Company’s stock price dropped sharply in value with a consequent
rapid decline in the value of the assets held in the McKesson Plan, exceeding $800 million. Id. at
*5
279
Id. at *4.
280
Plaintiff responded that notwithstanding this plan requirement, a fiduciary may be liable for a
decision to continue to invest in company stock where a prudent fiduciary acting under similar
circumstances would have made a different investment decision. Id. at *14, citing Kuper v.
Iovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1459 (6th Cir. 1995); Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 571-72 (3d Cir.
1995). The court found that the precedent cited by plaintiff were to some extent distinguishable.
In those cases, the plans required the company contributions to be invested primarily, but not
entirely, in company stock, thus providing the fiduciaries with some discretion regarding
investment options. In contrast, the McKesson Plan required all company contributions to be in
the form of company stock or at the company’s election, cash to be converted to company stock as
soon as practicable. Id.
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fiduciary abused his or her discretion by following the plan and investing in
employer securities. 281
The complaint, where it asserted breach of fiduciary duty by the failure to
divest the plan of the company stock also was insufficient. The defendants argued
and the court accepted, that they could not have sold company stock without
disclosing the financial improprieties without violating federal securities laws on
insider trading, while at the same time, disclosing the information publicly prior
to selling the stock would itself have resulted in the same precipitous decline in
stock value. 282 The court stated that “not even a fiduciary acting in its fiduciary
capacity is permitted to engage in insider trading”; 283 “fiduciaries are not
obligated to violate the securities laws in order to satisfy their fiduciary duties.” 284
This court conceived of the issue as one of causation as opposed to substantive
misconduct, and ruled that even if the defendants breached a fiduciary duty by
failing to divest the plan of McKesson stock after the merger, plaintiffs had not
alleged facts to establish that any damages were caused by such breach.

281

Id. at *13, citing 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2). Plaintiff also had the burden of showing a causal link,
i.e., that an adequate investigation would have revealed to a reasonable fiduciary that the
investment at issue was improvident. In this case, the court found that the complaint did not
sufficiently allege facts showing that following the plan was an abuse of discretion. All that the
complaint alleged was that the fiduciary breached their duty by allowing the plan to become
overweighted in company stock prior to and in anticipation of the merger.Id. at *16. 2002 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 19473, at 15-16.
282
Id. at *19.
283
Id. at *21.
284
Id. at *21, citing Restatement (Second) Trusts §166, cmt. a (the Trustee is not under a duty to
the beneficiary to do an act which is criminal or tortuous).
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This case summed up says to divest would have required the fiduciaries to
disclose not just to plan participants, but publicly, the accounting irregularities,
otherwise be liable for a violation of the insider trading prohibitions, but that the
carrying out of their fiduciary obligations did not require the fiduciary to violate
law or commit a wrong on a third party, even though the beneficiary may be
injured by the fiduciary’s failure to act. 285 In other words, the fiduciary could
remain silent, leaving the beneficiary in the dark to continue at his peril.
However, unlike the Hull case, this court treated the decision to divest
differently from the decision to continue to invest in company stock, granting
plaintiffs’ leave to amend to go beyond barebones allegations in the complaint to
allege a breach in that regard to plead more specifically that the fiduciaries
breached their duties and abused their discretion in not deviating from the
McKesson Plan, by continuing to follow the plan and make contributions in the

285

Id. at *21. Still, plaintiffs argued that the fiduciaries had other options other than violating the
insider trading rules that could have averted the loss to the plan, including selling the stock back to
the company in a private transaction; seeking an independent assessment from a financial or legal
advisor or resigning in favor of an independent fiduciary, or seeking judicial guidance if the only
apparent option for preserving the trust was to deviate from the terms of the trust itself; or seeking
insurance against the loss. The court rejected each of these alternative proposed courses of action
as unpersuasive, accepting the arguments of the defendants that retaining independent counsel or
an outside fiduciary after learning of the accounting problems would not have avoided that loss,
since an independent fiduciary would have been constrained by the same securities laws that
applied to McKesson. Repurchasing McKesson stock at the inflated pre-disclosure trading levels
would have shifted the loss to McKesson’s other public shareholders, and it was not certain that
the company would have agreed to such a transaction. Id. at *22. Nor would insurance have
protected the plaintiffs, since the fiduciaries would have been obligated to disclose the accounting
irregularities or be liable for insurance fraud. The court found no lawful action that could have
been taken that would have avoided the subsequent loss occurring after public disclosure of the
accounting problems. Id. at *23.
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form of company stock. 286 Would there nonetheless be communicative content to
a decision by the company to cease making matching contributions in stock, but
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Id. at *25-26. The court also upheld plaintiff’s theory that there was a breach of discretion for
the plan not to make contributions in the form of cash as opposed to stock, although plaintiffs
needed to plead more facts. Id. at *27. The court further ruled on the question of who was the
appropriate ERISA fiduciary defendants, holding that the Board Compensation Committee was, in
that the Plan designated the company as the named fiduciary. The Plan also provided that the
Compensation Committee was responsible for investment policy of the Plan, which was
responsible for the selection of the Trustees and investment advisors and managers and for the
overall investment policy of the plan. Id. at *30. Because the Master Trust required the
Compensation Committee to implement the investment policy as determined by the Board of
Directors, the Master Trust being one of the documents or instruments governing the Plan within
the meaning of the statute, the Board of Directors would also be deemed fiduciaries with respect to
the plan. Id. at *33-34. However, with respect to the decision to contribute stock as opposed to
cash, only the company was a fiduciary since the plan provided that the company had the sole
discretion in that decision. Id. at *33-34. The court also found the plan’s trustee, Chase
Manhattan Bank, was a directed trustee, with no discretion to determine whether employer
contributions would be in cash or stock, but the allegations of breach of fiduciary duty was
insufficient. The complaint alleged in only conclusory fashion that Chase knew the investments
directions were improper, in violation of the plan and in violation of ERISA. The court dismissed
certain claims of the complaint against HBOC, finding that the Administrative Committee was the
plan fiduciary, but not the Board, although the Board had the authority to appoint the Trustee and
the Administrative Committee and the duty to provide channels and mechanisms through which
the Administrative Committee would communicate with participants and beneficiaries, but had no
discretion in selecting investment options and therefore would not be liable for breach of fiduciary
duty claims related to selecting investment options. The only possible claim to which the Board
could be liable were claims for failure to monitor the Administrative Committee, failure to
communicate information to the Trustees or Administrative Committee needed for their proper
performance of their duties; or failure to provide a mechanism for information to be
communicated to the participants. The complaint, however, contained no facts to support any
allegations on failure to monitor. Id. at *51. Moreover, since the plan documents specified that
the investment decision making rested solely within the individual HBOC plan participants, it was
not necessarily the case that the Plan fiduciaries would be liable for breaches of fiduciary duty
merely because the participants elected to invest in HBOC stock and that stock proved to be an
imprudent investment. Id. at *51. In addition, no facts were alleged to establish that the company
and board failed to communicate such information to the Trustee and the Administrative
Committee to enable them to perform their duties nor that the board failed to provide channels or a
mechanism through which the Administrative Committee and the Trustee could communicate with
participants and beneficiaries or what harm resulted from the alleged failure to set up such
channels and mechanisms for communication. Id. at *52. Accordingly, the claim for relief was
dismissed with leave to amend. Similarly, plaintiffs’ claim that defendants breached their
fiduciary duty by failing to inform the McKesson plan fiduciaries that HBOC would be an
imprudent investment was dismissed absent showing that the HBOC fiduciary had a duty premerger to make that disclosure. Id. at *55
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in cash? Would the beneficiary and other non-employee shareholders need to
know more?
Several other decisions from the district courts are in accord with Hull and
McKesson. 287

B. Duty to Disclose Consistent With Insider Trading Laws
In re Enron Corporation Securities, Derivative & “ERISA” Litigation,
Pamela Tittle, et. al., v. Enron Corp., et. al. took an entirely different position
from Hull & McKesson. 288 There, the plans were the Enron Corporation Savings
Plan (“Savings Plan”), the Enron Corporation Employee Stock Ownership Plan
(“ESOP”) and the Enron Corporation Cash Balance Plan (“Cash Balance Plan”).
The employees made contributions from their earnigs, and the company made
matching contributions in company stock.
The plaintiffs alleged defendants breached their fiduciary and co-fiduciary
duties of prudence, care and loyalty under ERISA by: 1) allowing the Savings
Plan participants the ability to direct the Plan’s fiduciaries to purchase Enron
stock for their individual accounts from monies the participants contributed as
287

Edgar v. Avaya, 2006 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 23151(D.N.J. April 24, 2006)(divesting plans of
company stock prior to disclosure of adverse information would be in violation of federal
securities laws; “[n]ot even a fiduciary acting in its fiduciary capacity is permitted to engage in
insider trading.”)
288
284 F.Supp.2d 511 (S.D. Texas 2003). There were five classes of defendants: 1) individual
directors and officers of the corporation; 2) committees, trustees, and individuals that
administered the three pension plans; 3) Enron’s accountant Arthur Andersen LLP and some of its
individual partners and employees; 4) Enron’s outside law firm and some of its individual
partners; and 5) five investment banks. The complaint pleaded causes of action under ERISA,
RICO, state common law negligence and civil conspiracy. Id. at 531.
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deductions from their salaries; 2) inducing the participants to direct the fiduciaries
to purchase Enron stock for their individual accounts in exchange for funds they
contributed to the plan; 3) causing and allowing the Savings Plan to purchase or
accept Enron’s matching contributions in the form of Enron’s stock; 4) imposing
and maintaining age restrictions and other restrictions on the participants’ ability
to direct the Savings Plan fiduciaries to transfer both Savings Plan and ESOP
assets out of Enron stock; and 5) inducing the Savings Plan and ESOP
participants to direct or allow the fiduciaries of both plans to maintain investments
in Enron stock when they knew of the company’s precarious financial position. 289

289

29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)-(D), n.9 and 1105. Id. at 533.; Defendant Arthur Andersen, the
company’s outside auditor was charged with breaching its fiduciary duties by concealing from the
Plan fiduciaries and Plan participants the actual financial condition of Enron and the imprudence
of investing in Enron stock. Id. at 533-34. Plaintiffs also alleged breach of fiduciary duty based
on the lockdown (freeze, blackout) of the two plans, without adequate notice to participants, while
the plans switched to a new record keeper and trustee, during which time, the price of Enron stock
fell from $33.84 to $10.00 per share. Plaintiffs complained that during the lockdown, plan
participants were unable to move their investments from one plan investment fund to another
despite exigent circumstances that made the blackout imprudent. Id. at 535-36. Plaintiffs also
alleged a breach of fiduciary duty by the failure of defendants to appoint and monitor other plan
fiduciaries and failure to disclose to the investing fiduciaries material information about Enron’s
true financial condition; that defendants knew or should have known that the plan fiduciaries
appointed were not qualified to manage plan assets loyally and prudently; failure to monitor
adequately the investing fiduciaries investment of these assets; failure to monitor adequately the
plan’s other fiduciaries’ implementation of the terms of the plan; failed to disclose to the investing
fiduciaries material facts concerning Enron’ financial condition that they knew or should have
known were material to loyal, prudent investment decisions concerning the use of Enron stock in
the plans and/or with respect to the implementation of the terms of the plans; failure to remove
fiduciaries who defendants knew or should have known were not qualified to manage plan assets
loyally and prudently; knowingly participating in the investing fiduciaries’ acts; breach by
accepting the benefits of those breaches, both personally and on behalf of Enron; and by
knowingly undertaking to hide acts and omissions of the fiduciaries that defendants knew
constituted fiduciary breaches; and by failing to remedy those known breaches. Id. at 537.
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The court first found the defendants could be liable for failing to diversify.
It noted the nature of an ESOP plan, that it is one which is funded primarily with
the employer’s stock. However, it pointed out that a fiduciary of an ESOP is not
relieved of his traditional duties of loyalty, prudence, and care under §404 of
ERISA, 290 even though the fiduciary is not bound by the requirement of
diversification of plan assets under §404(a)(2). 291 Instead, ERISA only provides a
presumption that a fiduciary of an ESOP acted consistently with ERISA in
investing plan assets in the employer’s securities unless a showing is made that
circumstances existed that made such an investment defeat or impair the original
purpose of the trust. 292 The court pointed out that an ERISA fiduciary must
diversify the plan’s investments to minimize risk of loss unless under the
circumstances, it is clearly prudent not to diversify. 293
The court went on to say defendants could be liable for not exercising
independent judgment despite plan directives. An ERISA fiduciary has the duty
to follow the documents and instruments governing the plan, but only to the
extent that they are consistent with ERISA. 294 In case of conflict, the provisions
of the ERISA policies as set forth in the statute and regulations prevail over those
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29 U.S.C.§ 1104(a).
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2).
292
284 F. Supp.2d at 534.
293
284 F.Supp.2d at 548, citing 29 U.S.C.§ 1104(a)(1)(C).
294
284 F.Supp.2d at 549.
291
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of the Fund guidelines. 295 In any case, such a determination is not properly made
on a motion to dismiss, but only after discovery develops a factual record. 296
The court also ruled that defendants might be liable for not acting
prudently, the court noting that a fiduciary must meet the prudent man
standard. 297 The court found that law of trusts provides a starting point for the
analysis whether a breach of duty has occurred, noting it may not provide a
complete analysis, since ERISA may permit conduct that the common law trusts
may not, recognizing that an ERISA fiduciary may wear many hats: as the
employer and as plan fiduciary.

298

In meeting this prudent man standard, the

trustee is also under a duty to the beneficiary to give him upon his request at
reasonable times complete and accurate information as to the nature and amount
of that property, and to permit him or a person duly authorized by him to inspect -- the subject matter of the trust and the accounts and vouchers and other
documents related to the trust.
In addition, the trustee is under a duty to communicate to the beneficiary
material facts affecting the interest of the beneficiary which he knows the
beneficiary does not know and which the beneficiary needs to know for his

295

Id. at 549.
Id.
297
Explained Supra
298
Id. at 546.
296
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protection in dealing with a third person with respect to his interest.299 The court
found that there “is an affirmative duty beyond a full and accurate response
triggered by a participant’s specific question, to disclose material information to
plan participants and beneficiaries it is a breach of duty for employers to
knowingly make material misleading statements about the stability of a benefits
plan.” 300 “A duty to inform is a constant thread in the relationship between
beneficiary and trustee; it entails not only a negative duty not to misinform, but
also an affirmative duty to inform when the trustee knows that silence might be
harmful.” 301
The court noted that the under the common law of trusts, which Congress
indicated should apply as a threshold step to define duties of plan fiduciaries
under ERISA, generally the trustee’s duty to disclose information was triggered
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Id. at 555, citing Bins v. Exxon Co. U.S.A., 189 F.3d 929 (1999)(“We believe that once an
ERISA fiduciary has material information relevant to a plan participant or beneficiary, it must
provide that information whether or not it is asked a question.”); Sheet Metal Worker’s Nat.
Pension Fund, 128 F.3d 541, 546-47 (7th Cir. 1997). Courts have recognized a duty to provide
information after request for information from plan participant/beneficiary. Watson v. Deaconess
Waltham Hosp., 298 F.3d 102, 114 (1st Cir. 2002); Griggs v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 237
F.3d 371, 380-81 (4th Cir. 2001); Bowerman v. Wal-Mart-Stores, Inc., 226 F.3d 574, 590 (7th Cir.
2000); Krohn v. Huron Memorial Hosp., 173 F.3d 542, 547-48 (6th Cir. 1999); Eddy v. Colonial
Life Ins. Co., 919 F.2d 747-50 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
300
284 F. Supp. 2d at 558, citing Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 480 (3d Cir.
2000), in turn citing In re Unisys Corp. Retirem. Med. Ben. “ERISA Litiga”, 57 F.3d 1255 (3d Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1103 (1996).
301
284 F.Supp.2d at 558. The court reviewed those cases involving the duty to disclose potential
changes to an ERISA plan, focusing on the 5th Circuit’s ruling rejecting the test requiring “serious
consideration”, in favor of a “fact-specific approach, where the overarching question in such
analysis is whether there is a substantial likelihood that reasonable person in plaintiff’s position
would have considered the information an employer-administrator allegedly misrepresented
important in making a decision to retire. Id. at 560.
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by a specific request from a plan participant or beneficiary. 302 And, the trustee is
under a duty to the beneficiary to give him upon his request at reasonable times
complete and accurate information as to the nature and amount of the trust
property, and to permit him or a person duly authorized by him to inspect the
subject matter of the trust and the accounts and vouchers and other documents
related to the trust.” 303 The trustee has a duty to disclose material facts affecting
the interest of the beneficiary which he knows the beneficiary does not know and
which the beneficiary needs to know for his protection in dealing with a third
person with respect to his interest…” 304 As such, plaintiffs had stated a claim
generally for breach of fiduciary duty to disclose based on material information in
counts regarding the defendants’ alleged fraudulent accounting, concealment of
its deceitful business practices and of the company’s precarious, swiftly
deteriorating financial condition and defendants alleged representations
knowingly intended to induce the plan participant’s continued participation in the
pension plan’s purchase and holding of Enron stock, which was known and
should have been known to the plan fiduciaries. 305

302

Id. at 554, citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 173.
Restatement (Second) Trusts §173.
304
Id.
305
Id. at 563-64. Plaintiffs alleged that the Chief Executive Officer, Lay, the -----, Olson, the
compensation committee, and the company breached their fiduciary duty by failing to disclose
information about Enron’s dangerous financial condition that they knew or should have known to
plan participants, the Administrative Committee, or plan counsel, while these defendants were
individually selling large amounts of their own Enron holdings. Id. Specifically, plaintiffs
alleged that there were dangerous accounting irregularities which the company either participated
in or knew about but did nothing to address. Id.
303
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Defendants countered that if they met their duty of loyalty by selectively
disclosing only to the plan participants non-public information about material
accounting irregularities and financial improprieties, so that the participants could
make an informed decision not to purchase additional shares or to sell their
currently held shares of Enron stock before the market and the public found out
and the price plunged, they would be violating insider trading prohibitions under
the federal securities laws. 306 The court recognized that Rule 10b-5 requires that
a corporate insider, because he owes a fiduciary duty to shareholders, either
disclose material non-public information publicly or abstain from trading his own
shares for personal gain. 307 The court stated, “if a plan fiduciary were to tell plan
participants of Enron’s actual financial condition so they could sell at a high price
based on this nonpublic information, he would also be violating insider trading
laws and he, the plan participants as ‘tippees,’ and the Administrative Committee
might be found liable for securities law violations.” 308 The court discussed the
two cases cited by Defendants: Hull v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 309 and
In re McKesson HBOC, Inc. ERISA Litigation. 310

Both courts dismissed

plaintiff’s claims of breach of fiduciary duty by the plan fiduciary’s failure to
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284 F. Supp. 2d at 563.
Id. at 564.
308
Id.
309
2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22343 (D.S.C. Feb. 9, 2001).
310
2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19473 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2002).
307
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disclose adverse information to the plan participants on the ground that such
disclosure would have been a violation of securities laws. The Enron court while
not commenting further on the cogency of the Hull decision, did attempt to
distinguish McKesson on the basis that the ruling there applied to ESOP plans,
which by their nature are generally excepted from the duty to diversify and on its
face not applicable to 401(k) plans as was at issue in Enron. But this is not a
valid distinction, first, because one of the plans in Enron was an ESOP and
second because even with ESOP’s a fiduciary may be required to diversify unless
he demonstrates that it was clearly prudent not to diversify. 311 The court merely
dismissed McKesson as misguided, finding the defendant’s argument there as
essentially an argument that the fiduciary should both breach his duty under
ERISA and in violation of the securities laws, become part of the alleged
fraudulent scheme to conceal Enron’s financial condition to the detriment of
current and prospective Enron shareholders, which include his plan’s participants.
Instead, the court believed that “the statutes should be interpreted to require that
persons follow laws, not undermine them; they should be construed not to cancel
out the disclosure obligations under both statutes or to mandate concealment,
which would only serve to make the harm more widespread; the statutes should
be construed to require, as they do, disclosure by Enron officials and plan
fiduciaries of Enron’s concealed, material financial status to the investing public
311

93

Id. at 548-49. See discussion, supra.

generally, including plan participants, whether ‘impractical’ or not, because
continued silence and deceit would only encourage the alleged fraud and increase
the extent of injury.” 312
The court found, that “a fiduciary’s duty of loyalty should also not be
construed to require him to enable and encourage plan participants to violate the
law, i.e., to sell their stock at artificially high prices to make a profit or avoid loss
before disclosure of Enron’s financial condition was made public.” 313

“Nor

would selective disclosure of that information by the fiduciary to plan participants
protect any lawful financial interests of the plan participants,” since [“l]ike any
other investor, plan participants have no lawful right, before anyone else is
informed of Enron’s negative financial picture, to profit from fraudulently inflated
stock prices or to avoid financial loss by selling early before public disclosure.” 314
Any damage suffered to plan participants as a result of a drop in price before they
could make a profit or avoid a loss would not be the fault of the plan fiduciary but
of the underlying alleged fraudulent scheme, and the corporate officials who
participated in the scheme would be liable to plan participants.” 315 The court
concluded, “[a] trustee has no duty to violate the law to serve its beneficiaries.” 316
An ERISA fiduciary is not an insurer of the value of plan assets, even where that
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Id. at 565.
Id. at 565.
314
Id. at 565.
315
Id. at 565.
316
Id. at 565, citing Restatement (Second) Trusts §166, cmt.a.
313
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price is the result of fraud or manipulation; but only has a duty to satisfy the
prudent man rule, which provides immunity from liability if the fiduciary
performs the necessary investigations and provides accurate information in
accordance with it. 317 The court placed reliance upon the Department of Labor’s
interpretation of ERISA and its interface with the securities laws, which rejected
the McKesson court’s interpretation.

The Department of Labor, in an amicus

curiae brief suggested practical ways to resolve the alleged tension between
ERISA and the federal securities statutes: 1) disclosure of the information to other
shareholders and the public at large or forcing Enron to do so; 2) eliminating
Enron stock as a participant option and as the employer match under the Savings
Plan; 3) alerting the regulatory agencies, such as the SEC and the Department of
Labor to the misstatements. But this is no solution to the harm that results from
public disclosure of misconduct, which causes the stock price to plunge. 318

317

Id. at 565-66.
Id. at 567. The court went on to consider the personal liability of corporate employees, noting
that courts were divided about if and under what circumstances the officers and employees of a
corporation that is a named fiduciary in plan instruments may be personally liable for a breach of
their fiduciary duty. Some courts have held that individual employees must have an individual
discretionary role in the plan administration to be liable as a fiduciary under ERISA. See Confer
v. Custom Engineering Co.,952 F.2d 34, 37 (3d Cir. 1991); Torree v.Federated Mutual Ins. Co.,
1993 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 18605 (D.Kan. Dec. 3, 1993). Officers and employees are not liable under
ERISA, solely by reason of holding office. Other courts, stressing the functional definition of a
fiduciary under ERISA, have held that individuals within the corporations who actually exercised
the fiduciary discretionary control of authority in their official capacity may also be personally
liable, depending on the facts of the particular case. See Kayes v. Pacific Lumber Co., 51F.3d
1449, 1459-61 (9th Cir. 1995); Stewart v. Thorpe Holding Co. Profit Sharing Plan, 207 F.3d
1143, 1156 (9th Cir. 2000)(where committee or entity is named as the plan fiduciary, the corporate
officers or trustees who carry out the fiduciary functions are themselves fiduciaries and cannot be
shielded from liability by the company), cert. denied 531 U.S. 1074 (2002); Landry v.Air Line
Pilots Ass’n Inter. AFL-CIO, 901 F.2d 404, 418(5th Cir. 1990)(members of the board of directors
318
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But is the employee-shareholder “any other investor”? Perhaps not, since
whether she funds her retirement plan with Enron stock or cash or stock of
another company is not up to the employee. The employee wholly lacks the
discretion, autonomy of a voluntary market participant, but perhaps has the most
to lose by a decision made by another.
In re Worldcom, Inc. ERISA Litigation followed the reasoning of
Enron. 319 There, the plans were a 401(k) Salary Savings Plan and an employee
pension benefit plan. 320
The plan provided a number of different funds in which participants could
choose to invest their account balances, including a money market fund, a bond

of an employer that maintains an employee benefit plan will be viewed as fiduciaries only to the
extent they have responsibility for functions listed under ERISA, such as selection and retention of
plan fiduciaries, over which they necessarily would exercise “discretionary authority or
discretionary control respecting management of such plan)[[[other cases at 569]; Bannistor v.
Ullman, 287 F.3d 394, 403-06 (5th Cir. 2002)(corporate officers liable as fiduciaries since they
exercised control over plan assets, approved a new health plan, and had check-signing authority
for their employer corporation.
Finally, the court considered whether the fiduciaries were
relieved of liability to the extent that plan participants had control over plan assets under Section
404(c) of ERISA. The court found that the predicates for this exemption from liability were not
established on this motion to dismiss, namely whether the fiduciaries provide participants with
“complete and accurate information” about investment alternatives, a range of investments,
procedures to permit transfers and to deal with conflicts of interests, as well as notice that the plan
qualifies under 404(c). Furthermore, under 404(c), a plan participant lacks independent control
where he “is subjected to improper influence by a plan fiduciary or plan sponsor with respect to
the transaction or where a “plan fiduciary has concealed material nonpublic facts regarding the
investment from the participant or beneficiary…”
Plaintiffs alleged that among other things,
Enron concealed material non-public facts about Enron’s financial condition from them. Id. at
577.
319
263 F. Supp.2d 745 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
320
29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A). The plan was an eligible individual account plan as defined in
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(3) and a “qualified cash or deferred arrangement” as defined in
I.R.C. § 401(k).
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fund, various equity funds, and one or more funds invested in Worldcom stock. 321
Under the plan, participants had discretion to allocate their investments among the
alternatives offered, and to reduce or eliminate their investments in Worldcom
stock at any time. 322
Worldcom was the sponsor of the Plan and Worldcom was designated as
the plan administrator and as the investment fiduciary. The plan provided that the
Investment Fiduciary’s duties to include the power and discretion to: establish
and change the investment alternatives among which participants may direct the
investment of their accounts; and review the status of the investment policy and
the selection and performance of the investment alternatives offered under the
Plan. 323
Plaintiffs alleged breach of fiduciary duty to act with prudence: 1) when
the defendants continued to offer Worldcom stock as an investment alternative
under the plan; 2) when they failed to investigate and monitor the plan’s
investments, including its investment in Worldcom stock, that had they done so,
they would have discovered that Worldcom was an infirm investment and they
would have been obligated to reassess the merits of allowing participants to
321

The Plan is a “defined contribution” or “individual account” plan as defined by ERISA, 29
U.S.C. § 1002(34). The purpose of the plan was to “encourage eligible employees to save on a
regular basis, by salary deferral, and to provide [employees] an opportunity to become
shareholders of the Company and thereby furnish the incentives inherent in employee stock
ownership.” 263 F.Supp. 2d at 753.
322
Id. at 753.
323
Id. at 763-64. Id. at 753-54. In addition, Worldcom was a named fiduciary of the Plan as
defined by ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a).
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continue to invest in Worldcom stock and would have divested the plan of its
Worldcom holdings. 324
The court rejected Defendants asserted argument that they had no
discretion as to whether an investment in Worldcom stock should be offered to
employees since the plan description advised Worldcom employees that one of
their investment options was to invest in Worldcom Stock and that to the extent
that plan participants exercised independent control over the assets in his account,
a fiduciary could not be liable for any loss that resulted from the participant’s
exercise of control. The court ruled that ERISA does not shield fiduciaries from
liability in these circumstances if the investment decisions were “not
independent” if a plan fiduciary has concealed material

non-public facts

regarding the investment from the participants unless the disclosure would violate
the law. 325
The court ruled, “[t]o the extent, therefore, that any plan fiduciary had
responsibility to decide or present it [sic] views on the wisdom of the investment
options, it would have been a breach of that duty not to alert Worldcom of the
need to eliminate, or at least, to consider eliminating Worldcom stock as one of
the investment alternatives.” 326 Even in the context of an ESOP, which is
designed to give employees the opportunity solely to invest in the employer’s

324
325
326

Id. at 764, citing 29 C.F.R.§ 2550:404c-(c) (2).
Id. at 764.
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stock, a fiduciary may be liable for continuing to offer such an investment, where
circumstances arose which were not known or anticipated by the settlor of the
trust that make continued investment in the company’s stock imprudent. 327
Plaintiffs also alleged that the chief executive officer breached his
fiduciary duty to “monitor the plan’s other fiduciary and by the failure to disclose
to the Investment Fiduciary, Worldcom, and other investing fiduciaries material
facts he knew or should have known about the financial condition of Worldcom.
Defendant’s theory was that the duty to disclose arises under the federal securities
laws and not under ERISA; that by allowing plaintiffs to state an ERISA claim for
failure to disclose information that, if material, would have required the chief
executive officer to disclose, impermissibly extends the reach of ERISA and
imposes on corporations a duty of continuous disclosure not contemplated by the
well-developed regime of securities regulation. 328 Defendants argued that
plaintiffs’ allegations if accepted would impose a continuous duty of disclosure
on ERISA fiduciaries that overwhelms the federal securities law disclosure
requirements and compels fiduciaries to violate the prohibitions against insider
trading. Defendant argued that if an ERISA fiduciary who is also an insider
discovers material information affecting the value of the investment in the plan

327

Id. at 764, citing Moench v. Robertson, 62 F. 3d 553, 571, 572 (3d Cir. 1995)(corporate
insider’s knowledge of impending collapse of the corporation’s stock price, the “precipitous
decline” in the price of the stock, and the fiduciary’s own “conflicted status” might constitute such
a change in circumstances).
328
Id. at 765.
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sponsor’s stock, the fiduciary has one of two choices: disclose the material
information to plan participants before making it publicly known, thereby
violating the insider trading laws by suggesting that they divest stock based upon
material non-public information; or publicly disclosing the information, thereby
exposing the plan participants to harm when the market reacted to the adverse
information. 329 The court rejected defendants’ argument finding that when the
chief executive officer wore his ERISA “hat” he was required to act with all the
care, diligence and prudence required of ERISA fiduciaries, which meant that he
had a duty to disclose to the investment fiduciary and the other investing
fiduciaries material information he had regarding the prudence of investing in
Worldcom stock.

The court rejected the suggested tension between the federal

securities laws and ERISA, that would cause dismissal of the claim, although the
reasoning is not too convincing. The court explained that ERISA fiduciaries
cannot transmit false information to plan participants when a prudent fiduciary
would understand that the information was false. Nor, the court stated, was there
anything in the plaintiffs’ claim requiring ERISA fiduciaries to convey non-public
material information to plan participants. Instead, what was required, was that
any information that is conveyed to participants be conveyed in compliance with
the standard of care that applies to ERISA fiduciaries. 330

The complaint alleged

that Worldcom filed periodic SEC filings about the company’s financial condition
329
330

Id. at 767.
Id. at 767.
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and was under a duty to correct any prior material misrepresentation when it
became aware of the falsity. 331 “In any event, the existence of duties under one
federal statute does not, absent express congressional intent to the contrary,
preclude the imposition of overlapping duties under another federal statutory
regime.” 332
But this ruling still does not respond to the Scylla and Charybdis position
the insider who is an ERISA fiduciary is put in: violate the insider trading by
disclosing material non-public information to plan participants who then trade the
company’s shares to persons without the same information or violate the fiduciary
duty of loyalty by not disclosing material non-public information to plan
participants, who in the absence of that information continue to invest in and hold
the company’s shares which is overvalued in the absence of public disclosure of
the information. The court seems to suggest that the insider/plan fiduciary can
rightfully adhere to both duties of disclosure. They are not excused from nondisclosure, since the securities laws require it if trading occurs; yet they are not
excused from liability to plan participants whose share value drops upon public
announcement of the information, since ERISA requires disclosure.
Some courts like in Enton have drawn a false distinction between the types
of plans at issue in order to side step the larger issue of the propriety of disclosure

331
332

Id. at 767.
Id. at 767, citing United States v. Sforza, 326 F.2d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 2003).
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to plan participants. In Rankin v. Rots, 333 plaintiffs, plan participants brought a
claim under ERISA alleging breach of fiduciary duty against certain plan
fiduciaries, including the company, the board of directors and members of the
board finance committee and members of the employee benefits investment
committee appointed by the finance committee, and the director of employee
benefits. Plaintiffs alleged, inter alia that the fiduciaries breached their fiduciary
duty by: 1) continuing to invest in company stock when there existed a substantial
risk; 2) failing to provide complete, accurate, and material information about the
company’s true financial condition; 3) failing to disclose material adverse
information which severely threatened plan assets; 4) failing to give plan
participants accurate, complete, non-misleading and adequate information about
the composition of the Plan’s portfolios; 5) failing to monitor or evaluate the
performance of those appointed to fiduciary capacities; and 6) by promoting
company stock as a prudent plan investment and encouraging Plan participants to
invest in company stock. 334 The defendants moved to dismiss on, among other
grounds, that to the extent they had any fiduciary duties with respect to the
disclosure of information, they could not as a matter of law breached them
333

278 F. Supp.2d 853 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
These were the allegations against the chairman and CEO of the company and largely repeated
against other fiduciaries, including the allegation against the outside directors, that they failed to
take steps to eliminate or reduce the amount of company stock in the plan; maintained restrictions
on the trading of company stock held in the plans at sometime when such restrictions had the
effect of creating and maintaining an unsound level of concentration of plan assets; allowing and
compelling continued investment in the company stock fund, when a reasonable fiduciary would
have known that the investment was not prudent; failing to disclose material adverse information
which severely threatened plan assets. 278 F.Supp. 2d at 863-64.

334
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because to have disclosed non-public information about the company would have
violated securities laws. In ruling on the motion the court reviewed the decisions
of three other courts on the same defense: Hull v. Policy Management Sys.
Corp., 335 which assumed the same defense argument was correct, but did not
decide the motion to dismiss based on the argument; In re McKesson HBOC
ERISA Litigation, 336 accepting the argument, in a slightly different context and
dismissed plaintiffs’ claims accordingly; and In re Worldcom, Inc., 337 flatly
rejecting the argument. The court thought the better view was that in Worldcom.
The court essentially quoted large sections from the Worldcom decision, without
any explanation why it was the better view.
In Hill v. BellSouth, 338

the court endeavored to narrow the duty ot

disclose to cases presenting special circumstances. The court, however, was not
successful, since the circumstances there are those occurring in every case. The
court otherwise did not resolve the insider trading dilemma. There, plaintiffs, a
class consisting of participants and beneficiaries in a plan governed by ERISA,
sued defendants, the company sponsoring the plan and various officers and
directors alleging breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA. The Company was the
plan’s sponsor. Under the terms of the plan, the Defendant Savings Plan
335

2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22343 (D.S.C. Feb. 9, 2001). See discussion of Hull, supra at text
accompanying notes -----to -------.
336
2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19473 (N.D. Ca. Sept. 30, 2002). See discussion of McKesson, supra at
text accompanying notes -----to -------.
337
263 F.Supp.2d 745 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
338
313 F.Supp. 2d 1361, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6045 (N.D. Ga. March 30, 2004).
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Committee was to serve as Plan Administrator and the Plan was administered
through that Committee. Defendant, board of directors, appointed, monitored and
removed members of the Savings Plan Committee.

The Board of Directors

Finance/Strategic Planning Committee, among other responsibilities, oversaw
qualified benefit plans. Other defendants included the chief financial officer and
executive vice-president, principal accounting office and vice-president-finance,
who signed documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The
company and the Savings Plan Committee were named fiduciaries of the plan. 339
Under the plan, participants contributed a portion of their salaries to the plan and
could direct their contributions to be invested in any of the plan’s investment
options, including BellSouth Stock Fund. The Stock Fund invested in shares of
company’s stock.

Participants’ contributions were of two types:

basic and

supplemental. The Company matched participants’ basic contributions, but not
supplemental.

Matching contributions were made in company stock to an

Employee Stock Ownership Plan. 340 In January 2001, accounting errors led the
company to record doubtful consumer accounts as realized revenue.

The

company reported these inaccurate revenue statements both to the SEC and to the
public through a series of SEC filings and press releases. Later, the company

339

Id. at *5.
Id. at *5. Initially, these matching contributions could not be transferred to other plan funds,
but the plan was modified to allow participants to make such transfers and reallocations. Id. at *5.
340
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issued a press release revealing the overstatement to be $163 million, or about
$.09 per share. The release was followed by an SEC filing.
Plaintiffs alleged that the inclusion of the Stock Fund as a plan option,
coupled with communications from Defendants discussing the benefits of
Company stock ownership but omitting any discussion of risks, led participants to
invest their contributions in Company stock. The failure to properly consider the
accounting irregularities and riskiness of certain investments, before investing in
company stock amounted to a failure of the plan committee to prudently manage
the plan’s assets. 341 Plaintiffs further argued that defendants failed to prudently
manage plan assets, to provide complete and accurate information to plan
participants and beneficiaries, and to avoid conflicts of interest. Finally, plaintiffs
alleged that the company, the board of directors and Finance Committee’s failure
to monitor the Savings Plan committee’s investment in company stock for its
prudence, as well as their failure to disclose to that Committee accurate
information about Company finances and accounting practices was also a breach
of fiduciary duty. 342
Defendants moved to dismiss on the ground, inter alia that the investment
in the company stock was prudent, especially in light of a presumption that

341

Id. at *7. Plaintiffs also allege that incentive awards, tied to the value of the company’s stock,
created a conflict of interest in defendant officers of the company, as they would be unlikely to
reveal to plan participants information that might discourage their purchase of company stock in
order to bolster stock value.
342
Id. at *7.
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investment in employer securities is presumptively prudent for Individual Plan
Accounts; that the losses from the specific investments complained of did not
render company stock an imprudent investment; that its press releases were not
fiduciary in nature and could not form the basis of an argument that the Company
misled plan participants. Defendants also argued that they had no affirmative
duty to disclose information not specified by ERISA; indeed to do so, revealing
“inside information” to Plaintiffs might be a violation of Rule 10b-5 which
prevents insider trading. 343

Defendants argued from this that there was no

proximate cause between defendant’s failure to disclose because assuming that
information was wrongly withheld, upon its release, the market would have
immediately adjusted and Plaintiffs could not have sold stock at the pre-disclosure
price. 344
In denying the motion to dismiss, the court began with a discussion of
what the fiduciary duty is under ERISA.

Some courts have adopted a

presumption of prudence for fiduciaries of ESOPs, holding that in the context of
investing in the employer’s own stock. That presumption may be overcome by a
showing that under the circumstances, the fiduciary could not have reasonably
believed that the plan’s drafters would have intended that the fiduciary continue to

343

Id. at 1366. Defendants also argued that they were not liable for lack of diversification because
of a statutory exemption; that the existence of a financial interest in the performance of company
stock is insufficient to state a cause of action for breach of fiduciary; Defendants further argued
that the director and officer defendants did not act in a fiduciary capacity.
344
Id. 1366.
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comply with the ESOP’s direction to invest in employer stock. 345

In this case,

the court found that plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded facts in which a reasonably
prudent person would have found the unexpected nature of the loss, from certain
investments, to the company as well as the accounting discrepancies, sufficient to
signal that the company was no longer a prudent investment. 346
Pointing In re Enron, 347 for this statement, the court found a willingness
among courts “to find an affirmative fiduciary duty to disclose information
beyond the traditional duties to disclose specified in the statute or the common
law obligation to respond to specific requests from plan participants or
beneficiaries.” 348 However, this new affirmative duty to disclose has only been
imposed in “special circumstances with a potentially ‘extreme impact’ on a plan
as a whole, where plan participants generally could be materially and negatively
affected.” 349 But no general disclosure duty has been recognized; some special
circumstances are required. In this case, the court accepted plaintiff’s allegations
as true and the defendant admitted that certain investments were risky; that the
company was losing money, in an area in which no other peer company had
invested to the same extent; and that revenues had been inflated by improper
345

Id. at *12, citing Moench v. Robertson, 62 F. 3d 553, 571 (3d Cir. 1995); Kuper v. Iovenko, 66
F.3d 1447.1459 (6th Cir. 1995).
346
Id. at 1368. The court did express reservations about plaintiffs ability to muster sufficient facts
in support of its claim that the Latin American investments rendered Company stock an imprudent
investment, but on a motion to dismiss, where the court is required to accept the allegations as
true, it could not find that plaintiffs could not prove any set of facts to prove it claim.
347
284 F. Supp.2d at 555.
348
313 F.Supp.2d 1361, 1369 citing In re Enron, 284 F.Supp. 2d at 559.
349
Id. at 1370, citing In re Enron, 284 F.Supp. 2d at 559.
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accounting, all the while defendants kept encouraging employee investment in the
company stock, which then already represented 40% of the plan’s assets. 350 The
motion to dismiss was denied. 351 The court did not address what recourses were
available to the fiduciaries to protect the trust under the circumstances, i.e.,
whether the fiduciaries were obligated to make discrete disclosures to the plan and
run afoul of insider trading laws or make a public disclosure, which would as the
defendants have asserted, caused an adjustment in the stock price, leaving
plaintiffs unable to sell their shares at the pre-disclosure price.
In In re Westar Energy, Inc., ERISA Litigation, 352 plan participants sued
the corporate sponsor along with individual fiduciaries353 alleging, inter alia
violations of the duty of prudence and loyalty. 354 The pension plan at issue was a
401(k) plan, under which the company matched employees’ contribution up to a

350

Id. at 1369.
The court went on to deny the motion to dismiss on the conflict of interest claim based upon
plaintiff’s allegations that defendant’s compensation was tied to stock performance and defendants
knew of overstatement revenues. At the very least, the court found, plaintiffs have pleaded facts,
accepted as true, that show the fiduciaries had insider knowledge, knowledge which affected the
price of stock that they held and in some cases, sold, and acted in a way that benefited them
personally, yet did not protect the trust. Id. at 1370. The court also denied the motion to dismiss
the claim alleging failure to monitor, finding that plaintiffs’ allegations based upon the assumption
that the decision to invest in company stock was imprudent; plaintiffs’ theory was that the failure
to monitor consisted in allowing imprudent investment in Company stock. The allegations did
state such a claim. Id. at 1371.
352
2005 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 28585 (D. Kan. September 29, 2005).
353
The defendants included the corporation sponsor; the Investment and Benefits Committee, the
administrator of the Plan; David D. Wittig, former the chief executive officer; and nine individual
members of the Committee.
354
The gist of the complaint was that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties through
engaging in, allowing, failing to monitor, failing to disclose, misleading communications (through
representations and omissions) and through failing to appropriately respond to the risky, abusive,
aggressive, illegal and wrongful conduct of themselves and others. Id. at *5.
351
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maximum of 50% of the first six percent of the participant’s contributions. 355
Among the investment alternatives was the Westar Energy Common Stock Fund.
The company could match contributions with either common stock or cash. For
most of the life of the plan, the company matched contributions with company
stock.

In fact, until just before the suit was instituted, company matching

contributions were effectively locked into Westar stock, for matching
contributions were not permitted to be transferred into other investment
accounts. 356

The plan was administered by the Investment and Benefits

Committee with the responsibility of taking “all actions required of the Company
in the administration of the Plan.” “The Committee was comprised of three to
five members, who were appointed and removed by the company’s chief
executive officer.

One of the members was responsible for the routine

administration of the Plan, and the other members and the Committee as a whole
were responsible for matters relating to the investment of the Plan’s assets,
including the semi-annual or greater review of the investment performance, the
condition of the Plan’s assets, the selection of a trustee or any other investment
managers, review of the performance of the trustee and any other investment
managers and the recommendation of changes in investment managers. The
Committee was also responsible for the assumption of any responsibilities
355

The plan was designated as a stock bonus plan within the meaning of §401(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code, and an employee stock ownership plan within the meaning of §4975(e)(7) of the
Internal Revenue Code.
356
Id. at *8. This restriction did not apply to participants age 55 and over. Id. at *8, n. 13.
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delegated to an individual member of the Committee in the event that the
“Committee deems it necessary and prudent to do so.” 357
The specific conduct of which the plaintiffs complained was that the
company embarked on acquisitions of unregulated businesses in the home
security field, acquiring three companies at price exceeding $600 million, which
resulted in a substantial decline in the company’s income and a substantial
increase in debt obligations; undertook a restructuring scheme which saddled the
company with a capital structure of 93% debt, all the while making public
statements that the restructuring would be beneficial for the company, and
knowing the events and occurrences showed otherwise; 358 and permitted a variety
of executive compensation schemes and self-dealing transactions calculated to
drain corporate resources. 359

The plaintiffs maintained that the defendants

misrepresented or failed to disclose certain facts regarding the proposed
357

Id. at *9. According to Plan documents, the Committee reviewed the investment options
available to Plan participants; the Plan participants were specifically told the “number and type of
Investment Funds may be adjusted from time to time by the Investment and Benefits Committee
as it deemed advisable. Id. The court declined to address the applicability of ERISA 404(c),
which precludes liability on the part of a fiduciary where the participant exercised “independent
control” over their accounts, provided they had sufficient information to make informed decisions
with regard to investment alternatives, because the company did not address the issue in its reply
brief and because the complaint made numerous allegations that the defendants failed to provide
adequate information to participants for informed decision making and because this is an
affirmative defense, placing the burden of proof on the defendants. Thus, the issue was not
properly determined on a motion to dismiss.
358
These events and occurrences included the criticism by the Kansas Corporation Commission
and other experts, the rejection of a rate increase, and an actual decrease in rates. Id. at *30.
359
Plaintiffs sought to hold the named fiduciary, corporate sponsor, liable for breach of a duty of
prudence and loyalty where it continued the allocation and designation of discretion to the
Committee despite knowledge that the Committee was not capable to managing the funds honestly
and prudently. As such, the corporation was not entitled to the safe harbor protection under
ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 405(c).
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restructuring,

company

compensation

policy

and

accounting

misrepresentations. 360
Defendants asserted among other things 361 that to make the disclosures
plaintiffs identified, would have required them to violate securities laws on insider
trading and that ERISA cannot be construed to “invalidate, impair, supersede any
law of the United States.” Defendants relied largely on In re McKesson HBOC,
Inc. ERISA Litigation 362 and Hull. 363 The court first attempted to distinguish the
case from the facts in Hull, pointing out that unlike in Hull, the plaintiffs made no
allegation that the defendant investment committee had actual knowledge of
misrepresentations or misinformation communicated to plan participants.

But

here, plaintiffs alleged that defendants knew or should have known that
representations in SEC filings contained misrepresentations. The complaint also
alleged facts, which if proven, would circumstantially show that at least some of
the Committee Defendants knew or should have known of the misrepresentations,
since some were officers involved in the underlying transactions. But this was not
a fair reading of Hull. The plaintiffs, as here, alleged deliberate conduct by
360

Id. at *43. The Plaintiffs alleged the company failed to disclose the Asset Allocation
agreement in connection with the restructuring, which provided for the imposition of $1.6 billion
of debt on the utility business, debt which had been use to acquire the non-utility businesses and
assets.
361
Defendants also asserted that plaintiffs had failed to establish a causal nexus between their
alleged misconduct and the plaintiffs’ injuries. The court dismissed the assertion, finding ---------------------------.
362
There the court dismissed a claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted, finding that there was no feasible option available to the defendants that would not have
violated federal securities laws, including those on insider trading.
363
cite
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fiduciaries in providing misinformation and failing to provide information of
which they had actual knowlege.
Essentially, the Westar could interpreted defendant’s argument as one
involving the theory of “inevitable loss”, that any actions they might have taken
would not have prevented the loss of stock value. At the same time, it rejected
that theory. It simply chose to follow Enron, that plan fiduciaries must follow
both laws, meaning that there must be disclosure before trading, “whether
impractical or not, because continuing silence and deceit would only encourage
the alleged fraud and increase the extent of injury.” 364
C. Skirting the Issue
Some courts, rather than dealing with the issue head on or taking a
position that would be clearly disingenuous, have acted to skirt the issue
altogether. In In re Williams Companies ERISA Litigation, 365 plaintiffs pension
fund participants and beneficiaries sued the company, sponsor of the pension

364

2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 28585, at *53-54. In what seems a departure from the lack-step rulings
of many cases, in Wright v. Oregon Metallurgical Corp., 360 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2004), the Ninth
Circuit adopted a more normal view on required disclosure declined to adopt the Moench standard
for imposing liability for breach of the duty of prudence on the ground that it tended to encourage
corporate officers to utilize inside information for the exclusive benefit of the corporation and its
employees, which might potentially violate federal securities laws. Id. at 1098, n.4. In Wright,
the plaintiffs sought to hold plan fiduciaries liable for failing to investigate investment alternatives
or to amend the plan to permit participants to sell a higher percentage of employer securities than
then permitted was a breach of the duty of prudence, exclusive purpose and prohibited transactions
under ERISA. There, the plan was an employee stock bonus plan and an employee stock
ownership plan, the terms of which mandated that a defined minimum percentage of each plan
participant’s portfolio had to be invested in the employer stock. The plan originally allowed
participants to sell up to 40% of the employer stock in their individual accounts each year so long
as the participant remained an employee. Id. at 1093-94.
365
271 F. Supp.2d 1328 (N.D. Okla. 2003).
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plans, along with the board of directors and the Benefits and Investment
Committee for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA. Plaintiffs alleged that the
fiduciaries breached their duties by failing to disclose that the company was
operating below company sponsored expectations; that is was impossible for the
company to meet its financial goals without substantially revising estimates to
include massive cap-ex spending reductions, information which suggested that
investment in the company stock was imprudent. The plan at issue was an eligible
individual account plan, 366 under which each participant in the plan has an
individual account and his or her plan benefit was based solely on the value of
that account, i.e., contribution to the account plus any earnings and less any losses
or allocated expenses. 367 The plan was also an employee pension benefit plan, 368
which had both an employee and employer contribution feature, permitting but
not requiring employees to invest a portion of their salary in a variety of options,
including company stock. Eligible individual account plans are expressly
exempted from ERISA’s diversification requirements, which would otherwise
limit the holding of company stock. 369 The plan declared that it was a qualified
employee stock ownership plan designed to invest primarily in qualifying
employer securities and explicitly included the company’s common stock as an

366

29 U.S.C. § 1002(34).
Id.
368
29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A).
369
29 U.S.C. §1104(a)(2).
367
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investment option. 370 Employee participants had responsibility for deciding how
their contributions would be invested. 371 The plan promoted employee ownership
through the company’s voluntary match, which was invested solely in the
company’s common stock, 372 and provided that participants could diversify out
of their match and BESOP accounts when their employment was terminated or
upon reaching a designated age--initially 55, then lowered to 50. 373
The defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds, among other things, that
they had no duty to disclose material non-public financial information and, in any
event, any such disclosure would have constituted a violation of federal securities
laws; that they had no duty to eliminate company stock as an investment option
and, even if they did, Section 404(c) of ERISA insulates them from liability, that
section exempting the plan from the diversification requirement; and they had no
duty to avoid any alleged conflict of interest.

The court rejected all three

arguments, although it did not give separate reasons for each defense, finding that
“parsing of the alleged actions by the Committee defendants [would not be] useful

370

271 F. Supp.2d at 1328.
Id. at 1332.
372
Id. at 1333.
373
Id. at 1334. The court found that the Benefits Committee given the power under the plan to
appoint members of the Administrative Committee or Investment Committee and to delete or
establish an Investment Fund was a fiduciary for purposes of ERISA liability as well as the
Investment Committee, charged with recommending investment managers who would actually
invest the contributions of each fund and for monitoring the performance of the investment funds
and investment managers and for implementing any investment objectives or guidelines
established by the Benefits Committee, but not the company, nor the board merely by virtue of
their power to appoint members of the Benefits Committee, where they otherwise did not control
investment decisions or communicate Plan information. Id. at 1338, 1339, 1342.
371
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at this stage of the litigation.” 374 The court found that the fundamental question
was “whether the allegations in the Complaint, accepted as true, make out a claim
for a breach of fiduciary duty,” and ruled that they did. 375 The court specifically
found that under the plan, the Investment Committee had the discretion to
recommend investment options to the Benefits Committee and the Benefits
Committee had the discretion to delete or establish an Investment Fund. In that
the plan did not require that company stock be offered as an investment option,
any plan fiduciary had a duty to decide or present its views on the wisdom of
investment options and it would have been a breach of that duty to fail to address
the need to eliminate, or at least to consider eliminating, company stock as one of
the investment alternatives. 376 In the court’s view, the duty to disclose, duty to
eliminate inappropriate investment options, and the duty to avoid a conflict of
interest were in effect different aspects of a single fiduciary duty. 377 Indeed, the
court found that had the Investment Committee recommended removing company
stock from the list of available investment options, based upon its alleged
knowledge that company stock was wrongfully inflated, the damage alleged
would not have occurred. 378 The court otherwise did not address the insider
trading prohibition asserted by the defendants, leaving it unclear whether the
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Id. at 1343.
Id. at 1343.
376
Id. at 1343. The cited In re Worldcom, Inc,. ERISA Lit., 263 F. Supp. 2d 745 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
377
Id. at 1343.
378
Id. at 1342.
375
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fiduciary, after having considered the prudence of company stock as an
investment, would have had to disclose publicly the basis of this conclusion so
that plan participants could divest.
In In re CMS Energy ERISA Litigation, 379 plaintiffs, plan participants sued
the employers and certain directors and officers of the companies, alleging, inter
alia, breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA in failing to prudently and loyally
manage plan assets; failing to provide complete and accurate information to
participants and beneficiaries; failing to monitor the plan’s fiduciaries; and
causing the plan to engage in a prohibited transaction by acquiring CMS stock for
the plan for more than adequate consideration. 380

The retirement plan was

established and sponsored by CMS Energy Corporation, Consumers Energy
Company and CMS Marketing Services and Trading Company. The plan had two
components, both allowing for investment in CMS stock. One part was a 401(k)
Savings Plan allowing for employees’ direction of contributions into an
investment of their choosing, from ten investment options, including Fund CS,
which consisted primarily of CMS stock. 381 The other plan was an Employee
Stock Ownership Plan, where matching contributions up to 3% of an employee’s
379

312 F. Supp.2d 898 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
Id. at 903.
381
Id. at 902. Prior to January 1, 2001, participating employees could contribute up to 16% of
their pay to the plan; thereafter, they were permitted to contribute up to 25% of their pay. Id. at
902. Under the 401(k) plan, participants decided how to allocate their account assets among the
investment options offered to them. According to the plan terms, the matching contributions made
by participants’ employers, as well as incentive contributions, were made primarily in the form of
CMS stock and allocated to Fund CE, which consisted of CMS Energy Corporation common stock
and temporary investments. Id. at 902.
380
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salary were directed into the participating employee’s ESOP account.

Also,

incentive contributions were sometimes contributed to employees’ ESOP
accounts. 382
Plaintiffs alleged that CMS engaged in “round trip” electricity trades,
where purchases and sales of electricity happened simultaneously, with the same
parties and at the same price, that these trades, while having no effect on net
earnings of CMS, indicated an increased buying and selling volume, by including
$4.4 billion of revenues and expenses, but which had no economic substance, and
violated generally accepted accounting practices, rendering the financial
statements materially false. Plaintiff alleged that the CMS stock dropped after
CMS stopped making round trip trades and an investigation of the practice
became public. 383
382

Id. at 902
Id. at 902-03. The first question for the court on defendants’ motion to dismiss was who was a
plan fiduciary within the meaning of ERISA. The individual defendants argued that they were not
specifically mentioned in the plan and could not therefore be deemed a fiduciary simply by virtue
of their positions as officers and directors of CMS. Also, the absent any discretionary authority or
control exercised by them, their status as directors and officers did not make theme fiduciaries.
The court first looked to the terms of the plan itself, which provided that the “Employer shall be
responsible for the general administration of the plan and for carrying out the provisions thereof.
They may establish rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of the Plan, … The Board of
Directors of Consumers shall appoint such persons, who may be Members under the Plan, as it
determines at any time to act as Plan Administrators in all dealings under the plan. The
Employers are hereby designated as the Named Fiduciaries and Plan sponsors for the plan.” Id. at
906-07. The court concluded that ERISA did not require an individual to be named in a plan to be
fiduciary, which meant that individual directors and officers of the named plan fiduciary, the
Employers, could be held to be fiduciaries. Here, the broad language in the plan arguably implied
that any investment policy would be made by the Employers, where the plan did not otherwise
delegate investment policy or decisionmaking power to any other managers, although the Board of
Consumers could choose a plan administrator and the Employers could choose an investment
manager, but instead reserved the broadest administrative and management responsibility to the
Employers. The court was not inclined to dismiss the complaint against the individual defendants
383

117

Defendants argued, inter alia, that they did not breach their duties to
prudently and loyally manage plan assets, where the assets were invested exactly
as required by explicit plan terms. However, the court pointed out, where as here,
the plan contributions made by the employers were made in a fund that consisted
primarily, not exclusively, of company stock, that left the plan administrator,
inside directors and employer named fiduciaries with significant discretion to
manage the plan assets.

This meant the fiduciaries had a duty to exercise

judgment in investing in company stock. In any event, the court ruled, even if the
plan contained absolute requirements, defendants were still obligated under
ERISA 384 to ignore the plan, to the extent such term required them to act
imprudently. 385 Ordinarily, a fiduciary is entitled to a presumption that she acted
consistently with ERISA when she invests assets in employer stock in accordance
absent specific findings on what responsibilities were actually assumed by them. Id. at 908-09.
Defendants argued that was no ERISA fiduciary duty to advise plan participants concerning
whether investment in company stock was a sound decision or any duty to refuse the selection of a
fund by an employee because ????????? The defendants argued that the conduct at issue
involving business decisions, which might lead to a securities claim do not automatically
constitute a breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA. Id. 911. The defendant cite to Hamilton v.
Carell-, 243 F.3d 992, 998 (6th Cir. 2001) for the proposition that corporate business decisions do
not generally implicate fiduciary duties, and only actions taken in administrating or managing plan
assets, rather that establishment of a plan, are subject to fiduciary standards, citing Akers, 71 F.3d
at 230. Plaintiffs countered with the argument that alleged failures here, i.e., to offer CMS stock
to plan participants, match with CMS stock, and withhold critical information about CMS stock
from participants, during the period of sham trading and securities fraud were not “business
decisions” protected by the “two hats” rule, but were discretionary acts squarely within the
defendants’ fiduciary responsibilities. The court did not straightforwardly respond to defendants’
argument, but rejected them, pointing out that “ERISA did not require that the fiduciary with two
hats wear only one at a time and wear the fiduciary hat when making fiduciary decision.” Id. at
911. The court noted further, while defendants may be fiduciaries regarding certain actions, but
not others, the plaintiffs had pleaded sufficient facts to put defendants on notice of the claims
against them. But on notice of what? What conduct specifically was actionable?
384
29 U.S.C. § 1104(1)(1)(D).
385
312 F. Supp. 2d at 913.
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with Plan documents. But that presumption can be overcome by a showing that a
prudent fiduciary would have made a different investment decision. 386
The decision seemed to lump Defendants’ remaining arguments into one:
that with the ESOP’s, Congress sought to encourage employee investment in the
company, such that such investments were not improper; that they could not be
liable because the plan gave participants a variety of investment fund choices for
the Savings Plan; and that they could not have obtained inside information about
CMS’ financial dealings and lawfully used such information to benefit plan
participants, that such use would have constituted “tipping” as proscribed by the
Securities laws. 387

The court noted the exemption from the diversification

requirement under ERISA as to ESOP’s, but noted that only a portion of the plan
here fell within the exemption, and even as to that portion, a fiduciary is still
obligated to diversify if not diversifying would be imprudent. 388 As to the
argument that defendants could not be liable for following the directions of the
386

Id. at *39, citing Kuper v. Iovenko, 66 F. 3d at 1459. The court accepted defendants argument
that there could be no breach of fiduciary duty for failure to amend the plan, but ruled that
advising plan participants about the wisdom of company stock as an investment was not a de facto
plan amendment. Instead, plaintiffs’ claims were that the plan administrator exercised authority
and control over plan assets by advising the committees with regard to performance of the plan’s
investment and investment managers, selecting plan investment options and ensuring that plan
assets were prudently managed and protected. Furthermore, the plan reserved broad management
and administrative powers for the Employers, who chose and directed the trustee under the plan
and made incentive and matching contributions to the plan in the form of company stock and/or
under the terms of both plans, cash or temporary investments. Such discretion created the
potential for fiduciary liability. Id. at 914, citing Kuper, 66 F.3d at 1459.
387
Id. at 914. The defendants relied on Hull v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22343, *26 (D.S.C. Feb. 9, 2001) which held that a fiduciary does not breach an ERISA
fiduciary duty by failing to disclose to plan participants material non-public information, which
would violate the insider trading laws.
388
Id. at 914-15.
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plan, the court pointed out that plaintiffs’ claim was not that defendants failed to
give investment advice, but that they failed to take action through other measures
short of amending the plan in order to protect plan assets.389
On the insider trading issue, the court found the case relied on by
defendants, Hull, as not on point. Instead, the court relied on an opinion by a
court in its jurisdiction, Rankin v. Rots, 390 which quoted extensively from the
Worldcom, 391 case that “[t]hose who are ERISA fiduciaries…cannot in violation
of their fiduciary obligations disseminate false information to plan participants,
including false information contained in SEC filings…. []n any event, the
existence of duties under one federal statute does not, absent express
congressional intent to the contrary, preclude the imposition of overlapping duties
under another federal statutory regime.” 392 The court adopted the thinking of the
court in Rankin, finding that the securities law does not bar any portion of
plaintiffs’ claims. Again this court does not explain why. 393

389

Id. at 915.
278 F. Supp. 2d 853 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
391
Quayle v. MCI Worldcom, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17450.
392
312 F.Supp. 2d at 915, quoting Worldcom, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17450, 2003 WL 21385870,
at *14-15.
393
Id. at 915. Defendants argument addressed plaintiffs’ allegation that defendants breached
fiduciary duties by conveying misleading information about the soundness of CMS stock and the
prudence of investing in that security, through the “SEC and other filings….in the Summary Plan
Description, and by directing participants to review the reports in order to educate themselves
regarding the risks and benefits of investing in CMS stock in the plan.” Defendants argued that
plaintiffs do not allege fact sufficient to state a cause of action because under the “two hats” rule
communication of business information through SEC filings does not implicate a fiduciary duty,
because in making such a communication, defendants were specifically satisfying a securities law
requirement. In a related cause, the plaintiffs alleged that defendants breached their fiduciary
duty to plan participants by failing to disclose information about CMS stock. Defendants argued
390
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In In re Electronics Data Systems Corp. “ERISA” Litigation, 394 plan
participants brought suit under ERISA, naming the company and certain officers,
including the former chief executive officer, the benefit administration committee,
and the investment committee, as defendants alleging breach of fiduciary duty by
not disclosing the great risks associated with some of the company’s “megadeals”, i.e., multi-year information technology outsourcing contracts negotiated
for over $250 million each. 395 The risks affected plaintiffs interest in the EDS

that they did not have a duty to disclose inside information they might have learned about CMS
which might have impacted CMS stock values, particularly where the plan itself precludes the
named fiduciaries’ representatives from making recommendations as to the investment options
given by the plan. Moreover, defendants argued, plan participants had the same right and access
to public corporate financial information as any other shareholders of CMS stock; that any claim
regarding the non-disclosure by the company of the roundtrip trading was properly litigated in the
pending securities class action.While the court agreed that defendants did not have a duty to
provide investment advice, the plaintiffs’ allegations were broader, that they concerned the
fiduciaries surrounding disclosure; that the defendants could not mislead or fail to disclose
information that they knew or should have known would be needed by participants to prevent
losses. Id. 915-16. The court also rejected the defendants’ argument that it had no duty to
monitor. Plaintiffs alleged that “the Employer Named Fiduciaries and Insider Director Defendants
breached their fiduciary duties by failing to adequately monitor the Plan Committee, the Plan
Adminstrators and other persons, if any, to whom management of Plan Assets were delegated; that
the defendants knew or should have known that the other fiduciaries were imprudently allowing
the plan to continue offering company stock as an investment option and investing plan assets in
company stock when it no longer was prudent to do so, yet failed to take action to protect the
participants for the consequences of other fiduciaries’ failure.” Id. at 916-17. The court rejected
defendants’ argument noting that the administrative and management responsibilities reserved to
the Employers were very broad, that plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged a breach of the duty to
monitor. Id. at 916-17. The court went on to reject the defendants’ motion to dismiss the claim
alleging a breach of duty by a co-fiduciary, since the court rejected the motion to dismiss on
primary liability which is a requirement for establishing co-fiduciary liability. Id. at 917. The
court granted the motion to dismiss the claim that the plan purchased CMS stock for more than
adequate consideration, where the defendants knew the price of the stock was artificially inflated
by fraud. ERISA defines adequate consideration as “the price of the security prevailing on a
national securities exchange.” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(18) and this definition precludes any
consideration of an alternative definition under certain circumstances, where defendants are aware
of fraud affecting the selling price, as plaintiffs argued.
394
305 F. Supp. 2d 658 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
395
Id. at 661. While the company boasted of the value of these “mega-deals” on the company’s
revenues, it was not disclosed that the deals were subject to substantial risks from benchmarking
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401(k) retirement plan. The plan was an eligible individual account plan under
ERISA which allowed EDS employees to contribute up to 20 percent of their
income into one or more various investment options.

One of the offered

investment options was the EDS Stock Fund, which invested up to 99% of its
assets in EDS stock. Also, whenever, EDS made matching contributions on
employee investments, those matching contributions were invested in the EDS
Stock Fund. 396 The harm for which plaintiffs sought recovery included the loss in
value by over 50% of EDS stock upon announcement by the company that it
would not reach its expected earnings per share by some 70%.

Upon the

announcement, the EDS stock price plummeted by over 50%, wiping out some $8
billion in market value, including significant plan value for shares held by plan
participants and beneficiaries in the EDS stock fund. 397
Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants breached their fiduciary duties under
ERISA by continuing to invest plan funds in EDS stock despite knowledge that
the stock was an inherently risky investment; by failing to prudently manage plan
investments; by continuing to invest plan assets in high risk EDS stock; by
misleading plaintiffs by false and misleading Summary Plan Descriptions to plan
and milestone contract provisions, which if triggered, negatively affected EDS. Also the “megadeals” contracts included early termination provisions that allowed clients to leverage renegotiated
terms magnified problems associated with increased costs or pricing reductions. And, some of
EDS’s exceptionally large government contracts required large up-front capital investments that
reduced EDS’ liquidity. Finally, EDS’ exposure to high risk industries, e.g., airlines industry,
allegedly made the company’s investment in the mega deals a risk. Id. at 662.
396
Id. at 662. Plaintiffs alleged that the EDS Stock Fund represented over 20.8 % of total plan
assets on December 31, 2000.
397
Id. at 662-63.
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participants; by failing to disclose inherent risks in EDS information technology
contracts and in its association with the airlines industry. 398
Among other things, defendants also argued that they could not be held
liable because of an “ESOP presumption” that bars plaintiffs claims.

That

presumption holds that it is presumed prudent to invest an ESOP in employer
stock. 399

That is, “an ESOP Trustee is entitled to a presumption that it acted

consistently with ERISA in investing plan assets in the employer’s securities
unless a showing was made that circumstances have arisen that would make such
an investment defeat or impair the original purpose of the trust.” 400 The court
explained, although, courts generally refuse to consider presumptions at the
pleading stage, defendants relied heavily on a district court opinion holding that
plaintiffs must affirmatively plead facts sufficient to overcome the ESOP
presumption. 401 The court refused to rely on that case, and ruled that generally
courts should not apply evidentiary standards at the motion to dismiss stage of the
398

Id. at 663.
Id. at 668, citing Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 568-72 (3d Cir. 1995).
400
Id. at 668, citing Enron, 284 F. Supp.2d at 534 n.3.
401
Id. at 668, citing Lalonde v. Textron, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 2d 272, 280 (D.R.I. 2003), rev’d in
part, aff’d in part 369 F. 3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004). In Lalonde, the defendant Textron had established
an ESOP plan for the plaintiff employees’ benefit. Under the plan, the trustee automatically
invested 50% of employee contributions and 100%of employer matching contributions into
Textron stock. Id. at 276. Plaintiffs alleged that the trustee violated its fiduciary duties by
investing in Textron stock when volatile conditions caused the stock to lose 43% of its value over
one year. The court noted that ESOP fiduciaries are in a “unique station of having to facilitate the
ESOP goal of employee ownership, while at the same time being bound by ERISA’s rigorous
fiduciary obligations.” Id. at 278. Thus, the court adopted the “reasoning of the Third and Sixth
Circuits that an ESOP fiduciary is entitled to a presumption that its decision to remain invested in
employer securities was reasonable.” But, without citation or explanation, the Lalonde court
declared that plaintiffs must plead facts sufficient to overcome the evidentiary presumption or
have the case dismissed on a 12(b)(6) motion. Id. On appeal-----------------------------------399
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pleadings, because doing so conflicts with the concept of notice pleading under
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 402
On defendant’s motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiffs’ allegations
that defendants failed to provide complete and accurate information to plan
participants and beneficiaries, the court again ruled against the motion. Plaintiffs
alleged that the duty of loyalty owed by fiduciaries required that they speak
truthfully to participants, not to mislead them regarding the plan or plan assets,
and to disclose information that participants need in order to exercise their rights
and interests under the plan. In other words, plaintiffs alleged that defendants, as
fiduciaries, offered their beneficiaries an investment which they knew to be
unsound and concealed any information that would have allowed the beneficiaries
to discover that the investment was unsound. The court rejected defendants’
assertion that that count of the complaint was a fraud claim which was required to
be pleaded with particularity under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the court finding that the heightened pleading requirements do not
apply in a breach of fiduciary duty claim.
Defendants also argued that they had no duty to communicate with plan
beneficiaries because the plan allocated the duty to communicate to BAC.

402

The theory behind Rule 8 is that all that is required is a short, plain statement of the claim that
only needs to give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim if and the grounds upon
which it rests, and that a plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case before discovery. To require
plaintiffs to plead more would conflict with Rule 8(a) and lead to windy complaints, covering
matters which may prove to be irrelevant upon discovery. Id. at 669.
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Against the defendants’ arguments, the court considered plaintiffs allegations that
defendants were de facto fiduciaries who “were all responsible for the selection
and monitoring of the plan’s investment options; the plan did not effectively
allocate fiduciary duties; and the plan required all fiduciaries to “furnish all
information needed for the proper performance of such Fiduciary duties.” Taken
the allegations as true, the court could not find that plaintiffs could not prove any
set facts consistent with the allegations that would establish a duty to
communicate with plan beneficiaries. 403
Defendants further argued that even if they had a duty to communicate
with plan beneficiaries, they could not perform that duty without violating the
insider trading laws. Defendants claimed that they acquired information about
EDS’ allegedly poor financial situation in their corporate capacity, and that the
information was not publicly available; that if they were to reveal the non-public
information to the plan beneficiaries they would violate federal insider trading
laws. The court agreed that ERISA does not require Defendants to violate federal
insider trading laws by imposing a so-called “duty to tip,” it ruled that at the same
time Defendants could not use the securities law to shield themselves from their
fiduciary duty to protect plan beneficiaries. The court adopted the analysis of the
Enron, case on this issue: “as a matter of public policy, the statutes should be
interpreted to require that persons follow the laws, not undermine them. They
403

Id. at 672.
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should be construed not to cancel out the disclosure obligations under both statues
or to mandate concealment which would only serve to make the harm more
widespread; the statutes should be construed to require, as they do, disclosure by
Enron officials and plan fiduciaries of Enron’s concealed, material financial status
to the investigating public generally, including plan participants, whether
‘impractical’ or not because continued silence and deceit would only encourage
the alleged fraud and increase the extent of injury.” 404
In Xcel Energy, Inc. Securities & “ERISA” Litigation, 405 plaintiffs, plan
participants, alleged that certain ERISA fiduciaries, including the chairman of the
board, president, CEO, directors and members of the finance committee, and the
chief financial officer and chief accounting officer, breached their duty by the
failure to disclose certain information and failed to act prudently in managing plan
assets.

The plans at issue were a 401(k) plans and an ESOP, both defined

contribution plans providing for individual accounts and eligible individual

404

Enron, 284 F. Supp. 2d 565. Finally, in a related cause of action, plaintiffs alleged a breach of
the duty of loyalty to plan beneficiaries, when with knowledge of the questionable value of EDS
stock as an investment, the plan fiduciaries continued to offer it, because it had a conflict of
interest as corporate officers with an incentive to conceal unknown information about EDS’ stock
value, and failed to hire independent advisors, and by failing to take any other steps necessary to
eliminate the inherent conflict of interest.The court rejected defendants’ motion to dismiss on the
ground that that count of the complaint cannot state a claim because ERISA permits fiduciaries to
be paid under incentive-based compensation schemes, even though the complaint does not
mention the former CEO’s incentive-based compensation. 305 F.Supp.2d 658, 674 (E.D. Tex.
2004).
405
312 F.Supp. 2d 1165 (D.Minn. 2004).
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account plans. 406 The 401(k) plan identified three plan fiduciaries: the company,
an appointed committee and the plan trustee. The ESOP plan identified two
fiduciaries: the company and the trustee. The plans identified the company as plan
administratrors. 407
Plaintiffs alleged that defendants knew of the significant risks posed to
Xcel stock value as a result as a result of certain cross-default provisions and
round trip trading (buying energy and selling it back at the same price, thereby
inflating sales revenue), yet failed to advise plan participants of these risks or
otherwise take action such as diversification to protect plan assets. When the
cross-default provisions became public, the stock price of Xcel dropped.
Plaintiffs alleged that defendants knew or should have known of various risks to
plan participants who were investing in Xcel stock through the plans; that as plan
fiduciaries, defendants were obligated to invest plan funds prudently and with
only the interests of plan participants in mind, diversify plan investment, monitor

406

As defined contribution plans, the plans provided an individual account for each plan
participant based on that participant’s contributions and company matching contributions. 29
U.S.C. § 1002(34) and 1107 (d)(3). Each of the plans included an ESOP component and a nonESOP component. An ESOP was designed to invest primarily in qualifying employer securities.
29 U.S.C. 1107 (d)(6). The non-ESOP components allowed participants to contribute a portion of
their pay to various investment funds, including an Xcel stock fund, on a pre-tax basis to provide
for retirement. Participants chose the fund or funds in which their contributions were to be
invested. Each plan called for the company to make matching contributions. Company
contributions to the ESOP’s were made in Xcel stock or cash to be invested in Xcel stock.
Contributions to the non-ESOP component were either made in cash or company stock, if the
employee had chosen that particular investment. Id. at *1173.
407
Id. at *1173.
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individuals assigned fiduciary duties, investigate matters posing significant risk to
the plans, and disclose material information to plan participants. 408
Defendants moved to dismiss on the ground among other things that the
complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. First,
defendants argued that they were not plan fiduciaries liable under ERISA. While
the complaint did not specify which particular duty was breached by a particular
defendant, the court thought in light of the theory of notice pleading under Rule 8
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, dismissed at this stage of the litigation
was not warranted. It was sufficient that plaintiffs alleged that defendants were
either named fiduciaries or functional fiduciaries. 409
Defendants also argued that they were entitled to a presumption of
prudence since the plan was an ESOP, such that plaintiff was required to plead a
rebuttal to the presumption. But the court rule that presumptions are evidentiary
standards that should not be applied to motions to dismiss. 410 In any event, to
overcome the presumption, plaintiff was only required to plead that continued
investment in company stock constituted an abuse of discretion in light of the
circumstances. 411

412

408

Id. at 1165.
Id. at 1178-79.
410
Id. at *1180, citing Swierkierwicz, 534 U.S. at 510-14.
411
Id. at *1180, citing In re McKesson, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19473. The individual defendants
also argued that they were not acting as fiduciaries, that the company was the designated fiduciary,
that individuals on committees with fiduciary responsibility such as the finance committee were
not acting in an individual capacity and that the finance committee was responsible only for
oversight. Taking the allegations in the complaint as true, the court thought it premature to
409
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However, the court agreed with defendants that plan elements, and design
that ESOP funds be invested in company stock, that participants be restricted
from trading in the ESOP until the age of 55 and that company stock be offered as
an option in the non-ESOP portion of the plan are plan design decisions that are
not subject to ERISA’s fiduciary standards.413 But plaintiffs did not argue that
the plan design violated ERISA, but that defendant had an affirmative duty to
disclose after they became aware of material adverse information about the true
value of the stock. Defendants also argued that to have revealed the adverse
information to plaintiff’s apart from the market or to have selectively acted upon
that information to the plan’s benefit could have constituted insider trading.
On this argument, the court joined those courts holding ERISA plan
fiduciaries cannot use the securities laws to shield themselves from potential
liability for alleged breaches of their statutory duties. 414

determine defendants fiduciary status at the motion to dismiss stage of the proceedings because
such a determination is a mix question of law and fact and because “fiduciary status under ERISA
is to be construed liberally, consistent with ERISA’s policies and objectives.” Id. at *1181.
412
413

Id. at *1181.
Id at 1181-82, citing In re Elec. Data Sys., 305 F. Supp.2d 658, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2631;
In re Enron, 284 F.Supp.2d 511, 565. The court quoted from Enron that the “statute should be
interpreted to require that persons follow laws, not undermine them. They should be construed not
to cancel out the disclosure obligation under both statutes or to mandate concealment, which
would only serve to make the harem more widespread, the statutes should be construed to require,
as they do, disclosure by [company] officials and plan fiduciaries of [the company’s] concealed,
material financial status to the investing public generally, including plan participants, whether
‘impractical’ or not….” Id. at *1182, quoting In re Enron, 284 F. Supp.2d at 565-66.
414
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VII. Resolution of the Conflict
The conflict is this. Some courts rule that a plan fiduciary has no duty to
disclose to plan participants facts of financial misconduct or other transactions
which might influence the decision of the plan participant to dispose of company
stock, if to do so would violate the securities laws. Other courts impose liability
upon plan fiduciaries for failing to make the same disclosure to plan participants,
but also impose a duty upon the fiduciary not to violate insider trading laws.
How can these cases be harmonized? How can the affirmative duties
imposed by ERISA on a plan fiduciary be reconciled with the prohibition on
insider trading under the securities laws? Should the plan fiduciary who is a
corporate insider be required or permitted to make discrete disclosures to plan
participants of information having a negative impact on the value of company
stock as an investment, allowing divestment of that stock?

Here are some

relevant considerations.
The prohibition on insider trading is not absolute. Instead, it binds only
those who have a duty--either to those with whom the possessor of the
information is trading or the corporation whose shares are being traded or to the
source of the information.

Thus, one who obtains information through

independent research, fortuitously, and even by theft is free to trade to the
disadvantage of the other party. With this is the reflection of the idea that the
securities laws cannot and should not strive to equalize all risks in the market;
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there are some informational disadvantages that are unavoidable. But how is the
plight of the employee-shareholder similar to the fortuitous possessor of
information?

It seems that there are not.

Instead, they seem in no different

position than the insider in O’Hagan, who obtained and traded on information in
breach of a duty owed to the source of the information. Here, the plan participant
would be trading on information received from one, a plan fiduciary/insider in
breach of a duty owed to the source. But, is the case different if the corporation
discloses the information to the plan fiduciary without restrictions on what could
be done with the information?

Using it by the tippee, then would not be

actionable, because the disclosure would not have been wrongful. Would the
corporation have a duty to make public disclosures? Regulation FD may yet
require it.
Chiarella held that not all instances of unfairness amount to fraud. While
giving the plan participants the advantage of the bad news to enable divestment,
passing on the projected losses to the purchasers, it cannot be argued that this
unfairness does not amount to fraud if what the insider in O’Hagan did was
fraudulent.
The rulings from the courts supposedly requiring disclosure to both
participants and to the public are not satisfying; they leave millions of innocent
employee-investors subject to harm and may impose onerous disclosure duties on
corporations, that far exceed that now required by the Securities Acts. ERISA
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and the Securities Acts serve discrete aims: ERISA to encourage and safeguard
employee retirement plans, through stringent fiduciary duties requiring prudent
management; the Securities Acts to encourage periodic disclosure to ensure
informed investment decisions.
It seems helpful to consider the extent to which the plan participants had
actual control over the investment of plan assets. If they do not, then requiring a
plan fiduciary to disclose material non-public information will help avoid injury
to one who is as innocent as the person on the other side of the trade. It is
important to consider the extent to which the persons on the other side of the trade
assume a degree of risk in investing in stocks to start with, and whether research
could have produced the non-public information, or at least some red flags. The
securities laws should not aid those who knowingly engage in a crooked game.
Under the Dirks analysis, it is arguable that a disclosure to the plan
participants would be actionable where the ERISA fiduciary does not personally
benefit by the disclosure, but is only acting to protect plan beneficiaries. Yet, the
broad definition given to personal benefit by the Supreme Court including a
reputational advantage which might translate into a pecuniary benefit in the future
would suffice.

Does the ERISA fiduciary obtain such an advantage from

protecting the assets of the plan.? The court did not find such a benefit in Dirks,
who alerted clients to the massive fraud taking place in the corporation whose
shares were traded.
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Do the interests in protecting pension plan benefits outweigh the possible
harm to shareholders dealing without equal information in an anonymous market?
The Court has made clear that only uses of material non-public information which
is a breach of some fiduciary duty is actionable under Section 10(b). As said
above, the fortuitous acquirer or one who is given permission by the source of the
information may use it without regard to injury to the person trading on the other
side. So also information obtained through research and intuition may be used
without the requirement of disclosure, yet the same harm results to the person on
the other side of the trade without that information.
Congress could require that no plan fiduciary be an insider of the
corporation.

But this would only mean less information than is currently

available. The possible losses to pensioners might be reduced by stricter limits on
the extent that pension plans can be funded with company stock.

While not

permitting the corporate insider to make non-public disclosures to facilitate trades
by the employee-shareholders, courts could read the ERISA fiduciary duty to
require him or her to advise the employees that further investment in the company
would not be wise, but without stating why, if that would reveal non-public
corporate information, and to urge the company to match contributions in other
than company stock. This decision, not to fund pension plans with company
stock would not be a trade and therefore not prohibited by insider trading laws.
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But it would go a long way to reducing potentially devastating losses to the
pensioners.

According to Department of Labor regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1(b), these
requirements are satisfied if the fiduciary has given appropriate consideration to
those facts and circumstances that, given the scope of such fiduciary’s investment
duties, the fiduciary knows or should know are relevant to the particular
investment or investment course of action. Appropriate consideration includes
but is not limited to a determination that the particular investment or course of
action is reasonably designed, as part of the portfolio to further the purposes of
the plan, taking into consideration the risk of loss and the opportunity for gain,
and a

consideration of the composition of the portfolio with regard to

diversification, the liquidity and current return of the portfolio relative to
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anticipated cash flow requirements of the plan; and the projected return of the
portfolio relative to the funding objectives of the plan.
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